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I. Background: Growing Anxiety over Immigration 
Globalization increased the ease of which individuals can move from one place 
to another, significantly impacting migration patterns and the national economies of 
sending and receiving countries. While new technological advances drastically improved 
the flow of trade for goods and services, these developments also allowed for a more 
fluid interchange of people and their cultural foundations. Over the last twenty-five 
years, the relative volume and changing composition of new immigrants has intensified 
the public focus on immigration as a major domestic policy concern in many 
industrialized nations (e.g. Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; 
Joppke, 1999; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007).   Despite contextual 
differences in the experiences with immigration native-born citizens across developed 
countries have expressed fears that immigrants dilute nation-state sovereignty and 
control over borders (Castles and Miller, 1998; Luedtke, 2005), challenge national identity 
(Smith, 2001), and pose a substantial economic threat (Hanson et al, 2007; Lau et al, 
1997).   
Within many industrialized democracies, policies are formed when groups 
identify social problems and pressure policy makers into action (Manning, 1985; 
Kingdon, 1995; May et al 2001; Stone, 2002). These problems are defined in terms such 
as symbols, numbers, causes, interests, and decisions, which are subjective and framed 
ambiguously to maximize support (Stone, 2002).  The threat posed by inward migration 
has been constructed through each of these angles with the aim of triggering anxiety: that 
there are too many immigrants consuming too many public resources that they should 
never have had access to (Cohen, 2002; Citrin et al, 1997). Some researchers content that 
such frames help to cement support for restrictionist policies, in this case prohibiting 
access to social welfare provisions, by attributing blame to an ‘undeserving’ population; 
allowing policy makers to ignore the structural causes of poverty, historical factors, and 
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policy failures that perpetuate social exclusion (Gilens, 1999; Ryan, 1976; Sniderman and 
Carmines, 1997).  
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggest that political entrepreneurs that have an 
interest in maintaining a lean welfare state can undermine social movements that call for 
stronger welfare provisions by exploiting racial and ethnic divisions on the issues of costs 
and scarcity of resources to block the formation of a common identity based on class 
concerns. The authors provide several U.S. based historical examples to strengthen their 
claim, highlighting the defeat of the Populists in the late 19th Century and the role of elite 
segregationist senators from southern states who attempted to thwart the New Deal 
provisions during the Great Depression.   
Social rights, or access to the social safety net, embody one of the key principles 
of modern democratic governance: that citizens make personal financial sacrifices to 
ensure that all residents have access to basic necessities like food, education, housing and 
health care to bring all individuals in line with the standards of the society (Marshall, 
[1950] 1992). Yet, the perceived impact of immigration on social services has ignited a 
fierce debate and served as the impetus for a slew of policy initiatives aimed at 
prohibiting noncitizens from accessing public services in many democracies. In the wake 
of the Great Recession much of the political messaging related to the fiscal burden of 
immigration has been presented in tandem with, or as a distraction from large scale cuts 
to public services and government expenditures.  
These calls to reduce the welfare state come as public programs struggle to keep 
pace with the demands of the native born population (Abraham, 2014; Collett, 2011). 
The added burden of budget constraints allows for migrant groups, who lack full access 
to political rights, to be singled out for social exclusion without the ability to raise 
politically viable opposition. This combination of circumstances raises concerns that 
further policies that erode welfare provisions or exclude other populations that 
previously had access are more likely to be passed. However, within a democracy 
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whether and the extent to which immigration impacts policy outcomes will depend on 
the immigration attitudes of the native-born population. The aim of this doctoral 
research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public opinion about the 
foreign-born shapes preferences for punitive1 policies directed at migrants. This chapter 
introduces the setting of the research, highlights the current gaps in this area, and 
provides a historical overview of restrictionist2 policies linked to social welfare 
provisions.  
II. The Setting 
The number of foreign-born (both legal and unauthorized immigrants) living in 
the U.S. has doubled, from 20 million in 1990, to its current figure of nearly 45 million 
(United States Census Bureau, 2012; Lopez, Passel, and Rohal, 2015). The decision to 
immigrate to the U.S. is a complex and varied process with many factors, including labor 
market conditions, family reunification, and the perception of better opportunities 
(Massey, 1993). While there is an extensive body of literature that provides a rich field of 
theory aimed at explaining this phenomenon3, the purpose of this section is to provide 
an overview of the trends of both the number and background of the foreign born 
population residing within the U.S.   
                                                
1 The term punitive is regularly used (see Wilson, 2001; Ybarra, et al, 2011) in the political science literature 
to refer to policies that limit the numbers of immigrants in the country, restrict access to services, limit 
access to the country itself, and other areas that may create different outcomes for immigrant communities. 
Further, an analysis by Filindra, Blanding and Call (2011) shows the detrimental effects of restrictionist 
policies on the health, well-being, and overall outcomes of immigrant populations and the communities in 
which they reside. They argue that this equates to a type of punishment, and define these policies as 
punitive. The terms punitive, anti-immigrant, hostile, and restrictionist will be used interchangeably 
throughout this work. 
 
2 Daniel Tichenor (2002) defines a restrictionist policy as one that seeks to exclude immigrant populations 
from entry, access to public services, or private markets. The terms restrictionist, anti-immigrant, hostile, 
and punitive will be used interchangeably throughout this work. 
 
 
3 For more detailed explanations on the push and pull factors and cumulative causes that spark 
unauthorised migration to the U.S. see: Durand and Massey, 1992; Espenshade, 1995; Massey, 1990, 1993. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION 
The national origin for migrants has changed a great deal since the passage of the 
enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. This piece of federal 
legislation, which is commonly referred to as the Hart-Celler Act, eliminated the 
traditional immigration preference system that accepted specific numbers of new 
migrants based on national origin; the new law prioritized admittances based primarily on 
family reunification and attracting skilled labor to the United States. Prior to 1960, more 
than 80 percent of the foreign born living in the U.S. were from Canada or Europe. Data 
from the Pew Research Center (2016) revealed that the remaining share hailed from 
Mexico (6 percent), South and East Asia (3.8 percent), other Latin American countries 
(3.5 percent) and other areas (2.7 percent). Fifty years later the sending countries for the 
U.S. immigrant population had completely transformed with Canadian and European 
migrants making up 13.6 percent, Mexicans having the largest share at 27.7 percent, but 
with Asian immigrants rapidly settling to account for 26.4 percent of all immigrants. 
Migrants from other Latin Americans countries represent at 23.9 percent of the total 
foreign born, and 8.3 percent settled to the U.S. from in another region. 
Most migrants enter the U.S. legally, however, the proportion of unauthorized 
migrants has grown faster (61 percent) than the rest of the foreign born population (55 
percent). The vast majority of unauthorized immigrants living within the United States 
were either granted admission legally and have overstayed the visa, or have entered into 
the country without legal documents (Passel, 2006).  The number of unauthorized 
immigrant population living within the United States, roughly tripled from three million 
in 1980 to nearly 12 million at its peak in 2007 (Passel 2006; Passel and Cohn, 2011). 
This substantial growth began during the 1990s with 4.6 million arriving, and occurred in 








Table 1.1: Estimated Changes in Foreign Born Populations: 1990-2017 
 
This growth in migration is likely to be felt by citizens in ways that differ from 
other realms of policy and therefore this might set help explain why the issue of 
immigration has become more salient in recent years (Arajano and Hajnal, 2017). 
Evidence suggests that individuals residing in communities that have experienced upward 
migration over the last two decades are more likely to support local ordinances that seek 
to make life difficult e.g. obtaining a rental lease, enrolling in schools, sending 
remittances outside the U.S. (Hopkins, 2010).  
III. Framing the Message: Making Immigration a Priority Issue 
In recent years, the public discourse and policy debates on immigrants have 
mainly centered on unauthorized immigrants (Massey and Pren, 2012). Scholars have 
provided evidence suggesting that an immigrant’s legal status (or lack thereof) plays an 
 1990 2000 2010 2017 


















Percent of Foreign Born to Total Population 8.0% 11.0% 12.4% 13.7% 









Percent of Unauthorized Migrants to Total Population 1.4% 2.9% 3.6% 3.3% 
Percent of Unauthorized Migrants to Foreign Born 18.7% 27.1% 29.2% 24.1% 
Source:  Estimates provided for the unauthorized population were calculated by the Pew Hispanic Center (2006, 
2011, 2012, 2019). All figures are derived from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) from the US Census Bureau 1991, 2001, 2011, and 2017.   
 
Note: Individuals living in group quarters (e.g. university dorms, nursing homes, or prisons) are excluded from all counts.  
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important role in shaping Americans’ preferences for punitive policies (Brader et al, 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012). The size of the foreign-born population, their 
dispersion into new localities across the U.S., the changes in the ethnic composition of 
the country, and this shift in the ethnic balance are thought to contribute to the 
formation of anti-immigrant views (Hopkins, 2010).  
Immigration is hardly a new political concern within the U.S., but what is novel 
about this fresh wave of nativist sentiment is that elected officials, acting within all levels 
of government, are employing new tactics to address the perceived consequences of 
these demographic changes. Some politicians suggest that these new demographic shifts 
warrant re-examining the U.S. Constitution to prohibit birthright citizenship for the 
children of unauthorized migrants (Immigration Reform Law Institute, 2006) and 
implementing English-only ordinances in towns throughout the country (Preston, 2011) 
– they say these proposals directly reflect the will of their constituents.  Survey data 
depict a clear trend that views about immigrants over the last twenty years are hardening, 
tracking well with the growth in the foreign born population. For example, a Roper poll 
from 1990 revealed that 48 percent of U.S. citizens wanted to reduce the number of new 
immigrants admitted, while data from the 1996 wave of the General Social Survey found 
that 67 percent of citizens favored tighter restrictions (Simon & Alexander, 1993; Wilson, 
2001). A Washington Post poll from March 2013 illustrates natives’ concerns, with more 
than 80 percent of respondents supporting tougher border controls.  
More recently, those interested in the electoral success of candidates like Donald 
Trump in the U.S., Matteo Salvini in Italy, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Mariene La Pen in 
France, have started to examine long-term trends that link negative views about migrants 
to the high salience of immigration as a political issue. Certainly the rise of Donald 
Trump to the presidency, and the subsequent policies targeting immigrant – both legal 
and unauthorized populations – and large segments’ of the electorate’s ambivalence or 
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support of these shifts in policy – despite trends depicting a down-turn highlights the 
symbolic nature of immigration as a political issue (Gimpel, 2016; Citrin et al, 1997).  
 
POLICY BACKGROUND  
Analysis from several disciplines shows that restrictionist responses (hostile views 
and policy options) are a product of challenging circumstances, reflecting changes in 
economic and social conditions (Sniderman et al., 2004; Tichenor, 2002) as well as 
demographic change (Hopkins, 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).  Anti-immigration 
attitudes are strongly associated with national economic downturns (Lapinski et al., 
1997). Scholars have not reached a consensus about the 'true' impact of immigration on 
the social safety net, nor do they agree on the perceived economic threat. Yet, 
Americans’ knowledge of immigrant populations (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Wong, 2007) 
and the intracacies of the policies that regulate their numbers and access to the country 
and government funded programs  (Delli Carpini et al, 1996; Gilens, 2001; Zaller, 2004) 
remain remarkably low.  
 
Publi c  Charge Exclusion & the Deve lopment o f  the Wel fare State 
Although immigration represents a fundamental element of the founding of the 
United States, from the country’s inception policy makers have sought to control the 
public costs associated with immigration by implementing laws to limit entry to 
individuals deemed unable to maintain a household without additional support (e.g. 
parishes or local charities). These restrictions were and are still known as public charge 
exclusions, and early versions of these provisions pre-date the signing of the Declaration 
of Independence in 1776. For instance, the British colonies of Massachusetts and New 
York applied statutes as early as the 1640s that prohibited migrants who were thought to 
be “paupers or the infirm” from settling, unless it could be proven that the passenger 
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would not eventually become a burden on society (Baseler, 1998). By 1728 the colony of 
Pennsylvania established its own legislation, which excluded "any such infant, lunatick 
[sic], aged, maimed, impotent or vagrant person" from settlement (Bilder, 1996).  
The ratification of the U.S. Constitution shifted the responsibility of immigration 
policy from the states to the federal government.  The newly formed Congress 
formalized the process that would enable the foreign born to become citizens, however, 
the public charge laws implemented during the colonial era were left largely unchanged 
and continued to be enforced at the state level (Basler, 1998). Borrowing language from 
state laws, the Immigration Act of 1882 federalized the public charge exclusion, 
prohibiting the entry of any immigrant deemed “unable to take care of himself or herself 
without becoming a public charge” to the United States for settlement. As a 
consequence, any individual identified as a potential ward of the state would be returned 
to their country of origin at the ship-owner’s expense (Tichenor, 2002). The law also 
attempted to divert immigrant related expenses away from native taxpayers by 
establishing a ‘head tax’ for the new comers at the port of arrival. Within a decade 
Congress passed the 1891 Immigration Act to strengthen the public charge law so that 
individual who had not paid their own fare would be barred from entering the U.S. and 
immigrants that were deemed a public charge within a year of arrival would be deported. 
Tighter restrictions for immigrants emerged with the development of social 
welfare programs during the Progressive Era. Passage of the 1917 Immigration Act 
extended the public charge rule to allow the government to deport immigrants that 
became destitute within five years of their arrival.  By the 1930s new immigrants were 
required to demonstrate that they had sufficient funds to support themselves, were 
gainfully employed by a U.S. based business, or had secured an affidavit of support 
where one or more legal residents signs an official document pledging to sponsor and 
support the immigrant if the individual faced financial hardship (United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2013).i  Soon the affidavit of support became the 
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most common means of entry, however, a series of court decisions4 in during the 1950s 
held that the documents were not legally binding to the sponsor of the migrant because 
the laws for federal assistance failed to spell out residency restrictions for lawful 
immigrants (Wasem, 2012). Since the affidavit of support was generally unenforceable, it 
was rarely used to prevent legal immigrants from enrolling in public programs.   
The welfare system within the U.S. expanded during the 1960s, and many of the 
newly established programs were funded through required matched contributions from 
the states (Skocpol, 1991). Concerned about the potential burden on state coffers, many 
state officials implemented residency requirements for legal immigrants (unauthorized 
immigrants were prohibited) in the programs that received federal-state match funding 
(Tichenor, 2002). However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 1971 case Graham v. 
Richardson (403 U.S. 365) that such restrictions by the state were unconstitutional under 
the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. The federal government responded by 
updating the eligibility criteria to ensure that non-citizen applicants for Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, or 
food stamps were lawfully admitted for permanent residence or were otherwise 
“permanently residing in the United States under color of law”, also known as PRUCOL, 
a legal designation which enabled access to certain public benefits (Reischauer, 1995). By 
the early 1980s the perceived abuse of the welfare system brought about calls for new 
legislation to curb the enrollment of new permanent residents (Wasem, 2012). The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 required status verification of applicants 
and used the affidavit of support to ensure that a portion of their immigration sponsors’ 
income and resources would be included in the application to limit eligibility for food 
stamps, SSI, and AFDC for up to three years. 
                                                
4 Two key decisions that diluted the ability of program administrators to apply the affidavit of support as a 
condition for eligibility include Department of Mental Hygiene v. Renal, 6 N.Y. 2d 791 (1959) and State v. Binder, 
356 Mich. 73 (1959). 
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The Case for  Wel fare Reform & Restr i c t ing Immigrant Elig ibi l i ty  
 
By the mid-1990s calls to overhaul the nation’s welfare system were becoming 
more prominent and universal. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) established time limits on public benefit programs for all 
recipients, but the law also dramatically altered legal immigrants’ access to welfare 
provisions. Limiting access to social services is a policy position is often associated with 
fiscally conservative Republicans, however, political interest in curbing immigrants’ 
eligibility for social welfare provisions gained bipartisan support in the early-1990s (Fix 
and Passel, 2002; Tichenor, 2002).  
A decade earlier, much of the research investigating the public cost of immigrants 
showed that immigrants were less likely to be enrolled in public benefits programs than 
native born citizens (Blau, 1984; Borjas and Trejo, 1993; Tienda and Jensen, 1986). 
However, as the discussions for overhauling the social safety net became as a top policy 
priority, some researchers enhanced the case for restrictionist policies by suggesting that 
migrants were choosing to settle within the U.S. due to the availability of social programs 
(Borjas and Hilton 1996). Particular emphasis was placed on a specific statistic that 
immigrant households had surpassed native families’ rates of public assistance, it was 
argued the consequences of which increased the fiscal burden for native taxpayers and 
reduced the quality of the immigrant population (Borjas, 1999; Hanson, 2005). Although 
these findings on benefit usage were technically accurate, other scholars delved deeper, 
presenting a more nuanced picture of benefit usage among the foreign born and 
demonstrated that the political anxiety surrounding immigrant enrollment and 
corresponding fiscal burden was not possible given actual take up rates (Duleep and 




Table 1.2: Estimated Benefit Usage by Citizenship Categories 1995-2006 
 Native-born  Naturalized Citizens Noncitizens 
 1995 1998 2001 2006 1995 1998 2001 2006 1995 1998 2001 2006 
                              Estimated number of recipients (in millions) 
AFDC/ 
TANF 4.3 2.5 1.7 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 
SSI 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Medicaid 28.5 25.1 28.3 34.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.6 
Food 
Stamps 25.1 21.9 16.0 19.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Total 
Population 239.2 244.6 249.1 259.5 7.9 9.9 12.0 14.5 16.6 16.6 16.6 22.7 
                                     Percent of total recipients by citizenship category 
AFDC/ 
TANF 86.0 84.4 83.3 88.2 2.3 3.9 3.7 2.8 11.8 11.8 12.4 9.0 
SSI 86.2 85.5 86.6 85.3 3.9 6.5 8.1 8.6 9.9 7.8 5.3 6.0 
Medicaid 90.2 90.6 90.2 89.0 1.7 2.8 3.5 4.1 8.0 6.5 6.3 6.9 
Food 
Stamps 89.6 90.2 90.2 91.0 1.6 2.2 3.1 2.6 8.9 7.2 6.7 6.4 
                                       Percent of benefit usage within citizenship category 
AFDC/ 
TANF 2.3 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.3 3.9 2.3 1.4 0.7 
SSI 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.2 2.5 1.4 1.3 
Medicaid 11.9 10.2 11.4 13.1 6.9 8.0 9.1 10.8 15.3 10.9 9.7 11.6 
Food 
Stamps 10.5 7.6 6.4 7.7 5.6 4.5 4.6 3.9 14.9 8.9 5.8 6.2 
Source: CPS March Supplements – 1996, 1999, 2002, 2007 
Note: Non-citizen refers to a foreign-born immigrant that has not become a naturalized citizen. 
 
 
Table 1.2 compares the number and rate of participation within federally funded 
entitlement programs by citizenship status from 1995-2006. While immigrant 
households, who are on average poorer and less educated, were more likely to meet the 
income threshold for eligibility (Capps et al, 2004; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 2000), the 
actual number of noncitizens and naturalized citizens enrolled in public benefits 
programs during this period was substantially lower than native born citizens, thus the 
projections for savings were considered by many fiscal experts as short-sighted and 
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misleading. Despite the evidence and potential impact on minority groups, several high 
profile Democrats associated with minority rights including the Chairperson of the U.S. 
Immigration Reform Commission, Barbara Jordan, Housing and Urban Development 
Secretary, Henry Cisneros, and President Bill Clinton all spoke on the record of the need 
to reduce the number of low-skilled migrants and bar access to social welfare programs 
(Tichenor, 2002).  
Preliminary versions of the bill were drafted in the Democratically-controlled 
House of Representatives and key administrators of the Clinton Administration revealed 
that the President supported these efforts because the issue polled well and had the 
potential to attract centrist voters (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). Visible support from these 
prominent figures within the Democratic party established a bipartisan consensus that 
tougher immigration control were necessary, and later even stronger restrictions were 
outlined in policy blueprint The Contract With America (Gingrich et al, 1994), which was 
later credited with helping Republicans secure their Congressional victory in 1994. The 
bill was signed into law on August 22, 1996 by President Clinton who, despite his initial 
commitment to “ending welfare as we know it,” later expressed ambivalence about the 
bill’s tougher immigrant provisions (Tichenor, 2002). 
The restrictionist measures were framed as a necessary step to promote self-
sufficiency and to improve the ‘quality’ of the immigrants admitted by deterring 
individuals who were perceived to be a higher risk of becoming a public charge from 
settling within the U.S. (Fix and Passel, 2002). Officials also projected that the immigrant 
provisions from welfare reform would equate to nearly $40 billion in programmatic 
savings in the first six years (Congressional Budget Office 1996). Ultimately, the savings 
estimate never materialized, which was perhaps unsurprising as the share of foreign born 
 21 
enrolled in federal entitlements programs made up only 15 percent of the total case-load 
in 1996 (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal, 2009). 
An Overview of  The Immigrant Provis ions o f  Wel fare Reform 
 
Weeks after PRWORA was signed into law, Congress fortified the immigration 
eligibility provisions through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996. Together the two complementary bills expanded the use of 
sponsor-to-alien deeming requirements to reduce new immigrant participation in means-
tested programs. Immigrants were now to be sponsored by a U.S. citizen or legal 
permanent resident whose income exceeded 125 percent of the federal poverty threshold 
(Vialet, 1997). Additionally, the sponsors’ affidavit of support became a binding pledge 
to support the applicant until the immigrant completed 40 quarters of employment 
(roughly ten years of full-time employment) or became a naturalized citizen. The new law 
also stipulated that the Attorney General would need to collect “appropriate 
information” regarding affidavits of support in the Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) system. Although Congress did not explicitly state what 
information was necessary to store in the SAVE system, the law required the Attorney 
General to generate an automated record of the sponsors’ social security numbers 
(Wasem, 2012).  
Policy makers contended that these provisions were intended to assist program 
administrators in the enforcement of public charge exclusions (Vialet and Eig, 1998). In 
practice the new deeming rules established made it increasingly difficult for sponsored 
immigrants to meet the income threshold for eligibility, even if the individual fit within 
one of the noncitizen eligibility criteria; the sponsor (and the sponsor’s spouse) would 
also be liable for reimbursing federal, state, or local agency if services were used before 
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the 40 quarters (Fix and Zimmerman, 1999).  Advocacy organizations and some scholars 
argued that these new laws represented a ‘back door’ reform of legal immigration that 
sought to keep the poorest migrants from settling within the U.S. (Espenshade et al, 
1997). 
PRWORA also created a new classification system for immigrant eligibility, based 
on the immigrant’s arrival date, legal status, the state of settlement, and the length of time 
the immigrant had been present in their state of residence (Fix and Tumlin, 1997). Table 
1.3 outlines the changes in the criteria for immigrant eligibility before and after 
PRWORA. Before enactment, legal immigrants living within the U.S. could access social 
welfare programs much in the same way as a U.S. citizen. After enactment immigrants 
were sorted into two broad categories “qualified” and “unqualified” migrants. Qualified 
immigrants included refugees (admitted under the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980) and asylees, 
non-citizens who served on active duty in the armed services (and their dependents), or 
veterans who were honorably discharged from the military (Holcomb et al, 2003). The 
unqualified immigrant category included all other foreign-born residents without 
citizenship: unlawful immigrants, temporary residence (students, tourists, temporary 
foreign employees, etc.), and applicants for political asylum or refugee status.  
But the immigrant provisions of these two bills created a more complicated 
classification. Because the unqualified immigrant class was also defined by arrival date, 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and other legal immigrants who had arrived after 
August 22, 1996 were prohibited from receiving benefits for at least five years or until 
U.S. citizenship was attained (Health and Human Services, 1996). LPRs who work in 
jobs in which Social Security taxes are collected could potentially enroll after completing 
40 quarters of work if the applicant also met the other eligibility criteria (Center for 
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Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2004; Fremstad, 2002). In practice the policy change 
transferred ‘post-enactment’ legal immigrants into the same eligibility category as 
unlawful immigrants, which effectively downgraded the significance of their legal status 
(Fix and Passel, 2002). The new law also banned unqualified immigrants from federal 
health insurance programs, nutrition benefits, welfare and related work supports, and aid 
to the aged and disabled. These new measures represented an important policy shift that 




Table 1.3: Benefit Eligibility Criteria for Non-Citizens Before & After PRWORA 
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Source: Urban Institute 1997/ Congressional Research Service 2012 
Note: States had the option to provide supplemental nutrition through the Women, Infants and Children 
program (WIC) to unqualified immigrants. Some provisions have been amended to lift the bar on Food 
Stamps for Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) children, and allow LPR children to access some federal 
health care programmes before five years. Unauthorized immigrants may also be eligible for other health 
programs (e.g. immunizations or testing and treatment for communicable diseases). 
 
                                                
5  Nonimmigrants are those admitted temporarily for a limited purpose (e.g., students, visitors, or 
temporary workers). The PRUCOL doctrine permitted access to public means-tested programs for some 
immigrants with ambiguous status. Under this provision, introduced through the Health Care Financing 
Administration in 1990, undocumented immigrants are ineligible to receive aid because their lack of status 
is clearly defined. 
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Loosening Restr i c t ions To Reduce the Fiscal  Burden 
Access to health care poses a particular concern for most state and local 
governments; this is because this is often the second largest expenditure on the budget, 
only behind education (Fix and Passel, 2002). Upon entry, unauthorized immigrants to 
the U.S. are typically younger and healthier than the average the native born population 
(Goldman et al., 2006). Recent studies have shown that both legal and undocumented 
immigrants consume health care at significantly lower levels than the native born 
population (Goldman et al., 2006).  This is due in part because unauthorized immigrants 
are more likely to work in low-wage jobs that do not offer health insurance or other 
benefits, and thus disproportionately lack health coverage making it difficult to access a 
primary care physician (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003).  However, without coverage, 
an unauthorized immigrant may delay treatment until a condition becomes critical, 
and/or seek care in an urgent care facility at considerably higher costs (Carrasquillo et al, 
2000).   
The lack of coverage combined with the rising costs of treatment has made it 
more difficult for these individuals to pay for their own care.  This means that the costs 
for treatment are then passed on to local communities and the hospital districts, which 
are paid though local taxes. The uneven distribution of the costs triggers a great deal of 
anxiety for many state and local governments, particularly in areas with higher 
concentration of unauthorized immigrants because they will not receive state or federal 
funding to reduce the fiscal impact of uncompensated care (Fix and Passel, 2002).  After 
revisions were made to PROWRA the federal government granted states the ability to 
extending Medicaid benefits (the public health care program for individuals with very 
low-income) to specific unauthorized immigrant populations (e.g. children and pregnant 
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women) to absorb some of the financial challenges by providing access to primary care 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003).   
Certain policies were never incorporated into the welfare reform effort, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women Infants and Children (referred to as WIC) 
and child tax credits; specific unauthorized immigrants (e.g. pregnant women and 
children) who meet the income requirements were not prohibited from enrolling. A 
detailed analysis by the Urban Institute found that the largest growth in WIC 
participation between 1997 and 2006 was among native-born children with unauthorized 
immigrant parents. Participation among mixed status families jumped from 6.8 to 11.7 
percent of all recipients (Vericker, 2010). Although higher enrollment rates may increase 
costs for the program, research shows that food insecurity dramatically increases the 
costs for health care programs, schools, and other important budgetary items (Abrams, 
1993). These costs savings helped to make the case for states to take their own initiative 
to expand access to other programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality.  
V. Research Aims  
This doctoral research builds upon prior work examining the links between 
individuals’ views about immigrants and preferences for restrictionist policies, but makes 
several very important contributions to this realm of public opinion research. First, 
examines how U.S. citizens respond to real-world political communication regarding 
immigration related policies by presenting respondents with vignettes that mimic or (as 
in the case of Chapter IV, draw from the actual language used in these debates. Vignette 
survey experiments give respondents short and clear illustrations of hypothetical people 
or situations, but vary specific attributes at randomly. Researchers can then isolate the 
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effect of each attribute put forward by comparing the differences across groups 
(Atzmüeller and Steiner, 2010; Auspurg, 2015).  
 
AN OVERVIEW OF HOW ATTITUDES AND PREFERENCES ARE FORMED 
The three empirical papers each take a novel approach to directly test how 
Americans’ evaluate immigrant populations, draw upon existing attitudes towards these 
populations and form policy preferences related to these populations. A first step in 
achieving this objective is defining what is meant by attitudes and preferences. 
O’Keefe (1990:18) argues that an attitude is “a person’s general evaluation of an 
object (where ‘object’ is understood in a broad sense, as encompassing persons, events, 
products, policies, institutions, and so on).” Druckman and Lupia (2000) expand upon 
this definition of attitude to capture the multidimensionality of an individual’s evaluation 
of an object, citing public opinion towards a popular leader like Bill Clinton. They note 
that while many Americans express a closeness or a positive attitude towards the former 
President’s politics, their attitude towards his moral disposition is more complex, or in 
spatial terms, a bit farther away.  
Other scholars contend that an individual’s preference is based on their attitude 
of each attribute of an object under consideration (Fishbein 1963; Krosnick, 1988). Thus 
these two (and likely more) attributes of the object – Bill Clinton - interact and are 
weighted in an individual’s mind to generate a preference. Each attitude regarding a 
particular attribute is formed in part from prior beliefs (Zaller, 1992). These beliefs about 
an object’s attributes are dependent various bits of information which can come from an 
infinite number of sources and interact between an individual’s brain and body, and are 
often influenced by a particular environment. Individuals can adapt their beliefs, attitudes 
or preferences upon exposure to new information.  (Churchland and Sejnowski, 2016). 
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Within the realm of political science there is a shared assumption that preferences 
form through a memory-based process (Lodge et al, 1990). That is that individuals base 
their evaluations on all relevant information that they retrieve from their memory. Going 
back to the Bill Clinton example, when an individual gets new information about an 
accusation regarding the president’s extra-marital affair, it is filed away in their long-term 
memory. At another point in during the run for re-election, the voter may receive more 
information on issue positions. On Election Day, this voter will rely on their memories 
of information on the various attributes they associate with the incumbent and use what 
information is retrieved, make an evaluation on each attribute, weight each attribute and 
form their preferences in favor or against (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Enelow and Hinich 
1984).  
This memory model is well used among social scientists, but one major down-
side is that it assumes that individuals engage with political information, and reflect on 
this information thoughtfully before forming a preference. However, a wealth of 
evidence contradicts this assumption, demonstrating that most American voters have 
very little information retained regarding the majority of political issues (Bartles, 1996; 
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Individuals’ engagement with information on 
policy issues, particularly on those related to immigrants is similar (Citrin and Sides, 2008; 
Wong, 2007).  
This lack of engagement presents an opportunity for politicians to sway voters 
with a more visceral tactic, drawing upon an assumption that attitudes towards 
immigrants are negative. If political actors can introduce new negative information 
through messages about immigrant groups, this act will trigger an intense gut reaction 
among voters (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; 1986; 1989), and influence candidate and 
party preferences (Hajnal and Rivera, 2014, Messina, 1989). Party leaders distribute these 
messages, and if framed strategically, can increase the likelihood of an individual 
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engaging with the message and easily retrieving the information contained in the message 
(Taylor et al, 1979).  
 
A TOOL TO ISOLATE THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL MESSAGES ON 
IMMIGRATION 
Measuring the extent to which political messages on immigration can stir up 
underlying attitudes and influence the political preferences of the recipient is tricky 
business. For example, consider an attempt to determine how presidential phrasings 
affect voters’ preferences regarding levels of immigration (the subject of the third 
empirical paper). Understanding this impact requires researchers to identify and separate 
as many environmental factors that could influence beliefs or preference changes, a 
seemingly impossible task using traditional observational methods. However, some 
political scientists have established novel ways to reveal message effects on the formation 
of preferences through the use of experiments. The experimental approach introduces 
new opportunities to get at the causal mechanisms that drive political phenomena. This 
section provides an overview of definitions, concepts, and the contributions of 
experimental research, and introduces some important methodological issues. 
An experiment involves a direct intervention of the social phenomenon under 
investigation, but requires random assignment to at least two conditions. Researchers 
design experiments to investigate the causal impacts of explanatory variables in line with 
the prevailing theory of the phenomenon under investigation. Although scientists have 
used experiments for hundreds of years, experimentation in the social sciences emerged 
in the 1920s and 1930s, with scholars randomly allocating subjects to treatment and 
control groups to unpick causal mechanisms that drive such social phenomenon.  
Early examples of experiments in political science can be found as early as the 
1950s, the first experimental study published in the American Political Science Review 
(APSR) appeared in 1956 (Eldersveld 1956), where potential voters were randomly 
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assigned to a control group that received no messages (25 percent), or one of three 
treatment groups - two that received messages encouraging them to vote via personal 
contact (25 percent included phone calls or 25 percent receiving personal visits), and one 
via a mailing (25 percent). Participants who received the personal contact treatment were 
much more likely to turn out to vote than those in either the control group or the 
mailing group; the author concluded that through the process of random assignment of 
participants that personal contact caused a relative increase in turnout. Within a 
generation of Eldersveld’s seminal work, scholars began using experiments to bolster 
international conflict resolution (e.g., Mahoney and Druckman 1975), which eventually 
sparked the short-lived journal The Experimental Study of Politics. 
The use of experiments in political sciences has skyrocketed over the last two 
decades as researchers have become more applied – reaching out to candidates (Gerber 
et al, 2007), political advocacy groups (Broockman and Kalla, 2016), and as online 
platforms have made conducting experiments with larger samples easier (Mutz, 2011). 
Evidence of the change is clear when considering that more than half of the 71 
experimental articles that appeared in the American Political Science Review were published 
after 1992 (Druckman et al, 2011). Other signals of the prominence of experiments in 
political science include the proliferation of courses offered in graduate programs, the 
investment by the National Science Foundation to establish an experimental 
infrastructure, and the great expansion of survey experiments in both private and publicly 
supported studies like this doctoral research. 
Where an experiment takes place is of vital importance to political scientists and 
the context to which they have been applied and questions tackled with this approach is 
varied. Over the last two decades, most experiments have been carried out in one of 
three contexts: laboratories, surveys, and the field. The environment where participants 
are exposed to stimuli (e.g. targeted voting ads) could be introduced in a controlled 
setting such as a university campus (McKelvey et al, 1992) or in a more natural 
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environment like within a person’s home via the postal service (Eldersveld, 1956), on the 
radio (Panagopoulos et al, 2008), through a face-to-face interaction (Broockman and 
Kalla, 2016) or in a web-based survey (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012). 
Methodological challenges emerge under each of these experimental settings. For 
example, many of the early experiments conducted in political science took place in the 
artificial settings of university labs using of student-aged subjects. While studies in other 
disciplines have discussed the limitations of conducting experiments on a younger, 
wealthier, whiter and generally homogenous population, these issues are often not 
discussed at length in the political science literature (Druckman et al, 2011).  
Some political scientists have attempted to overcome the problems of campus-
based experiments by conducting experiments on more representative samples. Field 
experiments present a solution to this concern of an artificial setting. However, in the 
field the researcher often has less control over what experimental stimuli the participants 
actually observe. Further, logistical challenges such as recruiting a sufficient number of 
participants or similar issues of diversity in sampling may materialize. 
Survey experiments offer a resolution to this issue, as web-based platforms such 
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk6 one of the sampling arms used for the analysis conducted 
in Chapter IV. The web service offers a much larger and more diverse pool (Buhrmester 
et al, 2010; Chandler and Kapelner, 2010) of respondents. However, this drawing from 
this pool of subjects also introduces important questions about external validity, namely 
that subjects may be exposed to phenomena they might have also encountered prior to 
participating in the experiment, thus complicating the inferences that can be made 
(Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). 
                                                
6Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online platform that allows researchers to upload surveys, 
which can be taken up by ‘workers’, or research participants as paid tasks. The MTurk ‘workers’ can then 
opt into and complete the survey. Although the pool of ‘workers’ on MTurk is unlikely to produce a 
nationally representative sample, the samples drawn from the platform are typically more diverse than a 
laboratory sample of university students. A more thorough discussion on the process of sampling via 




The methodological advancements made on experimental approaches within 
political science have been bolstered by critical investment, namely the large-scale 
infrastructure project Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), which is 
supported by the National Science Foundation. TESS provides free access to NORC’s, 
the sampling arm for the General Social Survey, AmeriSpeak Panel7 to successful 
proposals that employ experimental designs; the data from Chapter III is drawn from the 
AmeriSpeak Panel. This means that the stimuli that are being manipulated as a part of 
the experiment is put to a large and nationally representative population sample of online 
respondents. Also commonly referred to as a survey experiment, the population-based 
survey experiment is not defined by the setting or mode of delivery, but rather by its use 
of survey sampling methods to harvest a sample of experimental subjects that is 
representative of the target population for the phenomenon under examination (Mutz, 
2011). For a population-based survey experiment to be credible, the population captured 
in the sample should be statistically similar to the population in which the inferences of 
the research findings are being made. 
Similar to other experiments carried out in in the social sciences, research 
participants are randomly assigned to conditions, and treatments are administered as in 
any other experiment. A cost-effective feature of the population-based survey 
experiment is that participants can take part in a study without having to go to a 
laboratory or other venue. This means that the samples are sufficiently large to detect 
effects, often those that are more difficult to parse out in smaller experimental studies, 
and are applied in a more natural environment on a more diverse pool of respondents. 
                                                
7 TESS contracts with NORC the entity that conducts the experiments via its AmeriSpeak Panel. 
AmeriSpeak is a nationally representative, probability-based panel based on NORC’s National Sample 
Frame, an area probability sample funded and managed by NORC and used for several NORC studies, 
including: the General Social Survey funded by the National Science Foundation and the Survey of 
Consumer Finances sponsored by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board in cooperation with the U.S. Treasury 
Department. More information on the TESS peer-review process, the sampling strategy of NORC’s 




Questions about representativeness are valid; however, as with large-scale observational 
studies weights can be applied to ensure that the sample is similar to the target 
population.  
Many national surveys like the General Social Survey (N=1,500-4,600) and polls 
like Gallup (N=500-2,000) collect data from some reasonably large, round number of 
respondents for expediency. However, these surveys are intended to provide a snapshot 
into society rather than being devised to test a small number of specific hypotheses. As a 
consequence, it is not uncommon to have more respondents than is necessary – taking 
up the time or respondents and resources that could be spent to investigate other 
interesting areas, or too few, thus limiting the inferences that can be made (Druckman et 
al, 2011; Mutz, 2011). The data from Chapters III (via access to the AmeriSpeak Panel) 
and IV (via funding for the MTurk sample) come from the National Science 
Foundation’s TESS project. These studies require the sample size that is appropriate to 
the main hypotheses being tested and are justified by the power analyses included in 
Annexes 3.E and 4.C, which were submitted as part of the proposals.  
 
CONSIDERING EXPERIMENTAL NORMS AND ETHICS 
Besides the way an experiment is conducted, the extent to which the researcher 
follows experimental norms in neighboring disciplines, such as psychology and 
economics has emerged as an important debate in political science research. One case in 
point, deception in psychological experiments is commonplace, whereas economists 
generally forbid the practice. Similarly, psychologists typically prohibit any form of 
payment for research subjects, while economists typically require some form of 
compensation for a subject’s time (Smith 1976). The issue of compensation for research 
subjects is one of such importance that the first issue of Experimental Economics 
implemented a rule that automatically rejected submissions that used deception or failed 
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to pay participants for their actions (Druckman et al, 2011). These debates are critical to 
ensure that no harm is done to any potential participant who has been asked to take part. 
While the potential risk of harm to any participants is minimal, I have carefully 
considered strategies aimed at protecting all respondents. All individuals interested in 
taking part through MTurk or sampled through the AmeriSpeak panel was provided with 
my name, school affiliation, and contact information to direct questions and concerns 
about the research project, and a link to the research ethics policies at the London School 
of Economics was included. All potential respondents were told that participation was 
voluntary and informed consent was required before taking part.8 
The issue of recompensing participants was also carefully considered. 
Researchers have debated the risks of providing financial rewards citing fears of coercing 
respondents to participate or skewed samples (Grady, 2006).  However, findings from 
several papers on the quality of the MTurk sample suggest that financial incentive are not 
the sole motivation for taking part, additionally the pool of participants better reflects the 
samples from published research using convenience sampling (Buhrmester et al, 2010; 
Chandler and Kapelner, 2010). The level of compensation alleviates concerns about 
participant exploitation, but is more importantly an appropriate acknowledgement of 
their time. 
This project also incorporates many features to ensure the protection of 
participants' privacy and anonymity. All data submitted by participants will be fully 
anonymized. The responses collected through MTurk pool cannot be linked to the 
participants, as each individual is identified only with their worker code. Data from the 
AmeriSpeak panel were scrubbed thoroughly prior to dissemination by NORC to ensure 
the privacy of the panelists is protected. All data from this project will remain in 
electronic format and stored (or when necessary transmitted) on LSE secure servers. The 
                                                
8 See page one of Annex 4.D for a copy of the informed consent. 
 
 35 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Research Ethics Committee 
(Appendices A-C) and the National Science Foundation’s Time Sharing Experiments for 
the Social Sciences (TESS) peer-review panel (Appendices D & E) reviewed and 
approved this research.  
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The primary goal of this research is to determine how individuals’ attitudes 
towards immigrants shape their policy preference regarding these populations and to 
examine the impact of political messages surrounding immigration influence different 
segments of the electorate. This section includes an overview of why each topic is 
important, an overview of the methods employed and a summary of the findings. 
Chapter II (Paper 1) documents the pre-testing phase of a vignette survey 
instrument that seeks to measure two distinct phenomena: how individuals’ attitudes 
towards immigrants and the party sponsor influences support for government funded 
health care initiatives, and whether providing respondents with a concrete economic 
benefit induces more positive enrollment preferences when immigrant groups benefit 
from a public entitlement program. To date, not study has used cognitive interviews to 
unpack Americans views on real-world political communication on immigration policy. 
Developing and evaluating survey questions presents a major challenge to researchers in 
the social sciences. During the 1980s researchers in psychology, market research and 
government agencies developed techniques and other quality assurance tool to 
systematically draft and evaluate survey questions to identify sources of response error 
and improve the validity of survey questions (Forsyth & Lessler, 1991; Pressler, et al, 
2004; Tourangeau, 1984).  
One important strategy was the adoption of cognitive interviews, which refine 
survey instruments by asking potential respondents - individuals who meet the criteria 
for participation in the survey if randomly sampled - about how they interpret the 
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wording of the questions (Willis, 2005). This process helps to ensure that the questions 
are generating the intended information that the researcher seeks to measure (Groves et 
al, 2004). Following the guidelines of best practice, two rounds of cognitive interviews 
were conducted (Collins, 2015; Pressler et al, 2004; Willis, 2005), thirty-three in total, 
between August and September 2015. The goal of the evaluation process was threefold 
(1) identify any complicated language in the survey that could affect comprehension, 
memory retrieval, and decision processes; (2) investigate the ways in which participants 
mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; (3) evaluate how online 
survey respondents engage with the survey in its electronic form.  
This exercise not only improves the quality of the survey instrument, but also 
yields some important insights into how individuals residing within the U.S. – the target 
population – engage with and comprehend political communication related to 
immigration policies. The cognitive interview subjects revealed interesting insights about 
U.S. voters’ views regarding immigrant participation in various public entitlement 
programs. It was consistently noticed when an immigrant cue was embedded in one of 
the vignettes, and the definitions provided for both immigrants and illegal immigrants 
were overwhelmingly uniform across the sample. Many subjects automatically linked the 
issue of immigration to politics, especially among individuals who identified with a 
particular political party. Politically oriented subjects identified immigration as a ‘hot-
button’ political issue and consistently expressed concern that the vignettes mentioned an 
immigrant group in relation to the public entitlement programs and were overwhelmingly 
anxious about the partisan cue because they feared that members of the opposite party 
would respond more negatively when it was employed. Yet, when subjects received the 
concrete savings estimates, at least in some instances, that it was possible to neutralize 
the negative effect of the illegal immigrant cue. However, some subjects expressed 
skepticism about the savings estimates.  
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Chapter III (Paper 2) examines whether native citizens are prepared to turn down 
a fiscal benefit in order to exclude immigrants from specific public services. This study 
builds upon the vast literature examining the links between individuals’ anxieties about 
immigrants and preferences for restrictionist policies (e.g. Alesina et al, 1999; Borjas, 
1996; Citrin et al, 1997; Espenshade and Hampstead, 1996; Hanson, 2005; Hanson et al, 
2007; Faschini and Mayada, 2009; Luttmer 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The 
experiment is also specifically designed to examine the issues that spark exclusionary 
policies – concerns about immigrant participation in government funded programs, 
animosity towards unauthorized immigrants, and the perceived tax burden. However, the 
project deviates from prior scholarly work in this area by flipping the perspective to 
focus on the economic savings rather than fiscal burdens with the aim of minimizing the 
anxiety related higher taxes.  
The pioneering studies examining the relationship between citizens’ attitudes 
about immigrants and the potential fiscal burden as an explanation for restrictionist 
policies established a strong theoretical foundation (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; 
Borjas and Trejo, 1991; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hanson, 2005; Hanson et al, 2007; 
Faschini and Mayada, 2009), however, we have scant evidence based on experimental 
manipulation (but see Ford’s 2015 analysis in the British context). This study emerges 
from these important works and expands our knowledge by explicitly testing three 
hypotheses: that individuals’ concerns about immigrants trigger exclusionary preferences; 
that unauthorized immigrants intensify these preferences; and that information stressing 
a social and economic benefit of the social policies will help to reduce opposition to 
immigrant participation. Data from an original survey experiment put to a nationally 
representative sample (N= 1,931) of Americans show that across the all items immigrant 
participation triggered more exclusionary responses, regardless of the respondents’ 
educational attainment and income levels, suggesting that pocketbook concerns are not 
driving these preferences. I observed vast differences in the responses of Republicans 
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and Democrats, however, the immigrant cues consistently induced more negative 
responses irrespective of party identification. Finally, the savings estimates failed to 
neutralize punitive policy preferences, suggesting that Americans will reject a fiscal 
benefit to block immigrant access to government funded programs. 
Chapter IV (Paper 3) seeks to assess the extent to which the language referring to 
immigrants influences native citizens’ preferences on immigration-related policies. It 
builds upon the vast literature examining political parties’ use of cues (symbols) and 
frames (arguments) to establish policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; 
Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Druckman et al, 2010; Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and 
Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). The vignettes draw from prior work mimicking the real-
world political debates referencing immigrants (Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and 
Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). This study provides new insights on how partisans 
evaluate the parties’ current welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, 
but includes frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - former Presidents 
Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive) – and counter their respective 
parties’ current positioning on the issue. The second level of this study exposes 
respondents to two experimental vignettes to test whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue 
(neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response (Goren et al, 2009) on immigration 
policies across the various segments of the American electorate. 
The unique 4 by 3 experimental design was put to a pilot sample of 2,053 
respondents on the crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. The study provides a 
simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the positive and negative issue frames, 
partisan cues, and their effects across items. Investigating the impact and limits of the 
partisan cue effects within the context of these complex political frames on immigration 
within the U.S. is vital in this current political climate because as politically polarization 
has gripped the country (Abramowitz, 2010), the messaging strategies crafted on 
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immigration seek to draw sharper distinctions between the parties, but this has fueled 
some harsh rhetoric on the issue (Jeong, Miller, Schofield and Sened, 2011; McCaffrey, 
2000). Scholars have demonstrated that strategies to demonize immigrants as can 
increase apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996) and hostility (Iyengar and Westwood, 
2015) within the electorate, but also increase punitive policies directed at immigrant 
populations (Hopkins, 2010). The results demonstrate that the welcoming frames trigger 
more positive responses while the restrictionist frames induce more negative responses. 
Again, I find large differences based on an individuals’ partisan identity, but cues by the 
parties or their political elites fail to shift public opinion on the issue.  
Chapter V provides a conclusion summarizing the major findings of the thesis 
and discussing future areas of research.  
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CHAPTER II (PAPER 1) 
HOW DO AMERICANS ENGAGE WITH 
EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES ABOUT 
IMMIGRANTS & SUPPORT FOR 
RESTRICTIONIST POLICIES? 




Policy makers regularly cite voters’ perceptions of immigrants, their participation in 
government funded programs, and regulating their numbers as a key influencer of 
political parties’ current positions on immigration policies. But political parties’ regularly 
use issue frames as a fundamental means of influencing public opinion. Our knowledge 
on how individuals actually engage with these issues is currently limited because we have 
little information about how Americans comprehend political messages that 
communicate partisan positions on immigration, how they perceive immigrant 
populations, or how other factors may feed into their decision-making process as they 
reflect upon these political messages. Connecting theory on individual attitudes about 
immigrants with the research on framing and political partisanship is vital because it best 
reflects how individuals engage with this type of communication in the real world. 
Drawing from the 33 cognitive interviews to test experimental vignettes related to 
immigrant participation and support for public funded initiatives, I provide novel 













When Americans receive information about immigrants, what they are presented 
with is a message that has been molded and kneaded and sculpted by a whole host of 
political actors (e.g. political elites, strategist, and interest groups) who seek to define and 
interpret what will resonate with the electorate (Stone, 2002). The initial goal of these 
political efforts is to respond to public opinion and direct it, and in turn win elections 
(Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). We know from a growing body of research that political 
frames can influence attitudes on a multitude of issues (e.g. Goren 2002; Krosnick and 
Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). Hayes (2008) illustrates the 
point with examples commonly found in the media – those seeking to increase support 
for border security might focus on illegal immigration posing a threat to national security 
as a negative frame – similarly, a welcoming frame may emphasize that stricter 
immigration laws limit the potential of the U.S. economy.  
Scholars have also demonstrated that these frames can be successful because a 
large segment of the electorate has low policy and political knowledge, and are thus more 
susceptible to the influence of political frames (Bartels, 1996; Gaines et al, 2007; Gilens, 
2001; Lauderdale, 2012; Zaller, 2004). Other studies have shown similar low levels of 
knowledge by individuals regarding immigrants (Blinder, 2013; Citrin and Sides, 2008; 
McLaren and Johnson, 2008; Wong, 2007) and the specifics of social welfare provisions 
(Delli Carpini et al, 1996; Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski, 2001; Zaller, 2004). Given these 
findings, we are faced with some fairly substantive questions on how Americans 
understand the policies emphasized in frames, and in our quest to assess their impact we 
must develop a credible strategy to measure their attitudes.  
Determining how a target population comprehends and interprets these types of 
frames is critically important because while scholars have examined the links between 
individuals’ attitudes about immigrants and negative policy preferences there is little 
evidence demonstrating how attitudes about immigrants influence support and 
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enrolment preferences for programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. To 
disentangle these complex relationships a more complicated research design is required. 
It is possible to examine how U.S. citizens respond to real-world political communication 
regarding immigrant participation in public entitlement programs by presenting 
respondents with vignettes that mimic the language used in these debates that manipulate 
specific aspects as treatments, and putting these before a large sample of the populations 
(Mutz, 2011). Vignette survey experiments provide brief and clear illustrations of 
hypothetical people or situations and specific attributes are randomly varied; researchers 
are then able to isolate the impact of each attribute under consideration by comparing 
the differences across groups (Atzmüeller and Steiner, 2010; Auspurg, 2015). Over the 
last two decades, vignette survey experiments have played a crucial role in revealing new 
insights into a variety of social phenomenon including those analyzing the mix of 
competing messages found in political communication regarding social welfare 
provisions (e.g. Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Chong and Druckman, 2007). These 
experiments actively measure the concept under consideration and offer high internal 
validity by providing an experimental intervention and a control group (McDermot, 
2011). Some survey experiments are also able to achieve high external validity by 
recruiting large representative samples and collecting additional individual-level 
information that enables analyses beyond the core experiment (Druckman et al, 2011; 
Mutz, 2011; Sniderman and Grob, 1996).  
This paper details the pre-testing phase of the study, a vital step in developing a 
credible survey tool. The vignette survey experiment being tested seeks to measure two 
distinct phenomena: how individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants and the party sponsor 
influences support for government funded health care initiatives, and whether providing 
respondents with a concrete economic benefit induces a more positive enrollment 
preference when immigrant groups benefit from a public entitlement program. This 
evaluation process had three goals (1) identify any problems with comprehension, 
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memory retrieval, and decision processes that stem from the wording of the survey; (2) 
examine how individuals mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; 
(3) assess how survey respondents engage with the online survey. A two-pronged strategy 
was taken, incorporating a series of cognitive interviews and the electronic feedback from 
respondents who participated in a testing phase of the web-based survey.  
Based on the existing literature on political issue frames, individual attitudes 
towards immigrants and survey response strategies, there are four main areas to 
understanding responses to experimental vignettes on political issue frames on 
immigration because they may introduce measurement error because responses put 
forward by research subjects may not reflect what is being measured. The first area under 
consideration seeks to identify any problems with comprehension, memory retrieval, and 
decision processes that stem from the wording of the survey. It is possible that 
respondents may read a question interpret the language presented in a way that is 
different from what the survey seeks to measure, make a judgment and provide a 
response that does not reflect their true attitude on the topic (Tourangeau, 1984; 
Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau et al., 2009). Second, revolves around how 
subjects understand and interpret the policies or the populations under consideration. 
This is because while Americans may have low levels of knowledge on a policy or 
inaccurate information about a population (Citrin and Sides, 2007; Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996; Lauderdale, 2012; Zaller, 1992), they may still give a response to the 
question, employing satisficing strategies, which means giving a response that is good 
enough instead of one that actually represents their attitudes or preferences on the topic 
at hand (Krosnick, 1991). Third, centers on how Americans interpret the information 
under consideration and to gain better insights into the motivation behind the responses 
– individuals’ perceptions are gleaned by asking respondents to ‘think-aloud’ whilst 
answering and probing for deeper information (Groves et al., 2004). Finally, the forth 
seeks to gain deeper insights into the prior experiences that influence individuals’ views 
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on these topics (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2007; Sniderman, 2011) to theoretically 
test and incorporate in later versions of the instrument. 
 
II. Strategy 
ASSESSING COMPREHENSION THE VIGNETTES & QUESTIONS  
The first goal of the cognitive interviews is to ensure that respondents 
understand the words used in the vignettes and questions in the same way that is 
intended by the researcher and across respondents (Willis, 2005). The language used in 
surveys, and indeed in political frames seek to get individuals to tap into and retrieve 
memories on a particular issue, make a judgment or decision, and provide a response 
(Groves, et al, 2004). But this cognitive process will be hindered if respondents are 
unable to comprehend the issue or language before them, or express different 
interpretations of the words used (Pressler, et al, 2004; Tourangeau, 1984). For instance, 
Blinder (2013) contracted the polling firm IPSOS Mori to assess individuals’ attitudes 
about ‘immigrants’ in the UK. His research demonstrated marked differences in how 
British people perceive immigrants relative to how the state defines and measures 
immigration. This study highlights the potential policy implications of this mismatch in 
definition of these words, but differences in personal definitions across subjects could 
introduce measurement error, and is therefore necessary to investigate, and parse out as 
distinct treatment groups to unpack true differences in opinion rather than in definition. 
 
UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSING OF THE POLICIES & POPULATION 
The policies under consideration in the experiment includes five vignettes that 
are all positively framed, each focusing on a distinct policy aimed at improving economic 
and societal outcomes. The memory model does not require individuals to have pre-
existing attitudes about the policies at hand, but they need to have enough information to 
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draw upon to express this. Therefore, the first priority in this exercise requires 
determining whether subjects comprehend what the policies under consideration are and 
have a working understanding of the fundamental goals of the initiatives. A secondary 
goal of this exercise is to gain insights into individuals’ levels of knowledge of the policies 
and populations under consideration. Scholars have argued that most Americans have 
scant knowledge about the majority of political issues (Bartles, 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro, 
2000; Zaller, 1992). Studies examining citizens’ knowledge of immigrants and 
immigration related policies mirror these findings (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Wong, 2007). 
It has been argued that this lack of knowledge presents an opportunity for politicians to 
manipulate voters. Following the guidelines of best practice (Pressler et al, 2004; Willis 
and Lessler, 1999) each interview used both the think-aloud and verbal probing strategies 
to gain deeper insights into how individuals comprehend and process the information on 
the policies and the population in front of them. 
 
PROBING FOR PRIOR EXPERIENCES  
Sniderman and Piazza (2002) observe that individuals bring prior experience into 
their decision making process when answering survey questions and understanding as 
these aspects of the target population in advance of the survey will help to improve the 
research design and measure outcomes. Employing a unique vignette experiment, the 
researchers displayed the hypothetical college applications of white and black candidates 
with identical characteristics with three exceptions – race (varying between white and 
black) and college exam entrance scores, with the white student’s set at 80 and the black 
student’s randomly varied at 55, 60, 65, 70 and 75 – the experiment also varied father’s 
occupation, but this was secondary. The researchers anticipated that African American 
respondents’ personal negative experiences with racism would factor in racial 
discrimination in their assessment of the two hypothetical candidates and select the black 
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applicant as a ‘nod’ to the obstacles that had to be overcome. Their null hypothesis was 
that there would be no difference in the acceptance rates of the black and white applicant 
among African American respondents. The researchers were surprised to observe that 
even when the exam scores of the black candidate were the closest to the white 
candidate, African American respondents consistently selected the white candidate. Their 
conclusion suggests that African Americans prioritize the higher exam score over all 
other factors. In a later discussion of this paper, Sniderman (2011) notes that having an 
additional on the motivations of this decision would have been helpful in understanding 
motivation for the choices of African Americans decisions. Another study by Gaines, 
Kuklinski and Quirk (2007) used panel data to determine whether and how partisans 
change their beliefs and interpretation of facts about the government’s handling of the 
Iraq war overtime. Although most subjects expressed similar and accurate beliefs about 
facts, partisans tended to interpret the facts in ways that fit their party-preferences, those 
with higher policy knowledge were more adepts at using the interpretations to support 
their existing partisan lean. Here too the use of think-aloud and verbal probing strategies 
are necessary to better understand other factors that may influence individuals’ reactions 




Developing and evaluating survey questions has long challenged researchers in 
the social sciences. Researchers in psychology, market research and government agencies 
developed techniques and other quality assurance tool in response to these challenges, 
creating a systematic process to draft and evaluate survey questions (Forsyth & Lessler, 
1991; Pressler, et al, 2004; Tourangeau, 1984). One important strategy was the adoption 
of cognitive interviews, which refine survey instruments by asking potential respondents 
- individuals who meet the criteria for participation in the survey if randomly sampled - 
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about how they interpret the wording of the questions (Willis, 2005). This process helps 
to ensure that the questions are generating the intended information that the researcher 
seeks to measure (Groves et al, 2004).  
In-line with best practice, each subject was asked to think-aloud whilst providing 
their response and additional verbal probing strategies were employed (Pressler et al, 
2004; Willis and Lessler, 1999). The think-aloud technique provides subjects with the 
opportunity to explain their thinking or what is motivating their response as they 
respond to the tested question (Davis and DeMaio, 1993; Bickart and Felcher, 1996; 
Bolton and Bronkhorst, 1996). This technique has been useful in providing deeper 
insights into the process of how individuals retrieve information from their memory, but 
also illuminates the external factors that influence their decision making process (Willis, 
2004). 
We know from prior work that this type of political communication is often 
difficult for individuals to process (Druckman et al, 2010; Martin and Polivka, 1995). To 
minimize the risk of measurement error it therefore necessary to rigorously and 
systematically test the survey instrument to ensure that respondents interpret the 
vignettes and concepts uniformly and in line with the theoretical foundations (Groves et 
al., 2004). Following the guidelines of best practice, I conducted two rounds of cognitive 
interviews (Collins, 2015; Pressler et al, 2004; Willis, 2005), thirty-three in total, between 
August and September 2015. The purpose of these interviews was to elicit feedback from 
a similar population of individuals who could be sampled to take part in the quantitative 
survey – U.S. citizens above the age of 18 and to ensure that potential respondents 
properly understand the concepts measured in survey instrument. Additional feedback 
on the content and interface of the web-based survey was solicited from 50 respondents 
using the crowd-sourcing platform Mechanical Turk in October 2015.9 
                                                
9 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online crowdsourcing platform that allows researchers to recruit research 
participants. The samples drawn from the platform are typically more diverse than a laboratory sample of 
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THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW SUBJECTS 
Table 2.1 outlines the characteristics of the subjects that participated in the 
cognitive interviews. Individuals were recruited from three areas of the state of Texas – 
central (21 were located in Austin/San Antonio) and west (5 were located in 
Midland/Odessa) as well as the Gulf Coast (7 were located in Houston/Corpus Christi) 
regions - to enhance diversity within the sample. A purposive sampling strategy was 
employed, targeting specific groups based on characteristics of interest that may help to 
reveal problems with phrasing and concepts included in the survey (e.g. younger people 
who are less familiar with complex policies or economic arguments, individuals with very 
low incomes and educational attainment, ethnic and racial minorities, politically active 
and inactive, etc.). The subjects were recruited from two campuses of a community 
college within the Austin/San Antonio area, a non-profit organization based in Houston 
that serves low-income populations, and two conservative leaning social organizations – 
















                                                                                                                                       
university students. A more thorough discussion on the process of sampling via Mechanical Turk and its 





Table 2.1: Characteristics of Cognitive Interview Subjects (N=33) 
Covariates 
 N % 
Men 15 45.5% 
Women 18 54.5% 
Whites 22 64.6% 
African Americans 5 14.7% 
Latinos 4 11.7% 
Asian 3 9.1% 
Completed High School 2 6.1% 
Some College 14 42.5% 
Undergraduate Degree (B.A.)  9 27.2% 
Graduate Degree (M.A., PhD.) 8 24.2% 
Below $20,000 13 39.4% 
$20,000 - $39,999 7 21.2% 
$40,000 - $69,999 5 15.1% 
$70,000 - $89,999 3 9.1% 
$90,000 or more 5 15.1% 
Central Texas 21 63.6% 
Gulf Coast 7 21.2% 
West Texas 5 15.2% 
Age (Mean / Median) 42 40 
 
To ensure greater diversity across the pool of subjects and advert was also posted 
on the classified adverts website Craigslist, which was put out to residents in each region 
visited. Similar to MTurk, Craigslist serves as an online local noticeboard that expands 
the potential reach of adverts outside of the limited number of venues that one individual 
would be able to recruit from alone. All subjects received a $10 token to recompense 
 50 
their time, which is recommended by practitioners (Willis, 2005). Of the 33 respondents 
15 were men and 18 were women. The average age across the sample was 42. The oldest 
subject was aged 71 (24 percent were over the age of 45), and the youngest was 19 years 
old (with 57 percent of those interviewed were under the age of 24).  Nearly half 
interviewed had not completed any post-secondary education, with the other half having 
completed an undergraduate or graduate degree. Roughly 60 percent of the subjects had 
earnings under $40,000 annually. Information on political affiliation was collected from 
26 individuals of which 16 self-identified as Democrats, eight as Republicans, and two as 
Independents (one leaning Democrat and one leaning Republican). 
THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 
The cognitive interviews focused primarily on the content of the survey 
questions, rather than on the online administration. In line with best practice each 
interview lasted no longer than an hour because participants become tired and their 
attention flags (Hess, Rothgeb, and Nichols, 1998). To maximize the time and impact of 
each interview careful planning was done in advance. Unlike the respondents in the 
online testing phase, where the respondents would be locked into a treatment group, 
every face-to-face subjects who took part in a cognitive interview was exposed to a 
variety of treatments that were pre-selected at random. This meant that a subject could 
have received a vignette that provided both a savings estimate and the illegal immigrant 
prime for one question, a true control vignette for the second, and a bipartisan cue with 
no immigrant prime for the third, and so on.  
Following the guidelines of best practice (Pressler et al, 2004; Willis and Lessler, 
1999) each interview used both the think-aloud and verbal probing strategies. The think-
aloud technique was developed by psychologists and was first systemized by Ericsson 
and Simon (1980), and involves minimal interruption on the part of the interviewer, 
except to say something like “tell me what you are thinking” when the subject pauses. 
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This technique helps to minimize the influence or bias that the interviewer may have 
over the subject (Willis, 2005). Individuals were first provided an overview of the project, 
asked to read each of the five vignettes aloud from a computer screen to mimic the 
conditions of the computer administered survey, and instructed to explain their thought 
process as they answered each survey question. After describing their decision making 
process, a series of unscripted, but consistently applied probes were put to each 
interviewee to ensure that specific terms and concepts held a similar meaning across 
subjects.10 Notes on any potentially problematic areas of the processes that subject uses 
in arriving at an answer to the question was documented in the Question Appraisal 
System (QAS) developed by Willis and Lessler (1999) in accordance of best practice.11  
 
THE RESPONDENTS OF THE ONLINE PRE-TESTING PHASE 
 
Additional feedback on the general structure, wording, and user interface of the 
survey was collected from 50 respondents through the web-based crowdsourcing service 
MTurk in October 2015. Established in 2005 by the online marketplace Amazon.com, 
MTurk connects employers (referred to as requesters) and employees (referred to as 
workers) to complete tasks that cannot be automated (called human intelligence tasks or 
HITs). Researchers can limit access to their project to respondents in a specific country, 
and set a worker approval rating (similar to a star rating on the website EBAY) to 
improve the quality of the data. Given the subject matter, I restricted the sample to U.S. 
workers with a 95 percent approval rating. Workers are typically paid a small amount for 
each HIT completed. Amazon.com pays cash to workers that have provided bank details, 
and provides Amazon.com gift vouchers for workers without bank accounts or those 
unwilling to link their bank details to the company. Online respondents received a small 
                                                
10 A list of the probes that were used in each interview is provided in Annex 2.A 
 
11 An example of the QAS form is provided in Annex 2.B 
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payment of $1.00 for the completion of the survey, which was completed, on average, in 
about seven minutes. As with the payment provided to the cognitive interview subjects, 
the rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about exploitation, but the incentive is not 
greater than the payment offered through the LSE Behavioral Research Lab.12 
The online system, anonymity, and financial incentives have raised concerns 
about the quality of the data (e.g. respondents engage in random clicking of response 
options or create multiple accounts to take surveys more than once). Researchers in 
several disciplines within the social sciences have helped to alleviate these fears by 
replicating the results of several experimental studies (Berinsky et al, 2012). Although the 
virtual setting is far less controlled than a typical laboratory setting, it does reflect a 
similar structure to the nationally representative AmeriSpeak panel, which the final 
version of the survey will be presented to. Additionally, MTurk has created safeguards to 
limit multiple submissions by a single participant by linking accounts to bank accounts 
and address, checking the information against the IP address. Concerns about 
respondents randomly clicking responses for payment was addressed at the front end 
through by including a ‘weed-out’ question that test whether a respondent is paying 
attention before they start. Additionally, in an experiment conducted by Prior and Lupia 
(2008) survey respondents who were offered a small financial inducement for their 
participation took more time to complete a survey and provided more accurate responses 
than those who participated without compensation. The findings suggest that offering a 
small monetary reward for participation can enhance the quality of the responses and 




                                                
12 The LSE’s Behavioral Research Lab pays respondents £10 for studies that last up to an hour. More 






Table 2.2: Characteristics of Respondents for Online Pre-test Phase (N=57) 
Covariates 
 N % 
Men 37 64.9% 
Women 20 35.1% 
Whites 47 82.5% 
African Americans 2 3.5% 
Latinos 2 3.5% 
Asian 6 10.5% 
Completed High School 10 17.5% 
Some College 17 29.8% 
Undergraduate Degree (B.A.)  24 42.2% 
Graduate Degree (M.A., PhD.) 6 10.5% 
Below $20,000 13 22.8% 
$20,000 - $39,999 22 38.6% 
$40,000 - $69,999 18 31.6% 
$70,000 - $89,999 2 3.5% 
$90,000 or more 2 3.5% 
Democrat 40 70.2% 
Republican 11 19.3% 
Other / No Preference 6 10.5% 
Age (Mean / Median) 34 33 
 
Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of the respondents of the pretesting phase 
who were recruited from the crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. Of the sample of 
57 respondents, 37 were men and 20 were women. The average age across the sample 
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was 34. The oldest subject was aged 58 (8.7 percent were over the age of 45), and the 
youngest was 20 years old (with 14 percent of those interviewed were under the age of 
24).  Nearly 30 percent of respondents had not obtained a university degree, but only ten 
percent of respondents had a graduate degree. Similar to the subjects from the cognitive 
interviews, about 60 percent of the respondents had earnings under $40,000 annually. As 
with the sample of subjects, the online survey respondents were considerably more likely 
to identify with the Democratic Party. 
The cognitive interviews and responses from the online pre-test provide 
invaluable feedback on the types of problems that respondents are likely to experience in 
a large scale survey and insights into how individuals engage with political frames on 
immigration policies. However, the subjects from this study were recruited rather than 
sampled. As a consequence, we cannot make any conclusions regarding the distribution 
of the responses, and we should use caution in how we interpret the findings. Namely, 
they are useful in identifying the types of issues that respondents may encounter, but not 
how often. 
IV. Results 
SURVEY ITEMS IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
 
Some subjec ts  recommended that cer tain terms be rephrased to make the scenarios 
c l earer ,  l ess  t e chnical ,  and more eas i ly  interpreted.   
Only one subject selected a ‘Don’t Know’ response for one of the vignettes, 
however, she was able to articulate her ambivalence about the issue at hand.  While no 
other subject was unable to form or express an opinion on any of the five survey 
questions, some had difficulty defining who the policies were directed at or reading 
specific terms (e.g. ‘preventative’ or ‘return on investment’). Additionally, some subjects 
expressed skepticism over the strength of the statements. The revisions to each of the 
survey questions are included in the italicized text with changes underlined. Subjects’ 




CHILD TAX CREDITS 
 
Original Phrasing - “Tax credits for low-income parents encourage work and help lift thousands of 
families out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it helps to boost our economy. [It is 
estimated that every $1000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity.] We 
must encourage every eligible tax payer [, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to file for child tax 
credits.” 
A majority of subjects stated that the logic of the argument presented in this 
vignette was generally clear. However, a minority felt that an extra emphasis could be 
made that the tax credits would be targeted at families with children. Additionally, several 
subjects expressed dissatisfaction with the notion that tax credits encouraged work or 
lifted families out of poverty.  
 
“I don’t know if it encourages work – people who are not working are benefitting from other 
sources, they don’t care if they can get a tax credit or not.”  
 
“It [tax credits] will help you, it will help poverty stricken people, but it’s not going to take 
them out of poverty and it’s not going to encourage them to work. Now if you gave them 
$10,000 everybody would go to work. But it’s not enough, they work at McDonald for 
$12,000, or what is it $15,000, what’s $1,000 going to do?” 
 
 “No tax credit is going to encourage people to work, they work because they’ve got to eat and 
pay their bills…I agree with the statement and the premise of the program, just not the part 
about encouraging work.” 
 
“I wouldn’t say it [tax credits] helps to lift them out of poverty cause if you in poverty, a tax 
credit is not going to lift you out…If you’re making $10,000 a year and you get a tax credit, 
say it’s $1,000, it helps, but you’re still poor.”  
The language on these points were adapted to signal that parents must be 
working to receive the credit and specify that the provision it was one of many strategies 
to fight poverty. The word child was also added to emphasize the program was targeted 
at families with children. 
 
Revised Phrasing - “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low-
incomes and is an important tool in the fight against poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds 
it provides a boost to our economy. [It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents 
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generates $1,380 in local economic activity.] We must encourage every qualifying tax payer [, including 
immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to file for child tax credits.” 
FOOD NUTRITION 
 
Original Phrasing - “Programs that provide low-income children and new mothers with access to 
nutritious food improve the health of infants, prevent developmental delays, and increase rates of childhood 
immunization. This generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. [For example, 
every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.] We must get 
every eligible woman and child[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to participate in the food 
nutrition program.” 
 
Generally, subjects had a clear understanding of what the message on food 
nutrition was trying to convey. However, some felt that the vignette included 
information that was irrelevant to the rest of the argument and was therefore confusing. 
One subject in central Texas expressed concern about the immunizations stating:  
 
“Stats on this one don’t quite add up because there are savings for schools and health care 
system, how do kids get immunizations?” 
 
Some subjects expressed concern that the vignette was stating that low-income 
people meeting the eligibility criteria should be required to participate. 
 
“I think we should be helping people, but this ‘we must get’ sounds like the government would 
be forcing people to do this, and I don’t agree with that.” 
  
“This ‘get every eligible woman’ that’s a good thing to say, but in reality is hard to achieve, so 
that’s maybe unrealistic.” 
 
“Would we be forcing people to participate? I’m not comfortable with that.” 
 
To simplify and distill the argument, careful emphasis was placed on the direct 
health benefits and economic savings, and the point about immunizations was omitted. 
Additionally, the language on boosting enrollment was modified to avoid confusion 
about requiring participation of low-income people.  
 
Revised Phrasing - “Programs that provide access to nutritious food to low-income children and new 
mothers improve the health of infants and prevent developmental delays. This generates enormous savings 
for schools and the health care system. [For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs 
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results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.] We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child 
[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to access the food nutrition program.”   
IN-STATE TUITION 
 
Original Phrasing - “In-state tuition rates make college an affordable option for millions of students 
and prepare the next generation of workers for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. Individuals who 
receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. For every 
$1.00 invested in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return on investment. We must 
maximize our benefit by increasing [increasing including immigrants / illegal immigrants in] the number 
of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
 
Several subjects commented that the ‘return on investment’ phrase listed in the 
in-state tuition question was potentially too technical and slowed down the cognitive 
process. Individuals also expressed confusion regarding where the savings could be 
applied. While others, particularly those who either had children in university or were 
paying tuition rates felt that the strength of the statement detracted from the statement’s 
credibility. One younger subject in the Gulf Coast region stated:  
 
“I understand this return on investment – I mean I get that this is 4.50 return, but I don’t 
know what that means.” 
Another older subject based in central Texas with limited education explained:  
 
“It’s long – I’m still trying to process this [return on investment] and I got to ask myself what is 
this asking and think about it. I guess it’s saying when you complete this program you should be 
making more money.” 
 
Three separate subjects located in Austin and Houston (one in the first round 
and two in the second), who each had children in university expressed skepticism that in-
state tuition rates made college more affordable and prepares the next generation for 
better jobs.  
 
“I gotta daughter at the University of Houston – she gets in-state tuition, but let me tell you 
something, it ain’t cheap! She may not get a job when she’s done, either. I know it’s going to be 
ok in the long run- and I like that you included the phrase ‘on average’ and ‘over the life-time’ 
because I can see that this makes sense, but it’s not affordable!” 
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“My daughter is about to start school next week.  We’ve been saving for years, and I’m in a 
higher income bracket that most people, but right now college kids aren’t getting jobs and it’s not 
affordable.” 
 
“I can tell you right now that even with in-state tuition, and I know it’s cheaper, but University 
of Texas is not as affordable as it used to be. I moved in from out of state in the 1970’s and I 
think I paid something like $18 per class – something ridiculous like that – it was nothing! 
Now, it’s more than $15,000 with room and bored, and my kid was born and raised here in 
Austin.” 
 
While these sentiments did not seem to alter their opinion on the question itself, 
their comments illustrate that the language employed conjured up thoughts that could 
potentially detract attention away from the concepts being measured – whether 
immigrant participation in the in-state tuition program could alter enrollment preferences 
and economic benefit could neutralize the position. To minimize the risk of this 
distraction the language was softened. 
 
Revised Phrasing - “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare 
students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education 
earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. [Estimates show every $1.00 spent in 
getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services 
costs.] We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing [increasing including immigrants / illegal 
immigrants in] the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
 
HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 
 
Original Phrasing - “New health insurance credits reduce monthly insurance payments and out-of-
pocket costs for people with low and modest incomes. Elected officials /[Democrats] have worked to pass 
these subsidies to save taxpayers billions of dollars and provide millions of new patients with access to 
preventive health services. We should support health insurance credits to make sure that every qualifying 
person[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants] can purchase private health insurance.” 
Some subjects expressed a lack of clarity over the terms subsidy and preventative 
health services. Additionally while many subjects intuitively linked this provision to 
‘Obamacare’ some highlighted confusion about whether this meant the credits would be 
used to purchase private health insurance. Several subjects had difficulties reading or 




“Sub…what is this…ok, subsidies - I know what it means, it’s just hard to pronounce.” 
 
“Is a subsidy like a discount?” 
 
“Subsidies – credits it’s synonymous with that. You could use either one, but some people aren’t 
going to know what you’re talking about.” 
 
While most subjects never flagged any concerns about the term preventative 
health services and all were able to define the term, a few suggested that the phrasing 
could lead survey respondents to believe that health insurance credit may only cover 
preventative care instead of comprehensive care. These individuals recommended 
changes to broaden the scope to better reflect what the subsidy covers. 
 
“[Preventative care is] just health services to prevent stuff from happening, not anything they do 
have, but this might be limited to what people can get from the doctor. People go to the doctor 
because something’s wrong not because it hasn’t gone wrong yet. It [the term preventative care] 
could be confusing it seems it limits what people get.” 
 
“Pre – [Struggles with reading the term preventative care] how do you say this?... I do 
preventative maintenance, so I know what it means, but maybe say monthly or annually check-
ups.”  
 
The following edits were applied to the text of the vignette to reflect subjects’ 
recommendations. 
 
Revised Phrasing - “Newly issued credits to purchase private health insurance provide a discount to 
reduce monthly payments and out-of-pocket costs for people with low and modest incomes. Elected officials 
/ [Democrats] have worked to pass these credits to provide millions of new patients with access to health 
services, which saves the health care system and taxpayers billions of dollars. We should support health 
insurance credits to make sure that every qualifying person[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants] 




Original Phrasing - “Prenatal care is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and 
their infants. Elected officials / [Republicans and Democrats] have worked to expand prenatal care for 
women who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings to lower 
the risks of birth defects and reduce the high costs associated with premature births. We should support 




Some subjects misread the term prenatal care, instead substituting the word 
parental. Each individual who made this error managed to catch the misinterpretation, 
and could easily provide an accurate description of the types of services provided for 
prenatal care. The language within the survey was slightly altered to simplify the wording 
of the vignette. 
 
“Parental care is…wait that says prenatal care – it’s ok though, I guess, I associate this with 
parents [laughs]. That’s ok, right?” 
 
“I just said parental care, ha! I mean prenatal care. I’ve had babies, I should be able to say it!” 
Subjects’ feedback motivated the following modifications to the prenatal care vignette: 
 
Revised Phrasing - “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and premature births, and is the 
most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. Elected officials / [Republicans 
and Democrats] have worked to expand prenatal care for women who cannot afford health insurance to 
make sure they can get important health screenings. We should support programs that cover all qualifying 
mothers[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] with prenatal care.” 
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
All subjects were asked to describe what they understood the terms eligibility or 
qualify to mean. Every person interviewed was able to provide a clear response to this 
probe, which mainly centered around the income criteria, although the responses were 
sometimes varied. 
 
“People who live in poverty. Earn under $40,000 a year and have five kids, expecting mothers 
who work, people on disability, people in the military, but mostly people in poverty.” 
 
“Specific groups of people who meet certain criteria. There’s some kind of formula that the 
government has that says people can apply.” 
 
“People who are poor.” 
 
“Poor kids that I went to school with. Poor Mexican and black kids, they live in housing 
developments and end up on a more problematic track and don’t finish school.” 
 
One self-identified Republican provided this explanation for who might qualify for some 
of the programs described in the vignettes:  
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“Your income has to be at a certain level, you have to pass a drug test, no debt, receive assistance from the 
Church. There’s a hard cut-off, it’s not fair for some people.” 
 
During the discussion several subjects raised questions about the eligibility rules of some 
of the provisions. This was not a common occurrence across the first twenty interviews, 
fewer than six subjects made any mention of the term.  
 
“I don’t know what the eligibility criteria is. Who is actually eligible, I don’t know.” 
 
“In terms of qualifying, what does qualifying mean?” 
 
“I’m not sure about the child tax credits. I would think you need to have kids and make a 
certain income. I agree with everything else, but I don’t know enough about the rest like how 
close to the poverty line do people need to be?” 
 
Out of the 33 interviews one person selected the ‘Don’t Know’ option for the in-state 
tuition question. However, given this feedback it became apparent that it was necessary 
to address this issue within the survey.  
 
 
“Well, just don’t know enough about who qualifies. I don’t know enough about this program 
and I’m not sure if I can answer. [pause] No, I don’t think I can give an answer.” 
 
To avoid increasing the length of each vignette and to minimize the risk of 
priming respondents towards a particular response by drawing attention to the eligibility 
rules, it was necessary draft a general statement placed at the start the survey. The text 
below addresses the fact that each program has certain eligibility rules and that specific 
knowledge of these criteria is not necessary to form an opinion. The statement below 
was presented to the final ten subjects who participated in the cognitive interviews and 
50 survey pre-test respondents immediately before the vignettes.13  
 
 
Inserted Text - “The purpose of this study is to better understand people's attitudes about government 
programs and politics more generally. Each program has specific rules that determine whether individuals 
                                                
13 A copy of the text and layout of the survey is included in Annex 2.C.  
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can qualify for participation which may include things like income, residency, having children, or some 
other criteria.  
 
Knowledge of the eligibility rules for each program is not necessary to answer any of the questions. Just 
read each scenario carefully and provide the response that best reflects your views.”  
 
REACTIONS TO THE IMMIGRANT CUES 
The survey contains a treatment that primes U.S. citizens to think about ‘illegal 
immigrants’ and another for ‘immigrants’ participating in each program. These treatment 
primes are included to distinguish whether and the extent to which Americans respond 
to these different immigrant populations given the current political climate and the 
language used by political officials to polarize the electorate.  Prior research suggests that 
citizens’ knowledge of immigrant populations and immigration policy issues is low even 
when other areas of political knowledge are high. For instance, native-born citizens in 
Europe and the United States are known to over-estimate the number of immigrants 
residing in their respective country (Citrin and Sides, 2008; McLaren and Johnson 2007). 
Another study within the UK context shows that to the term ‘immigrants’ conjures up 
perceptions of people who are poorer, less educated, and in greater need of financial 
supports than the demographic snapshot of immigrants that is presented by the Office of 
National Statistics (Blinder, 2013). Although no study has identified the how attitudes 
towards various social services change when immigrant participation and legal status has 
been introduced, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) found that native citizens within the 
U.S. were universally much less likely to support hypothetical visa applicants if they were 
low-skilled migrants with limited English language skills, and even less supportive of 
hypothetical migrants when there was information indicating that the migrant had not 
entered the country legally.  
The terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ are used to reflect the language 
regularly employed by political officials of both political parties and a majority of media 
outlets (Hayes, 2008; Tenore, 2011). Although the use of the term illegal immigrant has 
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sparked its own debate, with several interest groups launching highly publicized 
campaigns challenging the use of the label, studies that have examined the effects of 
labeling unauthorized immigrants as ‘illegal’ have yet to produce evidence confirming 
these concerns. For instance one study by Knoll, Redlawsk and Sanborn (2011) tested a 
similar hypothesis, using the ‘undocumented’/‘Mexican’ immigrant and 
‘undocumented’/‘illegal’ immigrant labels on two different samples of likely attendees of 
the Iowa Caucuses in 2007/2008, and produced no evidence of a direct framing effect by 
label or ethnicity cue. A second study by Merolla, Ramakrishnan and Haynes (2013), used 
a nationally represented sample through the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in 
November 2007, and tested whether the terms ‘illegal’/‘undocumented’/‘unauthorized’ 
altered respondent’s preferences of national level policy options that had been 
considered in Congress that year. This project also yielded null results on the equivalency 
frames. Similarly, as a part of this doctoral research, I had run two separate pilot projects 
using a non-representative sample from the crowd sourcing platform Mechanical Turk 
and presented respondents with a series of similarly framed vignettes to those used in 
this survey instrument changing the labels from ‘illegal’ and ‘unauthorized’ and 
consistently found no difference across the treatment groups. In light of all of these 
findings it seems appropriate to mirror the language adopted in the current political 
debates. 
 
DEFINITIONS OF IMMIGRANT AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT 
 
Most subjec ts  made some re f erence  to the i ssue o f  l egal  s tatus when de f ining the term 
‘ immigrant . ’  
 
“Immigrants are people who are documented, but I guess it could also captures illegal 
immigrants.” 
 
“Someone with a green card or paperwork that says they can be here.” 
 
“Immigrants, well I think illegal. We don’t talk about legal immigrants [laughs]. The word 
immigrant has an emotional point, [pause] it’s funny because it’s bad.” 
 64 
 
The de f ini t ions for  the term ‘ i l l egal  immigrant ’  touched large ly  on the i ssue o f  v isas ,  
but some subjec ts  expressed concern about the ‘ i l l egal ’  labe l .  
 
“Somebody who is in this country unlawfully.” 
 
“People who came here without a visa.” 
 
“Someone who does not have the appropriate visas.” 
 
“I hate the word illegal immigrant, it says that somebody is wrong.” 
 
“It’s interesting that you use the term ‘illegal’ rather than ‘undocumented’.” 
 
The vignet te  for  prenatal  care prompted an interes t ing discuss ion with many 
subjec t s ,  part i cular ly  among those with Republ i can leanings ,  regarding the 
dis t inc t ion between the mothers without l egal  s tatus and the ir  unborn chi ldren who 
would rece ive  U.S. c i t izenship at  bir th.  Some subjec ts  s tated that this  des ignat ion 
lead to the ir  support  for  the prenatal  care quest ions when they rece ived the ‘ i l l egal  
immigrants ’  cue .  
 
One younger subject from central Texas who had expressed Libertarian leanings 
stated:  
 
“Um, well I’m pretty sure the law is that if the baby is going to be born on U.S. soil that it’s 
going to be a citizen. So, no matter what your stance is on illegal immigrants, you’re going to be 
helping an American baby, so you know, help them [the mothers] too.” 
 
Another self-identified Republican subject from the Gulf-coast provided the 
following comments regarding legal status:  
 
“This is important... it ensures the mom and baby will be taken care of. Even illegal 
immigrants shouldn’t hide in a closet because of a pregnancy. Babies before they are born need 
care, and they will be an American citizen. So I strongly agree.” 
 
POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMIGRATION CUES 
Recent research has suggested that partisanship may be a major contributing 
factor in shaping U.S. citizens’ attitudes about immigrants and the uptick in punitive 
policy preferences. For instance, polling data from the Pew Research Center’s 2014 study 
on immigration attitudes demonstrated that a majority of Americans (57 percent versus 
35 percent) agree that immigrants strengthen the country rather than create burden. 
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However, when analyzed by party affiliation, only 17 percent of self-identified 
conservatives agree that immigrants strengthen the country as opposed to 93 of self-
identified liberals. Additionally, two separate studies using nationally representative 
samples showed that U.S. citizens’ brief exposure to both written and spoken Spanish or 
heavily accented English by Latino speakers, prompted a more punitive response 
regarding immigration related policies, but only among non-Hispanic white Republican 
voters (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). 
 
Several  se l f - ident i f i ed Democrats expressed concern that the term ‘ i l l egal  immigrant ’  
was pol i t i ca l ly  loaded and would l ikely  tr igger  a negat ive  response f rom indiv iduals  
with Conservat ive  l eanings .  These concerns were not  expressed by those who se l f -
ident i f i ed as Republ i cans.  
 
“Illegal immigrant is a little loaded – just like Obamacare, it’s loaded.” 
 
“There’s a lot of political weight, um I don’t know how to put it, around this. It’s like oh, ‘I 
agreed with this until I see the illegal immigrants’ – I can see a lot of people say yeah, I totally 
agree with this except not…not with this illegal immigrants. I could see where that would take 
this question and make it very political. ‘Nope I don’t believe in doing anything for illegal 
immigrants, and while I agree with 99% of this, I’m going to say no because of the illegal 
immigrants thing here.’ If you left that out people would say, yeah I agree…I guess.” 
 
“If you leave it [the term illegal immigrant], it’s like ‘this is what we’re trying to do – save 
billions of dollars and get as many people covered on the private health insurance.’ Right now, if 
illegal immigrants are in this eligible person thing, I don’t even need to include that!...Fox-news 
wouldn’t like this! They’d pick this thing apart.” 
 
“You see, anytime you say illegal, now it could be including immigrants, but including illegals - 
for some people that’s going to be a disagree not matter what else you have in there. This is going 
to be a ‘no-go’… I’m bypassing it because of what I do, but I have to look at it and they’re 
persons too, but the illegal it’s like they’re not persons too. So you’ve already put into someone’s 
mind that these people are not people.” 
 
“I would think that some would still disagree because of the immigrant. Now I would say that 




Several  subjec ts  f rom the cogni t ive  interv iews and respondents  f rom the onl ine 
tes t ing-phase expressed ambivalence regarding the ‘ i l l egal  immigrant ’  cue in 
inf luenc ing the ir  pol i cy  pre f erences .   
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A respondent from the online testing phase provided the following comment 
about their conflict with the idea of illegal immigrants benefitting from public services:  
 
“I must admit that I have mixed feelings about giving full services to people who come here 
illegally. I do not think that they are entitled to them. We are generous if we give them. We 
would not get services at all if we went to their country illegally... /  Yet there are good things 
about educating children providing prenatal care and feeding children... I do not know how any 
feeling human being can deny food education and medical care to any child. I also believe that 
health care is a good thing for all people to get as it prevents the spread of diseases that will affect 
everyone in the community.” 
 
One younger subject based in central Texas explained his ambivalence about the 
illegal immigrant prime:  
 
“I would say that I strongly agree, but then I see the illegal immigrant. That has a nasty 
connotation is there another way to say this? Right now I’d say I agree because even with the 
immigrant it still makes them healthy, and that’s important.” 
 
A second online respondent shared similar sentiments:  
 
“Some of these I strongly agreed with except including illegal immigrants - that reduced my 
answers down to agree with. I just don't know that if someone is here illegally the government 
has any responsibility towards them at all.” 
Another respondent from the online testing phase offered a clearer perspective 
on how the prime changed their preference: 
 
 “I fully support societal (government paid) services for the poor. I DO NOT support AT 
ALL programs meant to help people who ARE ILLEGALLY PRESENT. Go home and 
get here legally. THEN I will show my support for you.” 
 
EMERGING THEMES: SOCIAL COMPARISON & FAIRNESS 
Several subjects expressed concerns about the fairness of immigrant participation 
in the public entitlement programs. While this is not a hypothesis that is being directly 
tested using the current survey instrument, the frequency with which it came up in 
subjects’ think aloud exercise warranted some acknowledgement. Behavioral economists 
may offer some useful insights into this phenomenon with a growing body of empirical 
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evidence from experimental research demonstrating that individuals prioritize reciprocity 
in social and financial exchanges. Gächter and Thöni (2010) conducted laboratory gift 
exchanges in several countries, including 56 subjects within the U.S., to test the ‘fair-wage 
effort’ hypothesis and found that workers’ that experienced lower wages reduced their 
efforts when workers had information that colleagues earned substantially more. More 
recently, an experiment conducted on seasonal contract workers in Germany provided 
evidence supporting the social comparison hypothesis showing that wage reductions 
lowered worker productivity and satisfaction only when colleagues in the same team had 
not experienced a similar wage cut. The researchers note that individuals with identical 
characteristics whose colleagues experienced the similar wage cut to their colleagues did 
not report lower satisfaction or reduced productivity (Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, and 
Schneider, 2014). These scholars’ findings provide an interesting framework to help 
explain the views expressed by the interviewees.  
 
Concerns about the i ssue o f  fa irness regarding immigrant part i c ipat ion,  spec i f i ca l ly  
i l l egal  immigrant part i c ipat ion,  in publ i c  bene f i t s  were raised by some subjec ts  with 
l ess  educat ion and others  with Republ i can leaning.  These concerns were not  raised 
among se l f - ident i f i ed Democrats  with more educat ion.   
A construction worker in central Texas who did not express any partisan leanings 
raised the issue of fairness in this way:  
 
“I’m not sure about the immigrants – I’m not real high on it. Us as American people who are 
paying taxes and we should get stuff first, but there are a lot of things that we can’t get even 
though we pay taxes, so it’s about fairness…That would cause me to disagree with it, but 
without it [illegal immigrants] then I question who is included. Not to say that illegal 
immigrants bother me, but I don’t want them there to get what I can’t get.” 
 A younger subject from central Texas who attended community college in 
central Texas expressed concerns when he compared his situation to the illegal 
immigrants:  
 
“Illegal immigrants don’t lose out on anything. So I say no, but eventually I’m going to lose 
‘cause I can’t put myself in their shoe when they benefit from this.” 
 
 68 
A self-identified Republican in the Gulf Coast region articulated financial 
concerns but stressed the issue of responsibility:  
 
“I strongly disagree with this one. We should not be paying anything to illegal immigrants, legal 
ones yes. The reason why? It’s bankrupting our country. We should be taking care of our own, 
not those. The government, well their [emphasis] government should be taking care of their own 
people.” 
A subject from west Texas who self-identifies as a Republican expressed her 
reservation regarding immigrant participation in programs and the issue of fairness 
linking it to homeless citizens:  
 
“All mothers need care for their safety, but it does make me mad that we have all of these 
homeless VA vets and immigrants get more than them. It’s not fair people are forced to pick 
and choose what they can get because of their income – if you need it, no matter what. We need 
to look at our own back yard first to see who gets benefits. But they [immigrants] can get more 
than the VA gets, you know. Why work? They qualify for more than our good old Americans. 
I think we should be fair on immigrants, but look after our own first.” 
REACTIONS TO THE SAVINGS ESTIMATES 
Americans’ attitudes on taxes are known to be complex. On one hand, most 
individuals want high quality services accessible to many, but their expressed willingness 
to pay remains low (Meltsner, 1974). Political scientists contend that some political actors 
capitalize on individuals’ concerns about immigration as a means of mobilizing voters in 
an effort to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; 
Messina, 1989). A wealth of empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals are more 
opposed to taxes that are more visible (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Citrin, 1978; 
Finkelstein, 2007; Meltsner 1974) and in recent years political strategists have emphasized 
the government costs associated with immigrants (Hanson et al, 2007). This survey is 
specifically designed to address the issues raised by the sponsors of exclusionary policies 
– immigrant participation, concerns about unauthorized immigrants and the perceived 
tax burden. However, I deviate from prior work by presenting native citizens with 
positively framed information about the return on investment for means-tested 
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programs. By altering the perspective to focus on the fiscal benefits rather than fiscal 
burdens I seek to neutralize some of the negative effects about immigrant participation 
and simulating a social and economic reward for maximizing enrollment. We currently 
have little knowledge on the impact of concrete savings estimates in relation to 
immigrant participation on views about social welfare programs, however, the subjects 




Many subjec ts  s tated that the savings es t imates  presented inf luenced the ir  support  
for  the programs put in front o f  them.  
 
One subject from central Texas who self-identified as a Democrat provided these 
comments about the savings estimates presented for the food nutrition program:  
 
“I would agree with that. I feel like it’s a cycle if you give them the habits and the resources and 
the knowledge it equips them to tackle this themselves so they cycle out…At first I was thrown 
because we got the health benefits here, then it went into the saving for schools, but then the 
statement resolves itself here with the ‘for every dollar we spend here, we get x back.’ [Pause] 
Yeah it’s helpful, because if it just said it creates enormous savings, I’d be like, why? But this 
makes it clear – we get something back.” 
One subject from the Gulf Coast with strongly expressed Republican leanings 
stated:  
 
“I agree with this because it makes sense. You’re saving money…if you lay a dollar out and you 
get $3.10 back that’s a no-brainer. Plus, most of those kids don’t have it anyway. So yeah, 
you’re netting $2.10 back.” 
 
Another subject in central Texas with no stated political affiliation provided the 
following explanation about how the numbers influenced her opinion on some of the 
vignettes presented:“ 
 
It was really interesting reading some of the statistics, like the $3.10 for every dollar, and the 
$1,380 for every $1,000 – I felt like I was learning. And having those statistics made me more 
inclined to agree, maybe because anyone can say [funny voice], ‘this will improve the economy.’ 
But actually having the numbers to back it up it gave me something to get behind.” 
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Once exposed to the concrete  savings es t imate some subjec ts  expressed a des ire  for  
more numeric  in formation,  somet imes because they were  cur ious and found the 
information he lpful ,  but others expressed skept i c i sm about the source  o f  this  
information.   
  
One younger subject with no stated political affiliation requested numeric 
information that had no relation to the fiscal arguments presented:  
 
“I wanted to see a statistic like I did with the other questions – maybe something about the life 
expectancy when they get these credits that would be helpful.” 
A subject based in west Texas who is a self-identified Republican provided this 
reaction to the savings estimate:  
 
“I’m one of those that I don’t always believe what I read. I’m going with the premise that these 
numbers are true, that they’re correct, but normally I would want to do some extensive research 
to find out exactly what that means…I’m skeptical because the government spends my money 
like I have a lot of it [laughs], and I don’t!” 
 
Another subject in central Texas who is a self-identified Democrat also wanted 
more information regarding the savings estimates provided:  
 
“Some of the things that I see, like this $3.10 savings on health care alone – the first thing I 
think about is over what period? These are things that I’ve read a bit about, and I strongly 
agree. Probably because I’ve heard other people say that. Um, yeah that seems definitely 
plausible. I’ve heard other people have done these kinds of studies, and their results are positive. 
So, yeah - this sounds like one of those things I’ve heard about – and I’ve never heard anything 
where they say we’ve spent money on low-income women and children and it wasn’t very useful, 
so we’re not going to do that anymore [laughs]!” 
 
Partisans tended to be more skeptical about the numerical estimates provided as 
compared to those without strong political affiliation. 
REACTIONS TO THE (NON)PARTISAN CUES 
An individual’s allegiance to a political party is believed to be one of the most 
important predictors of policy preferences. Well-cited work by Campbell et al. (1960) 
suggests that individuals with stronger bonds to a political party exhibit greater 
perceptual distortion towards the party’s platform. A generation of scholars have 
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supported this line of reasoning, consistently demonstrating that the politically engaged 
interpret new political messages with a bias toward their existing preferences and express 
their opinions to align with or justify their party’s position (Bartles, 2002; Druckman et 
al, 2010; Gaines et al, 2007; Gilens, 2001; Goren, 2002; Goren et al, 2009; Tourangeau 
and Rasinski, 1988; Zaller, 1992). When partisan voters are presented with a political 
message from their chosen (opposing) party they tend to support (reject) the message 
and accept (reject) the political consequences articulated in the statement (Abramowitz 
2010; Zaller, 2004).  
One subject in central Texas, a Democrat, provided insights into how his political 
leanings impact his level of trust in the information within the vignettes for the food 
nutrition program, which lacks a partisan prime, stating:  
 
“I’m in this camp. I can’t educate myself on all the issues because I come from that side of 
things. The people I vote for tell me these things are good, so I would probably believe this.”  
 
Citizens are more prone to engage in partisan reasoning when reminded of the 
origins a political message, but Zaller (1992) suggests that their response should be more 
positive when they receive a message that signals political consensus because this elevates 
the issue into the mainstream. Later research supports this finding demonstrating that 
citizens with higher levels of political knowledge and participation were more likely to be 
persuaded by political messages and lend their support to political issues when they 
receive information that indicates partisan consensus (Druckman et al, 2010; Goren et al, 
2009). The comments from some interview subjects in relation to the bipartisan prime 
starkly contrast the findings from prior work and raise important questions into the 
pervasiveness of polarization in American politics. 
 
Many subjec ts ,  even those without a s tated part i san leaning,  assoc iated  the v ignet te  
for  the heal th insurance subsidy with ‘Obamacare ’  even though the term 
‘Obamacare ’  was never  inc luded in the v ignet te .   
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Nonpartisan (‘Elected official’) cue to Nonpartisan - “That’s the new Obamacare – 
that’s the key word – is it seen as derogatory? You could see if that turns people off, but that’s 
the danger of using it.” 
 
Partisan cue on Nonpartisan - “Is this Obamacare?... Oh yeah, I didn’t pick up on the 
Democrats, but I know I’ve heard about this. Yeah, you can’t call it Obamacare.”  
 
Partisan cue to Nonpartisan - “This issue [health insurance subsidies] is divided along 
party lines, so it makes it worse. We can’t find middle ground, it’s difficult [Pause] So, don’t 
mention Democrats, it’s a hot button word. They will start making assumptions.” 
 
Subjec ts  who expressed a part i san leaning,  but rece ived the party sponsor cue 
expressed s trong emot ions when asked to discuss the ir  v i ews about the v ignet te  for  
the heal th insurance subsidy .   
A subject in west Texas who is a self-identified Republican wanted to omit partisan 
information because she felt it would reduce support among other Republicans:  
 
Partisan cue to Partisan (Republican) - “I know that this was done by the Dems, so I 
don’t care if it says this, but for some it may change how they see it. You don’t even have to 
make it a person – policy or the new law. The law was written to pass these credits. Even 
though I blame them personally, if it read another way I’d still say, ‘Well, who passed the damn 
law?’ I can pick that a part [laughs]. I saw that it said Democrats, and I know those S.O.B.’s 
did that [laughs]…I truly believe that when this law passed, well I don’t believe it was passed, 
it was shoved (emphasis) either down my throat or up my back-side! [laughs]. Either way 
um…I believe initially it started with good intentions, but later down the line I think they 
started to say, ‘How dare you question what I’ve put together. I’ve worked hard on this.’ Then 
it just got to, ‘Screw you, it’s just going to happen.’ And so it’s not the law of the land, it’s the 
forced of the government. And I think when they did this they took away individual rights.” 
 
A Gulf-Coast Democrat echoed the concerns expressed by the Republican woman from 
West-Texas, emphasizing the his perceptions of what the ‘typical’ Republican would say:  
 
Partisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - “I think a lot of people would strongly disagree 
with this because ‘they haven’t saved the system billions of dollars – I’ve been told that’s not true 
and it’s a big waste of money’…people more on the Republican or conservative side of things, 
anyone who watches Fox news on semi-regular basis is probably going to disagree with that. I 
think there are a couple of things they’d disagree with, both that there is savings with, uh 
Obamacare, I mean we’re talking about Obamacare here – um and, so people would disagree 
with the premise.” 
 




Partisan cue to Partisan (Republican) - “I disagree. Number one, I think what they’re 
doing is, well a lot of people are going to lose their health care because they can’t afford it because 
they’re paying for everyone else’s. So I strongly disagree. What I think is that they should have 
left it alone and taken all the money they wasted and given everybody health insurance. They 
need to improve on it, don’t get me wrong, but it’s going to cost everybody! They’re taking $1-3 
trillion out of Medicaid and Medicare to pay for this deal. So it’s going to hurt the people who 
need it the most, to pay for this. So I think they should have left it alone and funded health 
insurance for everybody else. I’m not sure how it works, but they’re spending money like it’s not 
theirs.” 
 
Subjec ts  who expressed a part i san leaning,  but rece ived the e l e c t ed o f f i c ia l  pr ime 
s t i l l  provided emot ional responses about the v ignet te  for  the heal th insurance 
subsidy .   
 
 
Nonpartisan (Elected officials) cue to Partisan (Democrat) - “So the country seems to 
be fairly polarized, especially in terms of immigration and health care. I think the past eight 
years, with Obama, it’s pushed the country to be more polarized um, which sucks. I wish we 
could all just get a long, and we’re probably a lot closer to things than we realize. But you’ve got 
people who are - well the whole Republican Party is trying to separate itself out from the 
Democratic Party as much as possible, and the Democratic Party probably does the same thing. 
Me, being someone identifying more as a Democrat, I see the party as trying to be more inclusive 
and [different voice] ‘we’d like you guys to agree with us’. I see Republicans as very adversarial 
[different voice] ‘we don’t care what you think, this is the right way! Whether you agree with us 
or not, this is the right way!’ But you know, I’m biased because I identify with this crowd and 
not that crowd.” 
 
Nonpartisan (Elected officials) cue to Partisan (Democrat) - “Oh, I got one more 
thing to say on this one, you say elected officials have worked to pass. Well not necessarily. I 
mean, some [emphasis] elected officials have worked to pass these credits [laughs], but a whole 
lot [emphasis] have not worked to pass this. It’s not like the whole government is working on 
this – we got maybe half and half because the Congress and Senate are split and, uh, is pretty 
much weighing on the not-doing-it. I mean the Obamacare was pushed through, and the 
Supreme Court said, ‘yeah we could do this stuff’. But there’s a time coming in where this may 
not look the same…But don’t put Democrats in there either, to me this has to be as generic as 
possible because you’re going to interview people who, I mean, I’m looking at this from a biased 
perspective, if you’re going to have a multitude of people doing this survey, you don’t want stuff in 
it that’s going to turn people off. So telling a Republican, I see Democratic officials – we’re 
already going to be in the ‘disagree’ category.” 
 
Some subjec ts  thought the bipart i san cue did send a posi t ive  message that prenatal  
care was a universal  i ssue .  However ,  most  part i sans were skept i cal  o f  the idea that 
Republ i cans and Democrats would be wi l l ing to work together .  Many Republ i cans 
c i t ed Democrats ’  s trong support  and uni lateral  passage o f  the Affordable  Care Act ,  
and Democrats o f t en c i t ed recent  e f for ts  made by Republ i can o f f i c ia ls  to  reduce 
funding for  the women’s  heal th care program Planned Parenthood.   
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Bipartisan cue to Nonpartisans - “I love that it says both Republicans and Democrats, 
because if it was just like, ‘Republicans did this’ then my first thing would be like, ‘damn those 
Democrats! They hate babies!’ So, good call on that [laughs]! I think it’s compelling that they 
both did it because then it can be clear that this is something that everyone universally agrees on, 
and it’s not just something that one political party wants everyone to believe in.” 
 
Bipartisan cue to Partisans (Republican) - “If they’re working together, it’s an issue that 
crosses the aisle. It’s not right to expect very vulnerable section of the population to not get help 
with this [prenatal care]. If you can plan ahead to help the child there are some basic fixes and 
the health concerns are important.” 
 
Bipartisan cue to Partisans (Republican) - “Well that’s what’s happening right? Well 
number one if it weren’t bipartisan I don’t think it’d pass. Oh but wait, I can’t say that 
because the Democrats were able to push through the health care without even one Republican 
vote, so maybe I don’t believe it. It really doesn’t matter who passes it I’m good with it, but I 
guess it could make a difference.” 
 
Bipartisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - “I notice that you use Republicans and 
Democrats in this one instead of just politicians [pause] uh women’s health has been a really big 
issue in Texas, namely on the matter of abortion. But if they’re closing down clinics, it doesn’t 
seem as if they’re expanding care. I would be interested in learning more.” 
 
Bipartisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - “No, don’t you know they cut Medicaid and 
they cut CHIP, I mean here in Texas. So I strongly disagree with this. I mean we used to do a 
lot more – we used to have WIC and now they’re refusing to let us join Obamacare and expand 
Medicaid, which would help poor mothers. I do know that the county does stuff – I work for 
Travis County. Even then, they don’t advertise the county clinics where you can get free prenatal 
care and vaccines and stuff, but they don’t want people to know about it. Why not? Because 
then the costs would go up. So I disagree… I don’t think we’re working to expand. Yeah this is 
what I disagree with – ‘the Republicans and Democrats’. I just read in the paper, maybe 
Sunday’s paper that the Republicans are screwing with Medicaid and Planned Parenthood. It 
makes me angry…they’re making it more difficult, making mothers take on more costs – 
they’re working to reduce as much as possible – reduce Medicaid, reduce free health for women, 
you know they can’t even afford birth control. So I disagree with that sentence enough that I 
disagree with the whole statement – take that middle sentence out!” 
 
V. Conclusions 
Policy makers and political entrepreneurs regularly employ messaging strategies 
on immigration with the aim of influencing public opinion to secure electoral victory 
(Hayes, 20008; Abrajano and Hajinal, 2017; Tichenor, 2002). A large and vibrant body of 
research has demonstrated that political issue frames can play a major role in shaping 
preferences on a variety of topics (e.g. Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and 
 75 
Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and 
Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). But our understanding of how Americans actually interpret 
these frames is limited because political communication is often difficult for individuals 
to process (Druckman et al, 2010; Martin and Polivka, 1995) and prior experiences 
(Gaines, et al, 2007; Sniderman and Piazza, 2002) also influence decisions. These factors 
require a more complex study design, and vignette survey experiments have helped to 
innovate the approach to analyzing the complicated mix of competing messages found in 
political communication (e.g. Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Chong and Druckman, 
2007). 
The cognitive interview subjects offered a glimpse into U.S. citizens’ opinions 
about how immigrant participation can influence preferences about various public 
entitlement programs. The findings revealed that most subjects comprehended the 
language and policies as intended and across the group. Subjects consistently noticed 
when an immigrant cue was embedded in one of the vignettes, and the definitions they 
came up with for both immigrants and illegal immigrants were overwhelmingly uniform 
across the sample. Most subjects’ reactions to the concrete savings estimates 
demonstrated, at least in some instances, that it was possible to neutralize the negative 
effect of the illegal immigrant cue. However, some subjects expressed skepticism about 
the savings estimates.  
Many subjects seemed to link the issue of immigration to politics, often noting 
the issue of immigration more generally as a ‘hot-button’ political issue. This seemed to 
be a particularly prominent concern among those who expressed some sort of political 
leaning.  
 
“Does politics drive the response to the questions? I mean whatever end of the spectrum, 
whatever source of news they get their information from – we’ve kind of been told which way 
we’re going to go. I’m a left-leaning Democrat and the group of people I agree with support this, 
and I agreed with everything...This is good because it presents evidence based arguments, but 
these aren’t always effective because the topics we’re discussing here are in the political sphere.” 
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It was not uncommon for individuals of both political parties to express concern 
that the vignettes set immigrant group in relation to the public entitlement programs 
because they felt it would negatively influence Republican respondents, not Democrats. 
On this point Democrats stated the political ramifications of an immigrant prime would 
decrease support for the provision, and Republicans seemed to be concerned on some 
level about how they as a party might be perceived.  This is an important take-away as 
the subjects in this study did not enter as a blank canvas.  Their previous experience 
helped shape their attitudes regarding immigrant cues and the policies under 
consideration.  
Through the cognitive interviews I gained rich insights into some of the factors 
that influence Americans’ preferences about public entitlement programs, immigrant 
participation in these programs, and the political dynamics at play. For some subjects, 
their ethnic background - being Mexican American - played a role in their how they 
perceived the immigrant cues. Others highlighted their vocation – a Methodist preacher 
– meant they could not exclude a person from any public program regardless of where 
they were born. Although these were important considerations for a handful of subjects, 
across the entire group, partisanship emerged as the most substantive factor swaying 
their preferences on the topic at hand.  
This outcome falls in line with prior research in the field of understanding 
framing effects in which partisans’ identity altered their interpretation of the facts 
(Gaines, et al, 2007). Subjects with strong party attachment crafted arguments that helped 
support their respective party’s position on the policy at hand. This expression of 
partisan interpretation was most evident when they observed the partisan cues embedded 
in the frames, and this seems to be a necessary addition to vignette survey experiments 
aimed at examining individuals’ attitudes about immigrants in the U.S. and their policy 
preferences for this population. 
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Annex 2.A – Verbal Probes Presented to Each Subject (without script) 
 
◆ Can you talk though why you picked this answer? 
 
◆ What were you thinking of when you picked this answer?   
 
◆ Can you tell me what you were thinking when you answered this way? 
 
◆ Can you give me some examples? 
 
◆ What came to mind when you read _____? 
 
◆ “I noticed you pausing - what were you thinking about answering that question?” 
 
Meaning of words/phrases and questions 
◆ What does the word _______ mean to you? 
 
◆ What does the phrase ________ mean to you? 
 
◆ The scenario asked you ______.  What did you think of ______ in this context? 
 
Low-income Moderate income Prenatal care Premature births
 Preventative care 
Return on investment Cost-effective Child tax credits  Democrats
 Republicans and Democrats 
Immigrant Illegal Immigrant 
 
Sensitivity 
◆ Do you think others would have difficulty answering a question or would answer 
the question honestly? 
 
Comprehension 












Annex 2.B – Example of QAS Form 
 
OL – August 18, 2015 
Male - African American – 1955 - Single 
Custodial Staff –$50-59K  
Political Views: N/A 
 
Evaluate Reading – Does the participant have difficulty reading the any part of the question?  
Underline words and phrases where readers experience difficulty or extended pauses.   
Conflicting or Inaccurate Instructions: Introductions or Explanations Y N 
Complicated Instructions: Introductions or Explanations Y N 
Wording: Lengthy, ungrammatical, or awkward phrasing, complicated syntax  Y N 
Technical Terms: Undefined, unclear, or complex terms Y N 
Notes:  
 
Interpretation of the Questions 
Clarity: Problems related to communicating the intent or meaning of the 
question 
Y N 
Vague: Multiple ways to interpret the question or to decide what is to be 




Knowledge/Logic – Problems with the underlying logic of any portion of the question 
Knowledge: Unable to understand specific terms within the question Y N 
Attitude: Is the respondent unable to formulate an attitude being asked about?  Y N 
Recall: Does the respondent have problems remembering the information 
asked for? 
Y N 
Computation: Does the question require any difficult mental calculation? Y N 
Notes: Does not like ‘return on investment’ and in-state tuition to a lesser 




Sensitive Content: Does the respondent feel that there is any content that is 
embarrassing, private, or of a sensitive topic that may prevent them or any 
individual from answering the question honestly? 
Y N 
Sensitive Wording: Are there any suggested improvements to the wording to 
minimize sensitivity? 
Y N 
Socially Acceptable: Does the respondent not respond Y N 
Notes: Commented that illegal immigrant may cause trouble but then defined 
what he thought was an illegal immigrant, and did not think that it would 





CHAPTER III (PAPER 2) 
ARE AMERICANS WILLING TO REJECT A 
FISCAL BENEFIT TO EXCLUDE IMMIGRANTS 
FROM PUBLIC ENTITLEMENTS? 
 
Abstract   
 The study explicitly tests three major theories believed to spark exclusionary policies 
directed at the foreign-born – concerns about immigrant participation in government 
funded programs, animosity towards unauthorized immigrants, and the perceived tax 
burden. Economists, psychologists, and political scientists have all demonstrated that 
individuals are less willing to fund public services when the costs are explicitly stated and 
when an emphasis is on unpopular beneficiaries. The vast evidence showing the impact 
of political frames suggests that political messages centered on the immigrant tax burden 
would negatively influence Americans’ enrollment preferences for government funded 
programs, but would a similar pattern emerge if individuals were exposed to a positive 
frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies? Also, could providing 
Americans with a concrete savings estimate associated with the policies weaken 
opposition to immigrant participation, or would citizens reject these savings to block 
immigrant access? Data from a unique survey experiment put to a nationally 
representative sample (N= 1,931) of U.S. citizens reveal that immigrant participation 
consistently induced more exclusionary responses, irrespective of educational attainment 
and income levels, indicating that pocketbook concerns are not driving these preferences. 
Although there are significant differences the responses of Republicans and Democrats, 
the findings reveal that immigrant cues consistently trigger more negative responses 
irrespective of party identification. Finally, across all groups there was little evidence 
indicating the savings estimates reduce punitive policy preferences, suggesting that 
Americans will reject a fiscal benefit to block immigrant access to government funded 






Over the last 25 years elected officials and other political actors regularly 
emphasize the negative effects of immigration, often putting costs squarely at the center 
of this debate. Recent efforts have included a slew of efforts proposed at all levels of 
government including re-examining the U.S. Constitution to prohibit birthright 
citizenship for the children of unauthorized migrants (Immigration Reform Law 
Institute, 2006) and implementing English-only ordinances in towns throughout the 
country (Preston, 2011). 
More recently, prominent pollsters in the realm of the U.S. political system have 
spent months trying to explain how they could have so badly miscalculated the 
controversial entrepreneur Donald Trump’s elevation to become the President of the 
United States.  A candidate’s favorability rating is measured using the following survey 
question – “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of businessman, Donald 
Trump?” Public opinion researchers heavily rely upon this measure as a strong predictor 
of candidate success (Shaw, 1999). Although he had not officially announced his 
candidacy, Trump’s favorability ratings were significantly less popular than previous 
contenders who had secured their party’s nomination, and significantly less popular than 
the other candidates expected to be in the race to lead the Republican Party (Enten and 
Silver, 2016).  
However, after giving a speech in which he stated: “I would build a great wall. And 
nobody builds walls better than me, believe me. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. 
And I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.” Trump’s favorability ratings 
immediately leaped from 35 to 52 percent (Chase et al, 2016; Lind, 2016). Although 
many of his most ardent supporters live in communities where there are relatively few 
immigrants (Rothwell and Diego-Roswell, 2016), a growing number of scholars and 
pollsters have reached a consensus that the issue of immigration has fueled Donald 
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Trump’s success, and that he is bringing new voters into the political process (Gimpel, 
2016). 
Historical analysis shows that political actors from across the political spectrum 
regularly invoke hostile frames directed at immigrants either for the purpose of shoring 
up support or to implement restrictionist policies (Tichenor, 2002). For instance, 
consider a 1993 news report in The Los Angeles Times quoting Henry Cisneros, the 
Secretary for Housing and Urban Development under President Clinton: "there are some 
benefits [that illegal aliens] clearly ought not have... health benefits and welfare benefits and others that 
serve as a magnet attracting people here from other countries."  
Although there was little evidence to support this claim,14 the argument that 
immigrants enter the U.S. to benefit from the social safety net and subsequently drive up 
the costs for taxpayers, was used as an impetus for the passage of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Commonly 
referred to as welfare reform, the legislation effectively made citizenship a central 
component of eligibility, and was framed as a necessary step to improve the ‘quality’ of 
the immigrants by deterring individuals who were perceived to be a higher risk of 
enrolling in public services from ever settling within the U.S. (Fix and Passel, 2002). 
Politicians placed particular emphasis on a specific fiscal projection that estimated the 
immigrant provisions of the law would save nearly 40 percent within six years of 
implementation (Congressional Budget Office, 1996). 
Ten years after welfare reform, households that had at least one non-citizen 
family member were significantly less likely to be enrolled in entitlement programs, as 
compared to households totally comprised of citizens (Capps, Fix, and Henderson, 2009; 
Ellwood and Ku, 1998). The projected savings also never materialized, which was 
                                                
14 More detailed explanations on the push / pull factors and cumulative causes that spark migration to the United 
States see: Durand and Massey, 1992; Espenshade, 1995; Massey, 1990, 1993. Research investigating enrollment levels 
and the public cost of immigrants showed that immigrants were less likely to be enrolled in public benefits programs 
than native born citizens including: Blau, 1984; Borjas and Trejo, 1993; Tienda and Jensen, 1986. 
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perhaps unsurprising as the share of foreign born enrolled in federal entitlements 
programs made up only 15 percent of the total case-load in 1996 (Fix, Capps, and 
Kaushal, 2009). Nevertheless, these facts failed to dampen the political rhetoric on this 
issue.  Text from the influential political strategist Dr. Frank Luntz’s (2005) messaging 
manual on immigration policy captures the sentiment well: “Fix the immigration problem and 
we begin to fix the economy. Fix the immigration problem and we reduce the cost of government. Fix the 
immigration problem and taxpayers get the break they deserve.” 
The aim of this study is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public 
opinion about the foreign-born influences American citizens’ willingness to restrict 
access to government funded initiatives. To disentangle the impact of these attitudes on 
policy preferences aimed at immigrant populations I provide evidence from an original 
nationally representative dataset of 1,931 respondents.15 These participants were exposed 
to three experimental vignettes to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant 
groups influence their willingness to exclude for programs that reduce poverty and 
inequality and whether providing a concrete savings estimate could help to weaken 
opposition to immigrant participation. Additional tests were also conducted to determine 
whether education and income levels as well as political partisanship affect support 
restrictionists policies.  
CURRENT GAPS IN THE LITERATURE & EVIDENCE  
Some academics have argued that candidates and other political actors can 
recalibrate partisan alignments by exploiting citizens’ concerns about immigrants 
(Messina, 1989).  The theory suggests that political actors can promote policies that 
penalize immigrant populations in order to obtain an electoral advantage (Simon and 
Alexander, 1993; Wilson, 2001) with the aim of reducing the size of the welfare state 
(Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). But can a messaging strategy that emphasizes immigrant 
                                                
15 Using the power analysis (See Annex 3.C) to estimate the appropriate size of the sample to detect any 
differences across treatment groups. This approach is recommended as best-practice in population-based 
survey experiments and is a requirement of the TESS submissions process. 
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participation in government-funded programs really alter the way Americans view these 
initiatives?  
Scholars have examined the links between individuals’ attitudes about immigrants 
and preferences for restricting access to public programs  (e.g. Borjas and Hilton, 1996; 
Clark, Passel, Zimmermand, and Fix, 1994; Fachinni and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and 
Hiscox, 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007; Hopkins, 2010; Olzak, 1992), but 
there is little agreement as to what is driving the hostility. We know from prior research 
that states with a higher concentration of ethnic minorities, particularly immigrant 
populations, tend to have lower expenditures (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; 
Hopkins, 2009) and more stringent eligibility criteria for means-tested programs (Graefe, 
De Jong, Hall, Sturgeon, and Van Eerden, 2008; Hero and Tolbert, 1996). We also know 
that citizens tend to be less supportive of spending on public goods and redistributive 
policies when they live in more ethnically diverse communities (Alesina and Glaeser, 
2004; Luttmer 2001; Vigdor, 2004). However, we have limited knowledge about citizens’ 
predisposition for blocking different immigrant groups from social welfare provisions. 
There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that individuals’ attitudes regarding 
redistributive policies can be shaped by the tone and content of the information 
presented, or how a political message is framed (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; 
Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2003 and 2006; Druckman, 2001; Kahneman, Ritov, and 
Schkade, 1999; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). For instance, political frames generate 
greater levels of support for social welfare provisions when they spell out the 
connections between the governmental policy and the target population (Jacoby, 2000). 
Still, Americans’ reactions to these frames are, at least to some extent, affected by their 
attitudes about the potential beneficiaries (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Nelson and 
Kinder 1996). While Americans are generally sympathetic towards ‘the poor’ some 
segments of society (e.g. immigrants) are perceived as less deserving, and this underlying 
bias could have an adverse effect on enrolment preferences (Gilens, 1999).  
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Scholarly work has also shown that individuals harbor greater opposition to taxes 
or funding of public services when the costs are explicitly stated (Cabral and Hoxby, 
2012; Finkelstein, 2007; Green et al, 1994; Meltsner 1974; Povich, 2014). Citrin (1979) 
argued that this tax burden tunnel vision often leads voters to support policies (tax cuts) 
that can harm individual and societal interests. The large and growing body of research 
adds credence to the claim that political messages centered on the immigrant tax burden 
would negatively influence U.S. citizens’ willingness to allow immigrant participation in 
government funded initiatives. But would a similar pattern emerge if individuals were 
exposed to a positive frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies? Also, 
could this opposition to immigrant participation be weakened if Americans received a 
concrete savings estimate associated with the policies, or would citizens reject these 
savings to block immigrant access?  
EXAMINING CITIZENS’ OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION 
The early studies investigating the links between hostility towards immigrants and 
punitive policy preferences offer evidence to establish a strong theoretical foundation, 
but unfortunately, the research designs and datasets employed by these studies introduce 
serious limitations and multiple forms of bias. Namely, the attitudinal data used in these 
studies were not collected for the specific purpose of examining immigration attitudes in 
the context of exclusionary policies, which makes it difficult to parse out the particular 
strands that weave together of voters' view in this realm (Schildkraut, 2013). Large-scale 
surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) or the National Elections Survey (NES) do 
provide high quality attitudinal data with a nationally representative sample, all of which 
yield some useful insights into citizens’ perceptions of the foreign-born. However, the 
survey questions from these data sources often use general wording referring to 
‘immigrants’ and ‘welfare’ and are presented completely separate questions, ruling out 
any potential for causal claims (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).  
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Second, the language used in the questions does not allow researchers to 
distinguish citizens’ attitudes about immigrants based on their legal status. Schildkraut 
(2013) notes the serious implications this lack of specificity has on research findings, as 
she identified substantial differences in respondents’ attitudes for immigration policies 
depending the wording of questions related to immigrant populations, and the policy 
proposals presented. In recent years, concerns related to unauthorized immigrants have 
dominated the public discourse of the immigration debate (Massey and Pren, 2012). The 
inability to disentangle these differences in citizens’ attitudes is also problematic because 
a growing body of research has shown that citizens in the U.S. (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins, 2012; Hartman, Newman and Bell, 2013; Iyengar et al; 2013) and across 
Europe (Ford, 2011; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013) hold different attitudes towards 
immigrants depending on various background characteristics, including legal status. 
While evidence from peer-reviewed studies examining the citizens’ exclusionary 
preferences across policies is limited, it is also plausible that attitudes may change under 
the context of different spending entitlement programs. Currently 20 states, including 
those with Republican controlled legislatures and above average immigrant populations, 
have allowed unauthorized immigrants to attend public universities at in-state tuition 
rates (Leber, 2013, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015).  If the people’s will 
is reflected in policy outcomes, then it stands to reason that citizens may be more 
supportive of specific immigrant groups benefiting from university education. However, 
polling data referenced (2005) to justify Dr. Frank Luntz’s framing on exclusionary 
policies indicates growing support for more restrictive policies for in-state tuition rates 
and ‘welfare’ provisions, but less restrictive positions for primary and secondary 
education and emergency health care access.16 
                                                
16 Although Luntz’s messaging manual fails to include any information methodology or sampling strategy 
for the data provided - raising doubts about the representativeness of the polling data, his prominent role 
in the drafting of Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America” has provided him as an influential strategist 
particularly among Republican policy makers (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). This level of influence warrants 
an examination the differences citizens’ willingness to exclude immigrants/illegal immigrants on this issue.  
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Ultimately, the absence of a baseline (a control) measure of American’s 
preferences for specific provisions limit our insights into how voters’ attitudes change as 
additional factors (i.e. concrete fiscal benefit, immigrant participation, and legal status) 
are introduced.  Consequently, the measures used to examine the impact of immigration-
related attitudes generate incomplete, imprecise, and often yield conflicting results for 
social scientists interested in understanding how citizens’ enrollment preferences are 
affected by their about immigrant participation. To date no study has explicitly tested 
whether it is possible to neutralize the effects of underlying hostilities by introducing a 
concrete fiscal benefit to maximizing enrollment. An experimental approach, using a 
fresh survey instrument with a control to establish baseline enrollment preferences, is the 
only way to achieve this credibly. 
 
II: Prior Research & Hypotheses 
RESEARCH LINKING POLICY OUTCOMES & ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
Scholarly work on policy formation cites racial and ethnic diversity as a critical 
motivator for proposals that penalize minority populations and budget reductions for 
public programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; 
Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Key, 1949). Researchers examining the role of ethnic diversity in 
shaping punitive policies find that states with larger shares of ethnic minorities were 
more likely to introduce measures seeking to limit access to government services or 
making English the official language than states with larger white/non-Hispanic 
populations (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1997). Restrictionist policies, at 
all levels of government, are also strongly correlated with demographic shifts in minority 
and immigrant populations (Citrin et al. 1990; Hopkins, 2010). Hopkins suggests that 
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growth in ethnic minorities (2009) and the foreign born (2010) within communities can 
reduce individuals’ willingness to raise taxes and trigger punitive policies targeted at 
immigrants. The author notes this particularly prevalent when an event (e.g. security 
threat or economic down turn) sparks national level attention and an anti-immigrant 
message is crafted. In light of the economic shocks (stagnating wages or prolonged 
unemployment) faced by many Americans during the Great Recession, these findings 
may help to support the main hypothesis tested in this study - that U.S. citizens will be 
less willing to maximize enrollment in public entitlement programs if they are think 
immigrant populations are also participating.  
 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS ABOUT IMMIGRATION: INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP 
LEVEL  
The Risk of  Personal Mater ia l  Loss  
Economic factors are thought to influence attitudes about immigrants because 
individuals develop hostile attitudes toward those who they perceive pose a threat to 
their material well-being (Bobo, 1988; King and Wheelock, 2007). Early theories on the 
formation of anti-immigrant policies builds off of research on racial threat to explain 
Americans’ resistance to policies aimed at improving the conditions for African 
Americans in the wake of the civil rights movement (Bobo, 1983; Fosset and Kiecolt, 
1989). The theory posits that political hostility directed at immigrants stems from anxiety 
that individuals within a dominant group will lose social, political or economic standing 
to the competing interests of an out-group (Olzak, 1992; Brown, 2013). At a 
fundamental level, citizens are thought to perceive a zero-sum contest in which 
foreigners threaten access to jobs (Mayda, 2006), public resources (Borjas and Hilton, 
1996), or general economic prosperity (Citrin et al, 1997). Under this construct, an 
individual’s level of discontent is rooted in resource competition with immigrants (e.g. 
the supply of jobs or access to public resources), and this animosity towards foreigners 
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may increase even when the proportion of and gains made by the foreign-born are 
imagined rather than actual advancements (Blinder, 2013).  
Scholars focusing on individual level concerns about immigrants regularly cite 
voters’ 'pocketbook' concerns: that immigrants, who are on average poorer and less 
educated, may require more government services, and therefore place a burden on 
taxpayers  (Clark et al, 1994; Hanson, 2005). A much-cited study by Hanson et al. (2007) 
expanded on this theory suggesting that wealthier individuals residing in states with a 
high fiscal exposure – those states with a high proportion of immigrants and allowing 
greater access to programs – hold greater hostility towards immigrants because their 
financial burden is believed to be higher. Facchini and Mayda (2009) flesh out the 
theoretical assumptions by citizens’ socioeconomic status, offering evidence that suggests 
that high income individuals are more opposed to immigration because they fear higher 
taxes, while low-income individuals are worried that their benefit levels may be reduced 
because the pool of applicants would expand. From this perspective, it would seem a 
reasonable assumption that individuals reflect upon their own interests before 
considering the needs of the 'other' when forming positions on specific policies. Studies 
on voting behavior support this hypothesis, finding that individuals make choices at the 
ballot box that enhance their personal position (Downs, 1957; Plotnick and Winters, 
1985). 
The Economic Threat to Soc ie ty  
A growing number of studies have offered evidence at odds with the framework 
that individuals’ concerns about personal financial losses are driving hostile attitudes 
towards immigrants. For instance, Espenshade and Hempstead’s (1996) study utilizing 
polling data collected by CBS News and The New York Times found that the strength of 
citizens’ restrictionist preferences were highly correlated with concerns about the health 
of the U.S. economy. Citrin et al. (1997) provided a similar result the following year using 
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two waves (1992 and 1994) of the American National Elections survey. The researchers 
showed that personal financial considerations played very little role in American’s 
support for immigration levels and receipt of government funded benefits, but concerns 
about the national economy were closely associated with individuals’ desire to restrict 
immigration. Other studies using similar methods and observational data support the 
group threat framework as a predictor of resentment towards immigrants, identifying 
concerns about the demographic changes, cultural norms, national identity in addition to 
concerns public resources and the national economy (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Castles 
and Miller, 1998; McLaren, 2003). 
Experimental studies on this topic offer a more nuanced perspective on the 
drivers of hostile attitudes towards immigrants, directly testing the various attributes of 
immigrants and context specific scenarios that may influence support for restrictionist 
policies. For instance, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) examine American’s preferences 
of admitting low skilled versus high skilled immigrants via a bespoke survey instrument 
using a nationally representative online panel. The authors present evidence 
demonstrating that both high and low skilled citizens are more positive about high skilled 
migrants and oppose low skilled migrants in roughly equal measure. Another key finding 
was that wealthier Americans who reside in states with high-fiscal exposure are no more 
opposed to low-skilled immigrants than wealthy Americans who live in states with low 
fiscal exposure, contradicting the findings of earlier studies in this realm. The authors 
conclude that sociotropic, or group-level concerns about the economy, rather than 
individual level concerns about taxes provide a better explanation for their results. 
Another pair of studies that also employ an experimental design on a nationally 
representative sample present Americans with negative frames that mimic the arguments 
lately adopted by some politicians, and were able to elicit feelings of anxiety about Latino 
immigrants with noticeable accents when they speak English (Gadarian and Albertson, 
2013) and those without legal status (Brader et al, 2009). A further paper by Hainmueller 
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and Hopkins (2012) attempts to determine if Americans had specific preferences on the 
type of immigrants granted a visa. By randomizing a variety of immigrant attributes 
including nationality, education, language, legal status, and other factors they found that 
Americans were no less likely to select potential applicants based on nationality. 
However, the participants nearly universally favored attributes mirroring the portrait of a 
highly skilled (e.g. highly educated, good language skills, and had legally secured a visa) 
migrant. The findings of each of these experimental studies provide support for the 
assumptions tested in this paper - that immigrants who would conceivably participate in 
public entitlement programs would conjure the image of low skilled migrants (as 
observed in Blinder, 2013), and would decrease U.S. citizens’ willingness to enroll into 
the programs presented.  
Concerns about Legal  Status 
Prejudice and stereotypes about racial and ethnic groups are also known to 
influence individual attitudes towards the foreign born (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). 
Experimental approaches to this topic revealed that Americans’ support for immigrants 
can differ depending on an immigrant's national or ethnic background (Brader et al, 
2008; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Sniderman et al, 2004), but that legal status 
seems to trigger higher levels of exclusionary preferences among citizens (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins, 2012).  
It is certainly possible that the overlapping biases towards immigrants, Americans 
ethnic minorities, and the rapid growth in the Latino population (Humes, Jones and 
Ramirez, 2011) may also be fueling some of the current anxieties about the long-term 
impact of inward migration (Chavez and Provine, 2009). Ethnic minorities within the 
U.S. tend to experience poorer outcomes relative to the non-Hispanic White population 
(Gandara, 2008). However, differences in earnings and other indicators of social and 
economic wellbeing between Latinos and Black Americans may highlight the burden of 
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foreignness experienced by Latinos residing in the U.S. (Dovidio, Gluszek, and John, 
2010), and therefore the legal status of immigrant beneficiaries is a required indicator. 
THE CONVERGENCE OF POPULIST ATTITUDES & RESTRICTIONIST POLICIES 
In the realm of immigration policy there had often been a sizeable disconnect 
between public opinion and the legislative behavior of political elites. Tichenor (2002) 
argues that this phenomenon was particularly noticeable within the U.S. context, largely 
due to the lobbying efforts on the part of business leaders and a conglomeration of 
interest groups (e.g. religious organizations or ethnic advocacy groups) who are able to 
wield their influence to prevent more restrictive immigration policies. But as the politics 
of immigration have become more polarized in recent years there seems to be a 
convergence in the populist support for anti-immigrant policies and the actions taken by 
elected officials.   
Traditionally, political action is assumed to be a product of the preferences of the 
electorate (Page and Shapiro 1983; Radcliff and Saiz, 1995; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 
1987), as elected officials craft policies aimed at attracting support for the largest share of 
the vote, which typically requires a centrist approach (Downs, 1957). However, at least 
over the last decade, individuals who are more engaged in politics have secured greater 
influence over the political discourse than centrists because elected officials are seeking 
approval from their party's activists (Abramowitz, 2010).  This may help to explain the 
rapid revival of nativist sentiments and sharp party distinctions in who supports such 
provisions, with Republicans shunning the more tolerant approach to immigration 
adopted by former president George W. Bush and Arizona senator John McCain in the 
early 2000s.  
Abramowitz (2010) argues that demographic changes within the U.S. are at least 
partially responsible for the partisan shift in politics. The rapid growth in the Latino 
population, which is more pronounced in different states, is known to increase anxiety 
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about immigrants (Hopkins, 2010). This population shift has led some elected officials, 
particularly right-leaning candidates, to prioritize the views of constituents who will turn 
out to the polls over the pull of interest groups, and is thought to be a major trigger for 
the state-level restrictionist proposals put forward since 2005 (Goodwyn, 2011). Some 
academics argue that for such a strategy to be successful, minority groups must be small 
or socially segregated, and must be tied to one side of the political aisle (Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004).  Noncitizens meet the criteria, as they have few outlets to exercise their 
civil rights and low voter turnout rates among ethnic minorities, who also tend to vote 
for Democratic candidates help to strengthen this argument.  
Over the last two decades, states with conservative governments were more likely 
to implement reduced benefit packages for low-income families and create further 
barriers to limit access to entitlement programs (Graefe et al., 2008). Additionally, the 
negative immigrant-related messages introduced in recent years were significantly more 
likely to come from Republicans (Hayes, 2008) – these frames have become even more 
salient with the election of President Trump (Mutz, 2018). Experimental studies that 
exposed respondents to vignettes with similar language used by politicians in recent 
debates found that negative frames (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) 
about immigration control policies only seemed to resonate among Republican voters. 
Given the current state of politics on the issue of immigration, it is critically important to 
investigate the differences in how individuals’ preferences on immigration policies differ 
depending on their partisan alignment. 
HYPOTHESES 
We currently have limited knowledge about the extent to which Americans 
are willing to exclude immigrant populations from specific programs, what external 
factors motivate these preferences, and whether it is possible to soften opposition to 
immigrant participation by providing individuals with information that mimics a 
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fiscal benefit. Building off the prior work in this area, but directly asking a nationally 
representative sample of 1,931 Americans, I will test the following assumptions:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Participants who are primed to think about immigrants benefitting 
from publicly funded initiatives will be more willing to exclude than those who receive 
the control vignette that lacks any reference to the foreign-born. Those who receive the 
‘illegal immigrant’ prime will provide the most punitive response, followed by those who 
receive the vignettes that remind participants that ‘immigrant’ also benefit.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Participants who are in ‘immigrant’ or ‘illegal immigrant’ treatment 
groups, but are also provided with a concrete savings estimate will be less opposed to 
excluding immigrants than those in the ‘immigrant’ or ‘illegal immigrant’ groups that 
omit the savings estimates.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Participants who have lower income and education levels will be more 
willing to exclude immigrant groups than the participants with higher incomes or 
education levels. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Participants who self-identify as Republican will be the most willing to 
exclude immigrants, even when offered the costs savings, as compared to Democrats or 
Independents who do not lean towards either of the two parties. 
 
III. Research Design & Methodology 
THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
Interest-based concerns regarding the economic impact of immigrants are 
thought to be a major driver of spending preferences on programs aimed at reducing 
poverty and inequality, particularly in areas with a higher concentration of ethnic 
minorities (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Hanson et al, 2007). I directly test this assumption 
by embedding the three experimental vignettes listed in Table 3.1. These vignettes are 
positively framed and focus on the general savings to draw out greater support for 
specific means-tested programs: child tax credits for the working poor, the supplemental 
nutrition program (WIC), and providing in-state tuition rates to non-state residents. The 
survey includes a second treatment level that presents respondents with a concrete fiscal 
benefit stated in numbers to test whether it is possible to neutralize the effects of 
hostility towards immigrants. The unique 2 by 3 survey design and large sample size 
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provides the opportunity to distinguish whether immigrant participation, their legal 
status, and explicitly stated monetary benefits alter Americans’ enrollment preferences 
across a broad range of programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality.  
The AmeriSpeak panelists provide key demographic information when they sign 
up to participate, it is therefore possible to block respondents into treatment groups 
based on a specific attribute to improve the power of the study (Bowers, 2011, Mutz, 
2011). A growing body of research has shown key differences in immigrant attitudes 
based on partisanship (Hopkins, 2014; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013), and to limit the 
risk of biased results participants were blocked into their treatment groups based on their 
party identification at rates proportionate to the general population – Republicans 42 
percent, Democrats 42 percent, Independents 16 percent who expressed no political lean 
towards either the Democrats or Republicans. Participants were then randomly assigned 
to a question order for the experimental vignettes, with equal probability among all 
possible orders across the three vignettes.   
 
 
Once the participant received their first vignette they were randomly assigned to 
one of six treatment groups, which are also of equal proportion and remain in that 
treatment across the three vignettes. The control group (1/6 of respondents), which did 
not contain an immigrant cue or a savings estimate establishes a baseline enrollment 
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preference for each of the programs of interest. The first treatment group (1/6 of 
respondents) differs from the control in only one aspect – the introduction of a numeric 
value for programmatic savings. The four remaining treatment groups follow an identical 
design, but introduced an immigrant cue - using 'immigrant' without savings (1/6), 
'immigrant' with savings (1/6), 'illegal immigrant' without savings (1/6), and 'illegal 
immigrant' with savings (1/6). For each vignette the savings estimates presented to the 
three treatment groups receiving the fiscal benefit are identical.  
 
Table 3.1: The Vignettes  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?  
CHILD TAX CREDITS: “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working 
parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep [people / immigrants / 
illegal immigrants] out of poverty. Also, when these families spend these tax refunds it 
provides a boost to our economy. [It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to 
working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity.] We must encourage 
every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits.”  
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION: “The food nutrition program helps low income 
[immigrant / illegal immigrant] children and new mothers get access to healthy food. 
This improves outcomes for their babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates 
enormous savings for schools and the health care system. [For example, every $1.00 
spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.] We 
must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition 
program.”    
IN-STATE TUITION: “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable [for 
immigrants / illegal immigrants] and help to prepare these students for higher-wage 
and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn 
more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. [Estimates show every 
$1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher 
tax revenue and reduced social services costs.] We must maximize our economic 
benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
Response Options (all versions):  
1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Disagree   3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree   5= Strongly Agree    
 
The entitlement programs have been selected because specific unauthorized 
immigrants (e.g. pregnant women and children) who meet the income requirements are 
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eligible for child tax credits and WIC. Additionally, 20 states provided unauthorized 
students who met certain criteria to claim in-state residency status, which reduced the 
costs of attending higher education. The services are generally referenced rather than 
using the program names (e.g. WIC, or even ‘welfare’) to reduce the risk of bias or 
confusion (Pew Research Center, 2011).  Each vignette includes three treatment groups 
that reference numeric estimates for programmatic savings. These figures are pulled from 
analyses conducted by universities and government reports, and therefore are not 
uniform. The savings estimates are explicitly stated in order to determine whether the 
numeric (and fact-based) information influences citizens’ preferences about who should 
benefit from government-funded programs. If such a change is observed it would 
provide a useful empirical strategy of anchoring17 not commonly used in research related 
to immigration attitudes and generate new evidence to advance the theory in this area.  
By including the ‘immigrant’ group I am able to test whether Americans’ 
concerns about immigrant participation in means-tested benefits reduces enrollment 
preferences. Blinder (2013) documents that UK citizens perceive the most disadvantaged 
migrant when exposed to the term ‘immigrant’.  Unauthorized immigrants are selected as 
a treatment prime because they are known to have the most polarizing effect given the 
current political climate. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) found that Americans were 
much less likely to support hypothetical visa applicants to the U.S. if they had not 
entered the country legally. Additionally, over the last decade, much of the negative 
opinions espoused about the foreign-born are directed at the growing number of 
unauthorized immigrants.  
                                                
17 The fields of experimental psychologists and behavioral economists have long used anchoring heuristic, 
or numeric information to influence participants’ knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. A useful sample of 
the literature includes: Airely et al. 2005; Chapman and Johnson, 1999; Epely and Gilovich, 2005; Strack & 




The Advantages o f  Employing an Experimental  Design 
Incorporating the randomized survey experiments in the research design 
provides several advantages over using standard survey data. First, an online survey 
allows the participant to complete the questionnaires privately, which is important, given 
the sensitive nature of the topic. Participants are more likely to respond honestly about 
their perceptions of different immigrant groups if they are not worrying about how a 
researcher may perceive or judge their preferences, therefore administering the survey 
online should help to reduce the social desirability bias (Groves, Fowler, Couper, 
Lepkowski, Singer, and Tourangeau, 2004; Robson, 2011). Second, unlike traditional 
attitudinal datasets, this study’s use of the survey experiment reduces the risk of biased 
estimates for willingness to exclude immigrant populations because the random 
assignment ensures that participants have an equal chance of being allocated to any of 
the six treatment groups, and therefore it can be assumed that the distributions of the 
responses are similar and comparable. The control group establishes a baseline for 
enrollment preferences and the treatment groups measure willingness to exclude in 
relation to the participation and legal status of immigrant groups. In principal, any 
statistically significant difference in enrolment preferences between the treatments and 
control can be attributed to the difference in preferences about the particular immigrant 
groups and the concrete fiscal benefit presented to respondents (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009; Mutz 2011). I also varied the order of the questions and locked respondents into 
the same treatment group from the start as a further step to lower the risk of bias. 
DATA COLLECTION 
With an increasing proportion of the U.S. public spending greater amounts of 
time online, web-based survey methods are quickly gaining popularity among researchers. 
Market researchers were the pioneers of online surveys, but the opportunity to reduce 
field-costs and rapid turnaround for response and data processing times has made this an 
attractive option for researchers in recent years. The early days of web-based surveys 
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often yielded sketchy results because there was little thought that went into a sampling 
strategy (Groves et al., 2004; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2010). However, this is 
increasingly improving as research firms prioritize quality and find new ways to expand 
coverage to include segments of the population that are more difficult to reach, such as 
the elderly, individuals in rural communities, and low-income households (Loftis and 
Lupia, 2008).  To determine the extent to which immigrant participation changes 
Americans’ preferences about who should benefit from government funded initiatives, I 
examine the data from 1,931 U.S. citizens aged 18 and older who completed interviews 
using the AmeriSpeak Panel via the University of Chicago’s research firm NORC. Data 
were collected at two time points from April 18th to May 26th 2017 and again from 
January 5th to February 22nd 2018.18 For the study, 4,989 AmeriSpeak panelists were 
invited to participate via email, providing a completion rate of 38.7 percent. Respondents 
completed the interview on their own computer, privately, and thus are more likely to 
respond honestly about their perceptions about public programs and immigrants. 
Completing this sensitive survey online reduces the risk of social desirability bias present 
in face-to-face or telephone interviews, as participants are known to alter responses to 
ensure the researcher may perceive or judge their preferences more favorably (Groves et 
al., 2004; Robson, 2011).  
The following section provides a detailed discussion on the sampling procedures 
for this project via NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel. Access to this nationally representative 
sample was obtained through a successful application to Time-sharing Experiments for 
the Social Sciences (TESS), a project funded by the Social, Behavioral, and Economic 
Sciences Directorate of the National Science Foundation. From 2001, TESS has 
                                                
18 An initial balance check revealed a problem with the blocking conditions on partisan identification, 
where participants were recruited without having any prior information on partisan preference. The study 
re-fielded in January 2018 to ensure that the treatment groups do not differ on this variable that is believed 
to be closely associated with Americans’ current views about immigrants. A summary table of the 
differences in the Non-Partisan Sample and Final Sample can be found in Annex B – these two samples 
are statistically similar on all other covariates of interest. 
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supported a wide range of scholars within the social sciences to conduct general 
population experiments. Through a comprehensive peer review process the Principle 
Investigators screen proposals for their importance of their contribution to science and 
society. These proposals are then passed to a diverse team of leading scholars in the 
applicant’s field, in administering the review process. Successful applicants to TESS have 
the standard data collection and data dissemination costs paid by the program.  
The NORC AmeriSpeak Panel  
The NORC AmeriSpeak Panel has garnered a reputation among scholars as 
providing high quality data because it has gone to great lengths to establish and maintain 
a nationally representative panel. Initially designed by a research team in 2010 at the 
University of Chicago, the NORC National Frame employs a two –stage probability 
sample design, which covers more than 97 percent of households within the U.S. and is 
the same frame used to draw the General Social Survey (GSS). 
The first stage, a National Frame Area (NFA), is comprised of entire 
metropolitan areas or counties with a population of at least 10,000, and based on the 
2010 Census tracts. The NFAs are densely populated and dominated by tracts with 
street-style addresses; these areas contain 56 percent of the population and cover 8 
percent of the U.S. geographic area. The remaining areas of the U.S. was stratified into 
two strata: ‘rural’ areas defined as less likely to have street-style addresses – making up 81 
percent of the geographic area and 14 percent of the U.S. population; and a stratum 
containing 30 percent of the population and 11 percent of the geographic area where 
street-style addresses are predominate.  
The second-stage sampling unit is a ‘segment’ from within selected NFAs, and is 
defined according to the 2010 Census, based on Census tracts or block groups of at least 
300 housing units. A stratified probability sample of 1,514 ‘segments’ was drawn with 
probability proportional to size; the majority of these segments provided more than 90 
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percent coverage of the geo-codable city-style addresses according to the United States 
Postal Service Delivery Sequence Files (DSF - a computerized listing all addresses served 
by the agency that is updated every two months). NORC observed that there were 123 
segments within the NFA stratum for which the DSF provided insufficient coverage. To 
remedy this, NORC conducted an in-person listing exercise.  
NORC’s National Sampling Frame includes nearly 3 million households, with 
more than 80,000 households identified through the in-person listing. Still, in 2016 
NORC made further improvements to ensure representation of all U.S. states, by 
supplementing the frame with addresses from the U.S. Postal Service’s DSF. From 
October of 2016, more than 99 percent of the AmeriSpeak Panel recruited adults were 
drawn from the National Frame and .9 percent were sourced from the addressed-based 
sampling from the DSF.  
The sample for this study was selected from the AmeriSpeak Panel drawing on a 
48 strata sample based on age, race/ethnicity, education, and gender. The size of the 
selected sample per stratum is proportional to the population for each category. Further, 
NORC’s sample selection factors in expected differential survey completion rates by 
demographic groups to ensure the set of panel members with a completed interview for 
a study is a representative sample of the target population. NORC restricts eligibility for 
selection of panelists to one member per household, and panelists are only eligible for 
selection on a study once per week. Upon completion of the fieldwork, study-specific 
sample weights are applied to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the final 
sample are statistically similar to the characteristics of the U.S. population using the U.S. 






The average age of the respondent was 49 years old, 53 percent were female and 
36 percent had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher. Seventy-two percent of the 
sample reported their ethnic or racial background as white, 9 percent as African 
American, 13 percent as Latino, and 6 percent as “another” race or ethnic identity. 
Additionally, 42 percent of respondents identified as Democrats, 42 percent as 
Republicans and 16 percent as Independents without any particular political lean towards 
the two dominant parties. A balance check on the individuals’ characteristics (e.g. age, 
race, gender, educational attainment, political preferences, etc.) was carried out and 
confirms that participants are evenly distributed across the treatment and control groups, 
indicating the that analysis can be conducted without any additional adjustments (Mutz, 




Respondents will be asked to consider enrolment preferences in three areas of 
government spending on social services: supplemental nutrition ‘WIC; in-state tuition 
‘TUITION; and child tax credits ‘TAXCREDIT. The willingness to exclude is measured 
using a Likert scale ordered from negative to positive responses (1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree). 
 
EXPERIMENTAL ITEMS 
To test the difference in respondents’ willingness to exclude across the three 
policy areas presented to respondents. I created six binary indicator variables: 
                                                
19 A summary table of the demographic characteristics by treatment group can be found in Annex 3.A. 
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‘CONTROL’ (1 = no immigrant, no savings, 0 = assigned to a treatment); 
‘ONLYSAVE’ (1= no immigrant numeric savings, 0 = all other respondents); 
‘IMMONLY’ (1 = ‘immigrant’ prime, no savings, 0 = all other respondents); 
‘IMMSAVE’ (1 = ‘immigrant’ prime, numerical savings, 0 = all other respondents); 
‘ILLEGALONLY’ (1 = ‘illegal immigrant’ prime, no savings, 0 = all other respondents); 
and ‘ILLEAGALSAVE’ (1 = ‘illegal immigrant’ prime, numeric savings, 0 = all other 
respondents).  
IV. Results 
IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION & EXCLUSIONARY PREFERENCES 
The effect of the immigrant and fiscal benefit treatments was estimated by 
comparing the mean response of the treatment groups to the control. Although there is 
some difference in U.S. citizens’ preferences on enrollment depending on the initiative 
put forward, a convincing majority of respondents allocated to the control group agreed 
or strongly agreed with maximizing enrollment - 63 percent for tax credits, 73 percent for 
WIC, and 65 percent for in-state tuition. Table 3.2 shows that a substantial drop in 
support for maximizing enrollment as the immigrant primes are introduced. For instance 
on the issue of in-state tuition, the proportion of respondents who agree or strongly 
agree to maximize enrollment steadily sinks from 65 percent in the control group, to 48 
percent in the ‘immigrant’ prime group to 38 percent in the ‘illegal’ prime group – a drop 









Figure 3.2:  
Distribution of Exclusionary Preferences by Initiative & Immigrant Prime 
 
The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression outlined in Table 3.3 
indicate that the immigrant treatment groups did negatively influence respondents’ 
willingness to maximize enrollment across each of the policy initiatives.  In-line with 
existing evidence (e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012), those who 
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were allocated to the ‘illegal immigrant’ treatment groups were significantly more 
negative (p<.01) across all vignettes, even for those respondents who received the 
savings estimate prime. This result holds even when compared to those allocated to the 
two ‘immigrant’ treatment groups.  Participants who received the ‘immigrant’ prime were 
also consistently less willing to maximize enrollment for each of the vignettes as 
compared to those allocated to the control group and ‘savings only’ groups. However, 
this outcome was only significant at the traditional .05 threshold on the issue of in-state 
tuition rates. 
 
Table 3.3: Willingness to Exclude by Initiative & Treatment Group (N=1931) 
 
 taxcredit   wic tuition 
 coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Savings Only 0.139  0.066 0.028 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
Immigrant' - No Savings -0.123 -0.170* -0.346*** 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
Immigrant' & Savings -0.072 -0.167* -0.265*** 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
Illegal' - No Savings -0.478*** -0.466*** -0.691*** 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
Illegal' & Savings -0.418*** -0.429*** -0.614*** 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) 
    
     Α 3.672 3.878 3.700 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.036 0.026 0.047 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
DOES A FISCAL BENEFIT WEAKEN OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRANT 
PARTICIPATION? 
The results from Table 3.3 also demonstrate that participants who were allocated 
the savings estimate treatments were consistently less negative than their pair group that 
lacked the fiscal benefit (control vs savings only, ‘immigrant’ only vs ‘immigrant’ & 
savings, and ‘illegal’ only vs ‘illegal’ & savings). Figures 3.3-3.5 illustrate the results of 
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each experimental item with the three pairs of treatment groups. For each pair, the top 
line signifies the treatment for immigrant prime (or lack thereof), and its match 
immediately below, depicts the average for the corresponding immigrant prime plus 
savings estimate.  
For each of the vignettes, none of the three fiscal benefit groups (the bottom 
pair) provided an average response that indicated that the information would soften the 
opposition to enrollment across all the government-funded initiatives. While the 
uniformity in the results suggest that the possibility of a fiscal benefit could help reduce 
the opposition that comes from immigrant participation – this additional information 






























Figure 3.5 - Willingness to Exclude on In-State Tuition Vignette  
by Treatment Group 
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DO AMERICANS’ PREFERENCES DIFFER BY INCOME & EDUCATION?  
To test the assumption that individuals’ personal financial circumstances are 
major factor in shaping their exclusionary preferences, I grouped individuals with 
household incomes above and below the median income, $59,000 annually (U.S. Census, 
2016), against whether or not they had a bachelor’s degree or higher. If the American 
citizens sampled follow the fiscal burden construct (e.g. Hanson, 2005), we would 
anticipate that respondents with lower incomes who were exposed to an immigrant 
prime to have significantly more negative preferences after being asked about 
maximizing enrollment. 
On the issue of educational attainment, previous studies have found that a 
university education is positively associated with more tolerant views towards ethnic 
minorities.  College graduates are believed to be more pluralistic because they are 
exposure to cultural diversity, receive information and critical thinking skills about the 
impacts of migration, and are arguably more insulated against the threat of 
unemployment related to competition from immigrants than those without a degree 
(Harwood, 1986; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).  
Figure 3.6 Exclusionary Preferences on Tax Credit Vignette  
Comparing Total Sample by Education & Income 
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Figure 3.7 – Exclusionary Preferences on WIC Vignette 
Comparing Total Sample by Education  & Income 
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Exclusionary Preferences on In-State Tuition Vignette 




The results presented in Table 3.4 show that degree holders that received an 
immigrant prime were on average less punitive in their responses than those without a 
university education. Figures 3.6-3.8 provide a more holistic perspective, comparing the 
results of the six treatment groups with the total sample (level 1, N= 1931) to the six 
treatment groups for each of the four income and education segments: under median 
income/no degree (level 2, N=1006); under median income/with degree (level 3, 
N=275); over median income/no degree (level 4, N=737); and over median 
income/with degree (level 5, N=648). 
This panoramic view shows that education fails to dampen the negative effects of 
the immigrant primes – especially for those allocated to one of the two ‘illegal’ treatment 
groups. The remarkable consistency in this rejection of unauthorized immigrants across 
all subgroups and all items provide strong evidence against the theory that individuals’ 










wic           
(1) 






 coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Savings Only 0.139 0.145    0.066   0.073 0.028 0.036 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.093)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Immigrant' - No Savings -0.123 -0.108  -0.170* -0.149 -0.346*** -0.321*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.093)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Immigrant' & Savings -0.072 -0.061 -0.167*  -0.149 -0.265*** -0.244*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.093)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Illegal' - No Savings -0.478*** -0.461*** -0.466*** -0.441*** -0.691*** -0.663*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.093)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Illegal' & Savings -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.429*** -0.431*** -0.614*** -0.617*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.093)  (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) Under Median - With 
Degree  0.086  0.188**  0.198** 
  (0.087)  (0.090)  (0.090) 
Over Median - No Degree  -0.096  -0.093  -0.104 
  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Over Median - With Degree      0.067  0.115*  0.146** 
  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
       
     α 3.672 3.661 3.878 3.839 3.700 3.653 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.036    0.039 0.026 0.034    0.047 0.059 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
DOES PARTISANSHIP SHAPE PREFERENCES ON IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION? 
Although elected officials across the political spectrum have a long history of framing 
immigration as an important policy problem (Tichenor, 2002) much of the negative 
immigrant-related messages introduced in recent years were significantly more likely to 
come from Republicans (Hayes, 2008) – these frames have become even more salient 
with the election of President Trump. Experimental studies that exposed respondents to 
vignettes with similar language used by politicians in recent debates found that negative 
frames (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) about immigration control 
policies only seemed to resonate among Republican voters. Given the findings from 
prior research we would expect to see very different responses based on partisan 
preferences, more restrictive attitudes for Republicans receiving immigrant primes and 
less restrictive attitudes among Democrats, and more ambivalence for Independents that 
do not lean towards either of the two main parties.  
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Figures 3.9-3.11 also segments the results, this time by partisanship, comparing the results of 
the six treatment groups with the total sample (level 1, N= 1931) to the six treatment groups for 
each of the partisan identifications: broadly Democrat (level 2, N=812); broadly Republican (level 
3, N=819); and Independent (level 4, N=300). 
The results outlined in Table 3.5 and illustrated in Figures 3.9-3.11 clearly and 
convincingly demonstrate that although immigrant participation negatively influence all 
respondents support for maximizing enrolment, Republicans had a much stronger 
aversion to both the ‘immigrant’ and ‘illegal’ immigrant prime. Interestingly, the 
information on savings estimates did have a more demonstrable influence on 
Republicans as compared to Democrats and Independents, particularly for those who 
received the ‘illegal’ immigrant primes. 
Figure 3.9 – Exclusionary Preferences on Tax Credit Vignette 








Figure 3.10 – Exclusionary Preferences on WIC Vignette 
Comparing Total Sample by Party Identification 
 
Figure 3.11 – Exclusionary Preferences on In-State Tuition Vignette 










wic            
(1) 






 coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Savings Only   0.139   0.142   0.066 0.070 0.028 0.031 
  (0.090) (0.087)  (0.093) (0.088) (0.093) (0.088) 
Immigrant' - No Savings  -0.123 -0.142 -0.170* -0.191** -0.346*** -0.369*** 
  (0.090) (0.087) (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) 
Immigrant' & Savings  -0.072 -0.085 -0.167* -0.181** -0.265*** -0.280*** 
  (0.090) (0.087)  (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) 
Illegal' - No Savings  -0.478*** -0.492*** -0.466*** -0.481*** -0.691*** -0.707*** 
  (0.090) (0.087)  (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) 
Illegal' & Savings  -0.418*** -0.417*** -0.429*** -0.427*** -0.614*** -0.613*** 
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.093) (0.088) (0.093) (0.087) 
Leans Democrat  0.448***  0.514***  0.583*** 
  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.075) 
Leans Republican  -0.227***  -0.268***  -0.266*** 
  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.075) 
     α 3.672 3.587 3.878    3.783 3.700 3.576 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.036 0.109 0.026 0.120 0.047 0.158 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
V. Conclusion 
 
As policy makers square off on how best to manage unprecedented budget deficits 
and growing demands on public services, this study seeks to elucidate these political 
decisions by examining how Americans’ preferences about who should get access to 
government-funded assistance are influenced by their attitudes towards specific 
immigrant populations. Prior work in this area relies primarily on observational data to 
demonstrate these links, but the inferences made are limited because they lack a 
counterfactual, that is no direct comparison to an identical situation that obscures the 
possibility of immigrant participation. This study broadens our understanding of these 
links by explicitly asking a large and nationally representative sample of Americans about 
their willingness to provide access to people that plausibly meet the criteria for enrolment 
for each program put forward, but parses out the difference in enrolment preferences 
when Americans are reminded that ‘immigrants’ or ‘illegal immigrants’ can also benefit.  
Ultimately partisanship (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) appears to 
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have the largest influencer over an individuals’ willingness to exclude immigrants from 
participation. Yet, the results confirm that immigrant participation negatively affects 
Americans’ willingness to enroll universally. Similar to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012), 
the respondents who received the ‘immigrant’ prime were less punitive than those ‘illegal 
immigrants’ prime, signaling that legal status is a significant driver of exclusionary 
preferences; nevertheless the respondents expressed strong opposition for each group 
for each program presented. Consistently, individuals with lower levels of income and 
education provided statistically similar responses to their counterparts with higher 
incomes and education, indicating that concerns about higher taxes found in earlier 
observational work (e.g. Clark et al, 1994; Fachini and Mayada, 2009; Hanson, 2005) are 
not the a substantial factor dictating these preferences. Instead, the findings of this study 
do advance several theories a growing body of work, which suggests that spending and 
policy preferences targeted at immigrants are motivated by sociotropic or group-level 
concerns about how immigrants impact society (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; 
Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; McLaren, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Mutz, 2018).  
The partisan differences displayed by the respondents suggest that the debate over 
immigration policy within the United States will remain just as contentious, limiting the 
possibility of any major overhaul of the system in the near future. However, the 
consistency of these negative reactions to immigrant participation certainly signals to 
elected officials that Americans’ are at least tolerant to further restrictions on the types of 
government funded services that non-citizens may access, irrespective of legal status. 
This is a critical point to consider as the Trump administration has put forward 
additional hurdles to block legal immigrants from obtaining permanent residency or 
citizenship if they or household members received in certain services like supplemental 
nutrition, tax credits and other entitlement programs (National Immigration Law Center, 
2018).  
The results reveal another important finding worthy of further investigation – the 
initiative the generated the most support for exclusion, even among Democrats, was the 
offer of in-state tuition. The willingness to exclude was highest for both the ‘immigrant’ 
and ‘illegal immigrant’ primes. Much of the research that has sought to unpack the 
attributes that make a more ‘desirable’ immigrant, point to skill level as the most 
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important factor used to weigh up their decision (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014). The results presented in this 
paper indicate that Americans across all segments of the electorate are quite prepared to 
prevent immigrants from accessing a crucial credential necessary to obtain a high-skilled 
job, even when presented with a fiscal reward for doing so.  
The steady lack of impact observed for the fiscal benefit prime for each of the 
immigrant treatment groups hints at the presence of some reasonably entrenched norms 
in which Americans feel that it is appropriate to block access to government-funded 
services to the foreign-born, even when this decision equates to an economic loss.  
However, the fact that the fiscal benefit rarely resonated with those that did not receive 
the immigrant prime, also suggests that the numerical and fact-based argument is not 
compelling, at least not in the manner presented here.  
Future research seeking to dampen the effects of hostile attitudes towards 
immigrants should build upon the findings from studies that use emotional (e.g. Brader, 
Marcus, and Miller, 2011; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013) or moral (Igartua, Moral-
Toranzo, and Fernández, 2012; Lecheler, Bos, and Vliegenthart, 2015) frames to provoke 
positive feelings and policy preferences. Further, flipping the perspective on how policies 
impact individuals (e.g. Mutz, 2002; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012) rather than groups 

























Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Male 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Female 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age 18-24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 
Age 25-34 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.37 
Age 35-44 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 
Age 45-54 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 
Age 55-64 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 
Age 65-74 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.39 
Age 75+ 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 
White 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 
Black 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 
Latino 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 
Other Ethnicity 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
No H/S Diploma 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 
H/S Diploma 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 
Some College 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.39 0.49 
Bachelors or Above 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.44 0.50 
Under $35k 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.42 
$35k-$59k 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 
$60k-$99k 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 
Over $100k 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 
Broad Democrat 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.49 
Broad Republican 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 




Annex 3.B: Summary Statistics by Original Sample without 










Mean SD Mean SD 
Male 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 
Female 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Age 18-24 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 
Age 25-34 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 
Age 35-44 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 
Age 45-54 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 
Age 55-64 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 
Age 65-74 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 
Age 75+ 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 
White 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 
Black 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.28 
Latino 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 
Other Ethnicity 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.22 
No H/S Diploma 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 
H/S Diploma 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 
Some College 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Bachelors or Above 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 
Under $35k 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45 
$35k-$59k 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 
$60k-$99k 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Over $100k 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 
Broad Democrat 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.49 
Broad Republican 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.49 
Independent - No Lean 0.10 0.29 0.16 0.36 
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Annex 3.C: Experimental Instrument 
 [RANDOMIZE QUESTION ORDER] 
[RANDOMIZE TREATMENT GROUP] 
Display if Control 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.   
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep people out of poverty. Also, when 
families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We must 
encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if Savings Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep people out of poverty. Also, when 
families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is 
estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local 
economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child 
tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrant’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep immigrants out of poverty. Also, when 
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families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We must 
encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrant’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep immigrants out of poverty. Also, when 
families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is 
estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local 
economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child 
tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Illegal’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep illegal immigrants out of poverty. Also, 
when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We 
must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    




Display if ‘Illegal’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
1. “The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low 
incomes and is an important tool to keep illegal immigrants out of poverty. Also, 
when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is 
estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local 
economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child 
tax credits.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if Control 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income children and new mothers get 
access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access 
the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if Savings Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then  t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income children and new mothers get 
access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results 
in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible 
woman and child to access the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
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3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrant’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.   
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income immigrant children and new 
mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access 
the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrant’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.   
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income immigrant children and new 
mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results 
in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible 
woman and child to access the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Illegal’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.   
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income illegal immigrant children and new 
mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
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developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access 
the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Illegal’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
2. “The food nutrition program helps low income illegal immigrant children and new 
mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents 
developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health 
care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results 
in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible 
woman and child to access the food nutrition program.”   
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if Control 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare 
students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who 
receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute 
more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the 
number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    




Display if Savings Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare 
students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who 
receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute 
more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through 
college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services 
costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of 
students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrant’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for immigrants and help 
to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, 
individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime 
and contribute more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit by 
increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Immigrants’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for immigrants and help 
to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, 
individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime 
and contribute more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting 
students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and 
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reduced social services costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by 
increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Illegal’ Only 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for illegal immigrants and 
help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On 
average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their 
lifetime and contribute more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit 
by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
 
Display if ‘Illegal’ & Savings 
Please  take a  moment  to  r ead the  argument  care fu l l y  and then t e l l  us  what  you th ink.  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
3. “In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for illegal immigrants and 
help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On 
average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their 
lifetime and contribute more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in 
getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue 
and reduced social services costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by 
increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition.” 
1 = Strongly Disagree   
2 = Disagree    
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree    
5= Strongly Agree    
6 = Don't Know 
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Input:  Effect size f                   = 0.1 
     err prob                      = 0.05 
   Total sample size              = 2000 
   Numerator df                   = 5 
   Number of groups               = 6 
   Number of covariates           = 0 
Output:  Noncentrality parameter        = 20.0000000 
   Critical F                      = 2.2185848 
   Denominator df                 = 1994 
   Power (1-  err prob)           = 0.9517586 
 
Moderate Estimate  – 5 Covariates 
 
Input:  Effect size f                           = 0.1 
     err prob                              = 0.05 
   Total sample size              = 2000 
   Numerator df                   = 10 
   Number of groups               = 6 
   Number of covariates           = 5 
 
Output:  Noncentrality parameter         = 20.0000000 
   Critical F                               = 1.8354512 
   Denominator df                  = 1989 
   Power (1-  err prob)            = 0.8887952 
 
Conservative Estimate – 10 covariates 
 
Input:  Effect size f                           = 0.1 
     err prob                       = 0.05 
   Total sample size              = 2000 
   Numerator df                   = 15 
   Number of groups               = 6 
   Number of covariates           = 10 
 
Output:  Noncentrality parameter        = 20.0000000 
   Critical F                     = 1.6714265 
   Denominator df                 = 1984 




CHAPTER IV (PAPER 3) 
DOES HARSH LANGUAGE REFERRING TO 
IMMMIGRANTS TRANSLATE INTO HARSHER 
PREFERENCES FOR IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
– OR IS IT ALL POLITICS? 
 
Abstract   
This study explicitly tests the extent to which language referring to immigrants influences 
Americans’ preferences on immigration policies and whether a partisan cue induces a 
more polarized response. The novel 4 by 3 experimental design is put to a pilot sample 
of 2,053 respondents, allowing for a simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the 
positive and negative issue frames, partisan cues, and their effects across items. The study 
provides new insights on how partisans evaluate political messaging on immigration by 
drawing on frames in speeches by former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill 
Clinton (restrictive), each of which counters their respective parties’ current positioning 
on the issue. Understanding the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the 
context of these complicated political frames on immigration is critically important 
within the U.S. because as the country has become more politically polarized, the 
messaging strategies employed, particularly on immigration have become more extreme. 
Prior research suggests such strategies can increase apathy and animosity within the 
electorate, but also increase punitive policies directed at immigrant populations. The 
results on a non-representative MTurk sample demonstrate that the 
welcoming/restrictionist frames do influence support for limiting migration levels, but 





Over the last decade, the debate over immigration in the United States (U.S.) has 
become more prominent and contentious (Hayes, 2008a; Hopkins, 2010; Skocpol and 
Williamson, 2011; Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2012; Mutz, 2018). Some scholars argue 
that politicians can exploit natives’ concerns about immigration to attract new voters and 
destabilize existing partisan alignments (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Alesina and Glaeser, 
2004; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014, Messina, 1989)  
Crafting a winning messaging strategy requires political leaders (e.g. policy 
advocates, interest groups, politicians, and pundits) to identify the cues (symbols) and 
frames (arguments) that may appeal to potential voters and sway them into their camp 
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Cues and frames are 
types of rhetorical structures that define a policy problem to emphasize specific 
considerations with the aim of shifting public opinion and advancing the policy goals of 
the political actors who employ them (Kinder, 1998; Riker, Calvert, Mueller and Wilson, 
1996). Both serve to simplify the evaluation process within an individual’s memory, and 
are known to influence public opinion. However, a cue serves as a form of short-hand, 
requiring less new information or details for the decision making process (Druckman, 
Hennessy, St. Charles, and Webber, 2010). In addition to cues and frames, we know 
from prior research that individuals’ political decisions are influenced by a variety of 
factors including the tone (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995) and strength (Druckman et 
al, 2010) of the message, the importance of the policy issue (Lecheler, de Vreese, and 
Slothuus, 2009), the competitiveness of the environment (Chong and Druckman, 2007; 
Sniderman and Theriault, 2004), and the party sponsor (Downs, 1957).  
Political parties use cues and frames to establish policy reputations with the 
electorate over time (Druckman et al, 2010). The cues and frames disseminated by party 
leaders - often referred to as political elites - provide citizens, who may otherwise lack 
direct experience or knowledge of political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), with 
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crucial guidance regarding the political implications of a persuasive message (Zaller, 
1992).  Empirical evidence from prior scholarly work demonstrates that cues embedded 
in political issue frames can have a powerful effect on individuals’ preferences across a 
variety of policy areas.  
Carmines and Stimson (1980, 1986 1989) contend that when politicians use 
ethnic minority cues they can transform complicated policy proposals into an ‘easy’ issue 
because it evokes an intense gut-level reaction that transcends party allegiance. If framed 
appropriately, racial and ethnic cues have great potential to increase the salience, or 
importance, of issue (Lecheler, et al, 2009) and also undermine existing party loyalties 
within the American electorate. This visceral reaction against minorities is believed to 
provoke a redistribution of voters, and has the potential to uncap a stream of new voters 
(Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).  Once an issue becomes 
salient, or reaches has a high level of prominence in the political discourse, the issue sits 
at the surface of the minds of potential voters, and thus is easily retrievable (Taylor, 
Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, and Winkler, 1979). For more than two decades, immigration 
has ebbed and flowed to the forefront of the American conscience, surpassing issues like 
health care and the economy, that may have a greater impact on their day-to-day 
experience (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017). 
Political messages are also believed to be more persuasive when citizens can 
identify a political source like an elected official or a party sponsor (Brewer, 2001; Chong 
and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Zaller, 1992). Other scholars add to this body, 
demonstrating that prolonged exposure to issue frames can improve issue salience, but 
also help to cement party allegiances (Druckman and Leeper, 2012; Lecheler, Keer, 
Schuck, and Hanggli, 2015). Historical analysis shows that within the U.S., politicians of 
all political stripes have long used immigration as a reliable trigger to generate electoral 
support (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Masuoka and Junn, 2013; Tichenor, 2002). 
However, analysis of the rhetoric on immigration reveals that over the past twenty years 
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political elites in both parties are more inclined to use restrictionist frames than 
welcoming frames (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Hayes, 2008). However of late, the 
harshest rhetoric has come from the Republican Party (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; 
Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sandborn, 2011; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Zingher, 2014).   
Carmines and Stimson (1986) content that when politicians adopt a messaging 
strategy that employs cues and frames about minority populations, that it can have lasting 
effects on how the electorate defines the party, and therefore can be risky. That is, if a 
political party is perceived as opposing (or favoring) particular societal groups, then 
voters weigh the possible policy outcomes directed at this group when they are presented 
with a party cue (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Nicholson and Segura 2012; Stubager and 
Slothuus 2013). For instance, a party that is perceived to promote policies that negatively 
and disproportionately impact Latinos (with or without citizenship) may lose the support 
of this sub-group for several generations (Barreto, Fraga, Manzano, Martinez-Ebers, and 
Segura, 2008; Hawley, 2013; Wong, 2018).  
In light of these findings and under the current political landscape, in which the 
electorate is more politically polarized and one party has launched a prolonged campaign 
linking immigrants to various negative policy consequences, several important questions 
emerge. First, how much influence does negative frames have on shaping individuals’ 
preferences on immigration policy if there is no political information tied to the message? 
Second, if individuals are affected by the prolonged exposure to their party’s current 
immigration frames – restrictionist for Republicans and welcoming for Democrats – then 
how would partisans react to a contrasting frame from a credible in-party elite? Third, do 
party sponsor cues induce more polarized responses among partisans for the policies 
displayed or will the party faithful stick to their party’s current position on immigration? 
And finally, how do partisans respond to information that shows both parties have 
supported a particular immigration policy that runs counter to the current party rhetoric 
on the topic? 
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There is a sizeable gap in our knowledge about how citizens’ opposition to 
immigrants is altered by political parties’ complex messaging strategies, especially when 
you compare them to a contrasting position from the past. Measurement problems have 
hindered our ability to examine the links between individuals’ attitudes towards 
immigrants and their partisan ties. The pioneering studies that examined the correlates of 
attitudes towards immigrants and support public policies affecting immigrant populations 
relied primarily on observational data from large-scale surveys like the General Social 
Survey (GSS) or the National Elections Survey (NES). While these datasets provided 
richer perspectives into the relationship between voters’ opinions about acceptable 
immigration levels, citizens’ general level of support for immigrant participation in 
government-funded programs, or other policies directed at immigrant populations, there 
are substantial limitations in what inferences can be made. Namely, the data from large-
scale surveys were not collected for the purpose of examining attitudes regarding specific 
immigrant populations – legal versus unauthorized immigrants – a critical component in 
this political debate (Schildkraut, 2009). Nor do these surveys provide the partisan 
context that surrounds the discourse.  
To disentangle the multidimensional factors that influence punitive policy 
preferences requires a direct test that enables researchers to tease out changes in support. 
But a credible test must reflect the competitive real-world arguments put forward in the 
current debates, and contrasted with partisan positions of the past. To understand the 
partisan influence also demands varying partisan cues that expose respondents to positive 
and negative policy initiatives to activate underlying partisan biases across the electorate.  
Isolating the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the context of these 
complicated political issue frames (Druckman et al, 2013) on immigration is critically 
important within the U.S. because as the country has become more politically polarized 
(Abramowitz, 2010), the messaging strategies employed have become more extreme 
(Hopkins, 2013; McCaffrey, 2000). Studies have shown that such strategies can increase 
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apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996) and animosity (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) 
within the electorate, but also increase the likelihood of punitive policies directed at 
immigrant populations (Hopkins, 2010) or even attacks on ethnic minorities (Müller and 
Schwarz, 2018).  
This study builds upon the vast literature examining parties’ use of issue frames 
to establish policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; Chong and 
Druckman, 2007; Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs 
and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 
1992) to assess the extent to which the language referring to immigrants influences 
Americans’ preferences on immigration-related policies. The vignettes used in the 
original survey experiment draw from prior work mimicking the real-world political 
debates referencing immigrants (Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; 
Hopkins 2014). This study provides new insights on how partisans evaluate the parties’ 
current welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, but the 4 by 3 
experimental design includes frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - 
former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive) – and 
counter their respective parties’ current positioning on the issue.  
The second level of this study exposes respondents to two experimental vignettes 
to test whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue (neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response 
(Goren et al, 2009) on immigration policies across the various segments of the American 
electorate. Specifically, I examine the effects of party sponsor cues on a state level 
provision that offer prenatal care for expectant mothers with low incomes (National 
Immigrant Law Center, 2015) and the executive decision made under the Obama 
administration and expanded during the Trump presidency to denaturalize citizens who 
used an alternative name to apply for a visa (Taxin, 2018).  
Overall, I find that welcoming frames induce more positive responses across the 
electorate, while the participants who received the restrictionist frames tend to respond 
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more negatively. Although an individual’s partisan identification is the greatest predictor 
of support for restrictionist policies, the cues by party elites and those that signal 
bipartisan support make little difference. This suggests that Americans preferences on 
immigration are anchored in the parties’ current position on immigration, and are 




II. The Influence of Frames & Why Parties Single-Out Immigrants 
HARSH FRAMES ATTRACT NEW VOTERS & KEEP PARTY LOYALISTS 
Voter turnout in the United States has steadily declined since 1960. It hit its 
lowest rate since World War II in the 2014 midterm election, with only 36.4 percent of 
the voting-eligible population casting a ballot (McDonald, 2014). As a growing 
proportion of individuals disengage in the political process (Putnam, 1995), political 
parties have employed more negative and extreme political messages to court the ‘swing 
votes’ of weak partisans and non-voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Jacobs and 
Shapiro, 2000). This segment of the electorate is believed to have lower policy and 
political knowledge, and thus is potentially more easily influenced than their strong 
partisan counterparts (Zaller, 2004). However, during this period, party attachment has 
also strengthened, and as a consequence, a growing share of voters who are more likely 
to show up at the polls are going to be less likely to change their position (Abramowitz, 
2010; Ayenger and Westwood, 2015; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2004). 
In order to entice these irregular voters, whilst simultaneously maintaining high 
levels of loyalty among partisans, political parties have to work hard to construct a 
compelling and consistent messaging strategies. They supply the electorate with a set of 
frames and cues with the aim of influencing potential voters into adopting the position 
communicated through the frame (Hayes, 2008a; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and 
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Shapiro, 2000). Political parties use these rhetorical devices because they want to ensure 
that the electorate receives clear signals that can be drawn upon rapidly and without 
much information or much critical thought (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998). Through these vehicles, their messages are easily disseminated, 
seeping into the public discourse as efficiently as possible (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; 
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Skocpol and Williamson, 2011). Political issue frames make for 
ideal news segments because they provide low-cost and high impact stories, complete 
with attention-grabbing sound bites, compelling visuals. Further, the sensational attacks 
conveniently slot into the two-minute format of television news, the easily digested 
layout of USA Today or similar newspapers (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996), and digital 
sources like Twitter or Facebook (Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga, 2017).  
 
Tone Matters  
Political issue frames provide vital clues into the direction of the author’s support 
by employing a specific tone and emphasizing relative importance to specific 
considerations (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Nelson and Oxley 1999). For example, a 
restrictive frame on immigration may focus on the costs of border security as an impetus 
to reduce numbers, whereas a welcoming frame may emphasize that stricter immigration 
controls will increase labor costs, and thus limit the potential of the U.S. economy 
(Hayes, 2008). Negative frames can often yield short-term gains at the ballot box; 
however, the impact of this strategy in over the long-term is believed to contribute to 
reduced voter turnout and higher levels of political apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 
1996). Under the current electoral landscape politicians are more likely to deploy negative 
frames and cues to court the “swing votes” of weak partisans, independents and irregular 
voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Riker, Calvert, Mueller and Wilson, 1996). This 
messaging strategy could pave the way for strategic politicians to make political gains and 
achieve policy goals. 
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The Inf luence o f  the Messenger 
Sniderman and Bullock (2004) argue that in a representative democracy, citizens’ 
options for policy alternatives are limited to the ‘menu of choice’ that is presented to 
them by political parties, and that this menu is set through the hard fought process of 
electoral competition. Converse (1964) suggests that party elites play a crucial role in 
communicating this menu, referring to them as ‘ideological packages’. This 
communication system allows Americans to see ‘what goes with what’,  or match their 
values to a political identity (Goren, 2005). The parties are perceived to embody a set of 
values that are in synch with the citizens’ ideological identity (Petersen, Slothuus, and 
Togeby 2010). A consequence of this pairing is that overtime the parties are perceived to 
‘own’ certain issues, and this transition can alter how partisans interpret the messages 
(see Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Cohen 2003; Iyengar and Valentino 2000; Kuklinski 
and Hurley 1994). Ultimately, when an individual commits themself to a political party, 
the party itself serves as a cue on a variety of issues, which requires very little information 
regarding the details of a particular issue for the partisan to make up their mind (Leeper 
and Slothuus, 2014). 
 
THE ISSUE AS CUE: DOES A PARTICULAR PARTY ‘OWN’ IMMIGRATION? 
Scholars contend that over the last four decades Republicans secured electoral 
victory in national elections in part because the negative messaging strategies about 
minorities were effective in changing perceptions among white Americans (Gilens, 1999; 
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Sniderman and Carmines, 1996). They note that from the late 
1960s a substantial proportion of whites swapped party allegiance away from the 
Democratic Party in response to its support for the Civil Rights movement and the 
party’s diversification (Giles and Hertz, 1994). Sniderman and Piazza (1993) explicitly 
tested the impact of political predisposition and the associated concerns by examining 
variation in U.S. citizens’ willingness to support redundant workers when specific cues - 
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the race and work ethic of subject of the vignette – were introduced across treatment 
groups. Respondents were presented with specific attributes of hypothetical recipients, 
allowing the authors to identify with greater precision how certain populations (e.g. black 
versus white recipients) reduce support for government programs; they found that self-
identified conservatives were more likely to block access. Studies with similar approaches 
also find greater support for blocking access to government programs for minority 
populations for (Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers, 
1997; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997). 
Much of the pioneering work on the formation of anti-immigrant policies and 
attitude formation is derived from theories on racial threat developed within the U.S. to 
explain whites’ opposition to affirmative action and welfare initiatives (e.g. Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly, 1999; Bobo, 1983; Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Gilens, 1999; Kinder and 
Sanders, 1996; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Taylor, 1998). Nearly thirty years of 
research related to individual attitudes towards immigrants demonstrate that Americans 
of all political persuasions, or none at all, can harbor restrictionist preferences (e.g. 
Brader et al, 2008; Clark et al, 1994; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and 
Hopkins, 2013; Hanson et al, 2007; Lau, Sears and Jessor 1990).  In light of these 
findings, this may be a useful messaging strategy for Republicans to employ in order to 
pick up new voters (Hajnal and Rivera, 2014). 
Although Republicans have circulated the negative immigration messages more 
often in recent years (Hayes, 20008; Jeong, Miller, Schofield and Sened, 2011; Knoll, et 
al, 2011; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Zingher, 2014), historical records show that this was 
not always the case. For instance, Democratic lawmakers in the mid-1960s felt heavy 
pressure from labor organizations like the American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to curb the number of migrant workers along the 
U.S. / Mexico border (Tichenor, 2002). Congressional Democrats began sponsoring the 
 136 
legislation for such restrictions, with Democratic Senator Walter Mondale stating 
(Congressional Printing Office, 1970): 
 
“There is still a hemorrhaging of desperately poor Mexican labor that can come across the border any 
time they want for commuting purposes…it easy for illegal entrants to obtain employment both on the 
farms and increasingly in the cities, contributes substantially to the presence in the United States of 
perhaps as many as 400,000 aliens who entered illegally, have no right to be here, but who deprive low-
income domestic workers of jobs…The use of wetbacks coincides with high unemployment and low wages. 
At the current rate of unemployment perhaps as many as one out of every six unemployed American 
workers could be out of work because of the use of illegal entrants.” 
To stop this ‘hemorrhaging of people’, which he argued placed South Texas in a 
perpetual economic depression, Mondale drafted a bill limiting the numbers of migrant 
workers (Reimers, 1992). His proposal came after the end of the Bracero Program in 
1964. The Bracero Program, which translates to manual laborer, permitted 
predominantly Mexican migrants hundreds of thousands temporary work visas and was 
viewed positively by employers and migrants alike. The Democratic Senator’s use of the 
term ‘wetback’ in 1970 indicated a substantial key change in how the workers were 
referred and the policies that would regulate their numbers. The end of the program 
shifted the migrant workers’ status from legal manual laborer to unauthorized migrant 
(Tichenor, 2002). 
Contrast the language used by Senator Mondale against the following exchange, 
made a decade later by presidential candidates Reagan and Bush during the 1980 
Republican primary debates:  
 
George H. W. Bush – “If they’re [unauthorized immigrants] living here, I don’t want to see…six 
and eight year-old kids being made, one – totally uneducated, and made to feel like they’re living outside 
the law. Let’s address ourselves to the fundamentals. These are good people, strong people” (C– SPAN 
1980). 
 
Ronald Reagan - “Rather than talking about putting up a fence, why don’t we work out some 
recognition of our mutual problems, take it possible for them to come here legally with a work permit and 
then while they’re working and turning here, they pay taxes here and then when they want to go back, 
they can go back and the cross. And open the border both ways.”  
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In this exchange, Bush’s emphasis that unauthorized immigrants were ‘good 
people’ was not challenged by his Republican colleague Reagan. It is perhaps because this 
positive frame was outranked in the party’s position that immigration, particularly 
unauthorized migrants, was a means of promoting labor competition, and a critical 
component to the success of the U.S. economy (Gonzalez O’Brian, 2018).  
The language used by all three of these policy makers signals their policy position, 
but also to some extent identifies their allies and the interests they represent. For the 
Democrat Mondale, the shift in tone was a nod to labor leaders to alleviate their 
concerns about migrant labor undercutting the wages of low-skilled workers. Whereas 
the comments made by the Republican candidates affirm the laissez faire position on 
migration to business leaders and free market conservatives.  Although both of the major 
political parties have adopted a tougher tone on immigration in recent years (Abrajano 
and Hajnal, 2017; Hayes, 2008), it is necessary to investigate the effects of how partisans 
engage with party issue frames from in-party elites in a way that counter the current 
position. Adopting this approach will help to clarify the conditions under which 
partisans’ support for a party’s policies can be shifted, and the extent to which voters’ 
support for tough immigration policies are a reflection of their adherence to the current 
party line. 
PARTY ATTACHMENT, POLARIZATION & THE LIMITS OF FRAMES & CUES 
The Importance o f  Party :  Part isans’  Response to Part isan Frames  
Campbell et al., (1960, 133) suggest that deep party attachment “raises a 
perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his 
partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of 
selection and perceptual distortion will be.”  Survey data over the last fifteen years 
support this argument, as partisans’ reactions to the political issue frames tend to be 
remarkably stable and fall squarely in line with parties’ doctrinal position. The scholars 
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investigating this phenomenon have found that party attachment is the strongest 
predictor of an individual’s judgments on a full range of political issues, including the 
economy, candidate evaluations, or approval and policy preferences (Abromovich, 2010; 
Bartels 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; 
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lauderdale, 2012).  
Political theorists contend that this political reasoning is rooted in how the 
individual perceives this connection to their party. They note that party attachment is a 
type of social group identification similar religious denomination or an ethnic group, and 
their political activism provides a sense of belonging because the parties are able to 
connect to their core values (Brewer, 2001; Goren, 2004, 2013; Tomz and van 
Houweling 2008). In addition to this important form of social identity (Iyengar and 
Westwood, 2015), the political information disseminated by the parties is perceived as 
more valid than other sources and thus more easily absorbed (Green et al, 2002; Zaller, 
2004). The strong social connection and sense of belonging derived through partisan 
identity has led to a gradual bleed of party preferences into nonpolitical spheres (Willems, 
2019), like taking a stand against the alt-right by following the comic Tina Fey’s call to  
purchase sheet cakes in protest of the President’s response to Charlotsville riots, and the  
elementary school teachers who dressed as ‘Mexican migrants’ and the border wall for 
their Halloween costumes in support of the President’s boarder policies. Iyenger and 
Westwood (2015) argue that this partisan bleed is different from the political protests of 
the past, and contribute to an alienation of partisan foes. Leeper and Slothuus (2014) 
expand upon this view and provide evidence showing that these actions exacerbate 
partisan divides and help to fuel polarization. Ultimately this mix of factors is believed to 
contribute to the difficulty in shifting partisans’ positions on a variety of political issues.  
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Part isans’  Responses to Bipart i san Cues in Era o f  Polar izat ion 
In this period of deep polarization (Abramowitz, 2010), the electorate has 
expressed frustration and dismay over petty party rancor and its dysfunctional effect on 
governing (Binder, 2015). Some scholars have argued that partisan skirmishes may not 
solely be attributed to policy disagreements, but rather is the result of long-term strategy 
to prevent the opposition from legislative success. Gutmann and Thompson (2012) 
illustrate the point, noting that during the 2009 health reform debate, Republicans’ 
refused to contribute to bipartisan legislation in order to deny the Democrats a political 
win. They reference Senator Jim DeMint’s comments to colleagues, “If we’re able to stop 
Obama on this, it will be his Waterloo. It will break him.” 
Researchers have demonstrated that excessive partisanship reduces institutional 
approval (Ramirez, 2009; Riffkin, 2014) and can lead to losses at the ballot box (Carson 
et al., 2010). The results from public opinion surveys consistently demonstrate that a 
majority of the American electorate wants political officials to work together and 
compromise, which suggests that if politicians signal bipartisan agreement in action, they 
might elicit greater support for an initiative. Zaller (1992) notes that elite political 
consensus can send a powerful message to the electorate that a particular issue is 
universally supported thereby bringing it into the ‘mainstream’. Two studies examining 
the effects of political issue frames with partisan consensus both demonstrated that 
bipartisan frames could generate greater support for policies as compared to the frames 
with single party support (Druckman et al, 2010; Goren et al, 2009). But a growing body 
of literature has identified a potential paradox - that even through Americans might want 
Congress to be more bipartisan, partisans are more supportive of elected officials when 
they engage in partisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011; Nicholson, 2012). In 
one experimental study Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison (2014) present respondents 
with altered versions of the political context, portraying bipartisanship in Congress as an 
equal compromise or a capitulation by one side. The researchers also manipulated the 
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partisan distribution of roll call votes legislation for tax cuts for small business and 
budget cuts to NASA in order to determine how Americans respond to parties (not) 
reaching consensus on broadly supported policies. They found that participants could 
identify bipartisan processes, but their support for bipartisan solutions fails to match 
their partisan support on both policies.  
HYPOTHESES 
We currently know very little about how complex frames that link immigrants to 
political parties alter Americans’ support for policies that help or punish immigrant 
populations or how partisans evaluate the messages from in-party elites of the past. 
Under the theoretical framework of prior research in this area, I will test the following 
assumptions:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1 – Respondents exposed to the welcoming frames will be more 
favorable to increasing the level of immigration as compared to those who receive the 
restrictionist frames – this effect should hold within partisan groups. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Partisans who receive issue frames that attribute authorship to a 
credible party leader will respond in-line with their own party. In other words, 
Republicans (Democrats) allocated to the frames attributing authorship to Reagan will 
respond more (less) favorably to increasing levels of immigration as compared to their 
Republican (Democratic) counterparts that have no party leader cue. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 – Party sponsor cues will induce more polarized responses - with 
Republicans and Democrats providing more agreeable responses to the policies when 
they receive a party sponsor cue that matches their own allegiance and repel against the 
out-party. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4 – Bipartisan cues should elicit the most agreeable responses across the 
entire sample and within partisan groups. 
 
III. Research Design & Methodology 
THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
Party identification is believed to be a major determinant of where Americans 
align themselves on immigration policies (e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and 
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Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011). I explicitly test how partisans 
evaluate the parties’ past welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, and 
include frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - former Presidents 
Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive). These frames were deliberately 
selected to counter the Democrats and Republicans’ current positioning on the issue.  
The second level of this study exposes respondents to two experimental vignettes to test 
whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue (neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response (Goren 
et al, 2009) on immigration policies across the various segments of the American 
electorate. 
 














Republican Cue Republican Cue 
Group 2 Democrat Cue Democrat Cue 
Group 3 Bipartisan Cue Bipartisan Cue 





Republican Cue Republican Cue 
Group 5 Democrat Cue Democrat Cue 
Group 6 Bipartisan Cue Bipartisan Cue 





Republican Cue Republican Cue 
Group 8 Democrat Cue Democrat Cue 
Group 9 Bipartisan Cue Bipartisan Cue 






Republican Cue Republican Cue 
Group 11 Democrat Cue Democrat Cue 
Group 12 Bipartisan Cue Bipartisan Cue 
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The original 4 by 3 experimental design (summarized in Table 4.1) allows for a 
simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the positive and negative issue frames, 
partisan cues, and their effects across items. For ease of programming across the three 
experimental questions, participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 treatment 
groups of equal proportion and locked in the groups for the duration of the study. To 
determine the extent to which harsh language on immigration negatively influences 
policy preferences, ¼ of respondents were presented with a restrictive frame and a ¼ of 
respondents presented with a welcoming frame - neither group received any information 
regarding the origins of the statement. To test how partisans react to a frame that 
contrasts the current parties’ position on immigration the remaining half of the sample 
received the same welcoming (¼) and restrictive (¼) frames which also included the 
name and party of the political elite who made the statement – Presidents Bill Clinton 
and Ronald Reagan. Then respondents were then asked their views on the current levels 
of immigration. 
 
Table 4.2: The Welcoming & Restrictive Frames  
 
WELCOMING FRAME: “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and 
women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These 
families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from 
other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this 
country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home 
of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of 
family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but 
they shared the same values, the same dream.”  
[President Ronald Reagan, Republican] 
RESTRICTIVE FRAME: “All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but 
in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens 
entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal 
immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a 
nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-
defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws 
we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it.” 
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[President Bill Clinton, Democrat] 
IMMIGRATION LEVELS DISPLAYED TO ALL:  
Do you think the number of immigrants to America should be....  
Response Options:  
1 = Increased a lot   2 = Increased a little   3 = Remain the same as it is    
4 = Reduced a little   5= Reduced a lot    
The second level of this proposed study made use of the initial programming of 
12 treatment groups by exposing one third of each of the four frame groups to vignettes 
that reveal party sponsor cues. For vignette 2: Democrat / Republican / Republican and 
Democrat. For vignette 3: President Obama / President Trump / Presidents Obama and 
Trump. Exposure to these two vignettes allowed for a robust examination of whether the 
sole party sponsor cue induces more polarized responses among partisans and also 
determine the impact of a bipartisan cue in both a positive and negative context.  
 
Table 4.3: The Vignettes on Immigration Related Policies  
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
VIGNETTE 2 – PRENATAL CARE: “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is 
the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some 
states [Republicans / Democrats / Republicans and Democrats] have worked to 
expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to 
make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income 
unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”  
VIGNETTE 3 – DENATURALIZATION: “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify 
immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa 
application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The [Obama / Trump / 
Obama and Trump] administration[s] began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa” 
Response Options (all versions):  
1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Disagree   3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree    
4 = Agree   5= Strongly Agree    
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Vignette 2 focused on unauthorized immigrant participation in prenatal care for 
low-income expectant mothers through the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. 
This policy was included because the issue often flies below the political radar - several 
states even expanded access to unauthorized immigrants, often with bi-partisan 
sponsorship (see Heberlein, Brooks, Alker, Artiga, and Stephens, 2013). The beneficiaries 
of this program are vulnerable (low-income mothers and their infants), and the program 
addresses expansion of government funded health care (often deemed a Democratic 
issue) and the protection of unborn children (often considered a Republican issue), 
making the addition of the party sponsor cues believable for the partisans that receive an 
in-party cue. The bipartisan cue at least in theory, should signal that this is a universally 
supported provision (Harbridge, 2015; Zaller, 2004), thereby inducing the most positive 
response. Yet, given the tribalization of politics in recent years (Iyengar and Westwood, 
2015) it is also possible that respondents would be unconvinced that the parties can work 
together. Those who receive an out-party cue are perhaps more likely mirror their party’s 
current position on the issue (Goren et al, 2009)  – a more positive response among 
Democrats (perhaps more so when exposed to the Republican cue) and a more negative 
response among Republicans who may wish to retreat from easily identifiable 
Democratic positions (Bechtel et al, 2015; Druckman et al, 2013).  
Vignette 3 centers on the denaturalization of citizens who used an alternative 
identity to successfully apply for a visa, but previously had deportation orders out under 
another name. This policy began under the Obama administration, when fingerprint 
records were used to identify from individuals with criminal backgrounds that had used a 
false identity to obtain a visa that later had their citizenship revoked. Fewer than 150 
cases were brought forward (Lind, 2018). The Trump administration continued with the 
practice, but adopted a more aggressive interpretation. To accelerate the process and 
bring more cases forward the Trump administration established a task force aimed at 
coordinating the effort and have investigated naturalized citizens that did not have a 
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previous criminal record (Taxin, 2018). This vignette is negatively framed and 
emphasizes a fraudulent act, which should in theory at least, spark more punitive policy 
preferences among all respondents, irrespective of party identification. Given what we 
know about the role of partisans’ preferences (Goren et al, 2009), one might expect 
Republicans to strongly support denaturalization and deportation when they receive the 
Trump cue, and similarly punitive responses for the bipartisan cues, but it is unclear 
whether a cue signaling support from Obama would make Republicans more negative 
because it signals that the policy is justified or less negative to rebel against the former 
President. Under this construct one might expect Democrats to repel from support when 
provided the Trump cue and be more supportive of the policy when shown the Obama 
cue. However, the intensely divided positions taken in the debate on the legitimacy and 
need for the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently may suggest that 
the issue of denaturalization will induce a response that reflect the parties’ current stance 
on this issue rather than supporting an earlier position – i.e. Republicans would be no 
less supportive with the Obama cue because it would validate the need for such action 
taken by the Trump administration, and that Democrats would strongly oppose this 
policy even when presented with the Obama or bipartisan cue. On the other hand, 
individuals may link this controversial issue to denaturalize foreign-born citizens with the 
largely unpopular family separation policy, and may oppose the policy because it does 
not align with their personal values (Schwartz et al, 2010).  
DATA COLLECTION 
Over the last decade web-based surveys methods have become a vital data 
collection tool for researchers. Market research firms were early adopters of online 
surveys in large part because of the lower data collection and processing times equated to 
lower operating costs than face-to-face interviews and telesurveys (Mutz, 2011). 
However, in those early days Internet access was low in certain areas (e.g. rural or low 
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income communities) prohibiting a general lack of reach by firms. These gaps in 
coverage rightly introduced many questions of validity (Groves et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, the ever-growing population that has gained access to the web through 
smartphones and better broadband connectivity make online surveys an appropriate 
alternative to student panels, which are often drawn upon for bespoke projects on 
sensitive topics (Loftis and Lupia, 2008; Mutz, 2011).   
The data for this study, a pilot for a narrower project funded by the National 
Science Foundation’s Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Science, was conducted 
using data collected through the web-based crowdsourcing service Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Although the platform enables researchers to collect relatively large samples in 
a short period of time, there are several trade-offs that need to be considered. The 
following section provides a detailed discussion on the subject pools selected for this 
project via Mechanical Turk, and compares the samples used in published studies from 
alternative sources or participants. 
 
 
An Overview of  Mechanical  Turk  
Established in 2005 by the online marketplace Amazon.com, MTurk connects 
employers (referred to as requesters) and employees (referred to as workers) to complete 
tasks that cannot be automated (called human intelligence tasks or HITs). Researchers 
can limit access to their project to respondents in a specific country and set a worker 
approval rating (similar to a star rating on the website EBAY) to improve the quality of 
the data. Given the subject matter is focused on issues related to American politics and 
policies, I restricted the sample to U.S. workers with a 95 percent approval rating. 
Workers are typically paid a small amount for each HIT completed. Amazon.com 
pays cash to workers that have provided bank details, and provides Amazon.com gift 
vouchers for workers without bank accounts or those unwilling to link their bank details 
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to the company. Paolaci, Chandler and Iperirotis (2010) recruited 1000 respondents 
within three weeks, paying just $.10 for participating in a three-minute survey. Berinsky, 
Huber and Lenz (2012) found similar results in their recruitment efforts, receiving more 
than 200 respondents in a day for a 2-4 minute survey for $.25 per completion.  
The grant application to the National Science Foundation’s TESS project was to 
gain access to a nationally representative sample of 2,000 respondents living within the 
U.S. A power calculation was carried out and indicated that the sample size of 2,000 should 
be sufficiently large to detect a difference in means of 0.15 approximately 97 percent of the 
time, if one actually exists within the U.S. general population.20 To yield the closest possible 
results of the sharper TESS study, the MTurk sample sought was also for 2,000 respondents. 
 
Table 4.4: Submitted Surveys (per hour)  









$.02 5.6 5.6 5.3 
$.10 25.0 14.3 6.3 
$.50 40.5 31.6 16.7 
Source: Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) 
 
The low rate of pay has raised ethical flags about the exploitation of workers, and 
these concerns have given rise to new research examining why individuals agree to take 
part in the marketplace. Respondents often reported that earning extra money was an 
important consideration for their participation, however, many workers also cited non-
monetary reasons, such as entertainment and ‘killing time’, considering it a productive 
alternative to television (Chandler and Kapelner, 2010). Another study by Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Gosling (2011) sampled 187 MTurk workers to understand why they 
                                                
20 The results of the power analysis can be found in Annex 4.C. 
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completed tasks, financial incentives ranked below the mean, with many reporting they 
found the HITs ‘enjoyable’. Yet, as Table 4.4 illustrates, participation is sensitive to the 
rate of compensation and the time to complete the HIT, with higher paying and shorter 
tasks generating more interest than those that take longer and pay less. For this project, 
participants received a small payment of $.50 for the completion of each survey for the 
five-minute questionnaire. The rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about 
exploitation, but the incentive is not greater than the payment offered through the LSE 
Behavioural Research Lab.21 
The online system, anonymity, and financial incentives have raised concerns 
about the quality of the data (e.g. respondents engage in random clicking of response 
options or create multiple accounts to take surveys more than once). Researchers in 
several disciplines within the social sciences have helped to alleviate these fears by 
replicating the results of several experimental studies (Berinsky et al, 2012). Other studies 
comparing the results of cognitive tasks found that the quality of the data obtained 
through the MTurk pool to be as good as, or better for cognitive tasks than traditional 
sampling pools from universities, and online panels created by research firms (Chandler 
and Kapelner, 2010; Horton et al, 2010; Paolaci et al, 2010). Although the virtual setting 
is far less controlled than a typical laboratory setting, MTurk has created safeguards to 
limit multiple submissions by a single participant by linking accounts to bank accounts 
and address, checking the information against the IP address. Concerns about random 
clicking were addressed at the front end through the design of the instrument and careful 
testing before the survey is distributed, and included a ‘weed-out’ question that tested 
whether a respondent is paying attention before entering the survey  (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009).  
                                                
21 Based on the average survey completion time of five minutes, the amount paid to respondents would 
equate to $6 per hour, whereas the LSE’s Behavioral Research Lab pays respondents £10 for studies that 




Table 4.5: MTurk Sample as Compared to High Quality Internet Panel  
& Face-to-Face Samples 2008 


















Female  60.1% (2.1) 57.6% (0.9) 51.7% (0.2) 55.0% (1.3) 
Education  
(mean years) 
14.9 (0.1) 16.2 (0.1) 13.2 (0.0) 13.5 (0.1) 
Age (mean years)  32.3 (0.5) 49.7 (0.3) 46.0 (0.1) 46.6 (0.5) 
Mean income $55,332 ($1,659) $69,043 ($794) $62,256 ($130) $62,501 ($1,467) 
Median income  $45,000 $67,500 $55,000 $55,000 
Race 
White  83.5 (1.6) 83.0 (0.7) 81.2 (0.1) 79.1 (0.9) 
Black  4.4 (0.9) 8.9 (0.5) 11.8 (0.1) 12.0 (0.6) 
Hispanic  6.7 (1.1) 5.0 (0.4) 13.7 (0.1) 9.1 (0.5) 
Marital status 
Married  39.0 (2.1) 56.8 (0.9) 55.7 (0.2) 50.1 (1.3) 
Divorced  7.1 (1.1) 12.1 (0.6) 10.2 (0.1) 12.9 (0.8) 
Separated  2.5 (0.7) 1.3 (0.2) 2.1 (0.1) 2.9 (0.4) 
Never married  50.6 (2.1) 14.2 (0.6) 25.7 (0.2) 26.2 (1.1) 
Widowed  0.7 (0.4) 4.9 (0.4) 6.3 (0.1) 7.8 (0.6) 
Housing status 
Rent  52.7 (2.3) 14.3(0.1)  32 (1.2) 
Own home 47.3 (2.3) 80.8 (0.8)  66.1 (1.2) 
Religion 
None 41.8 (2.1) 13.1 (0.8)  26.9 (1.2) 
Protestant 20.7 (1.7) 38.7 (1.4)  28.2 (1.2) 
Catholic  16.5 (1.6) 22.9 (1.0)  17.5 (1.0) 
Jewish  4.4 (0.9) 3.0 (0.4)  1.2 (0.3) 
Region of the U.S. 
Northeast  22.1 (1.8) 16.9 (0.7) 18.4 (0.1) 14.6 (0.9) 
Midwest  26.6 (1.9) 28.3 (0.9) 21.9 (0.1) 21.2 (1.1) 
South  30.9 (2.0) 31.4 (0.9) 36.5 (0.2) 42.8 (1.2) 
West  20.4 (1.7) 23.4 (0.8) 23.1 (0.2) 21.4 (0.9) 
 
Source: Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) 
Note. Percentages except for education, age, and income with SEs in parentheses. 
 
 
The respondents from MTurk look more demographically diverse than a typical 
web survey sample, and much more representative than a traditional sample of American 
college students (Buhrmester et al, 2010; Paolaci et al, 2010). In another study, an MTurk 
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sample compared reasonably well to a Knowledge Networks panel (which is now the 
research firm GfK) for the National Election 2008-09 Panel Study (Berinsky et al, 2012). 
As summarized in Table 4.5, the MTurk participants are not representative of the U.S. 
population. Many of the studies analyzing the use of MTurk for research have 
highlighted respondents are, on average, more likely to be female, unmarried, renters, 
more educated, and less conservative than the typical American (Berinsky et al, 2012; 




To determine the extent to which partisan attachment, the language used to refer 
to immigrants, and the party sponsor alters Americans’ preferences about immigration 
related policies, I examine the data from 2,053 U.S. citizens aged 18 and older who 
completed interviews using the online software tool Qualtrics. The web-based survey 
service allows users to generate survey instruments, collect and store data, and create 
reports. The platform is user-friendly, supports advanced survey logic (e.g. piping), and is 
able to handle complex designs including projects that require random assignment and 
embedding in external websites. Qualtrics offers many important quality control features 
that allow researchers to completely anonymize responses, track the Internet Protocol 
(IP) address to exclude participants from outside the sampling area, and limit multiple 
submissions from a single respondent. Further Qualtrics meets strict data security 
requirements to ensure participants’ data are protected. 
Data were collected from August 28th to August 29th 2018. Participants used their 
own private computer, tablet or mobile device to complete the survey, and this element 
of privacy is associated with a lower risk of social desirability bias because participants are 
not interacting with an interviewer and do not need to monitor their responses to fit 
what they believe society expects an ‘appropriate’ answer to be (Groves et al., 2004; 
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Robson, 2011).  The average age of the respondent was 38 years old, 50 percent were 
male, and nearly 60 percent had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher. Seventy-five 
percent of the sample reported their ethnic or racial background as white, eight percent 
as African American, six percent as Latino, and seven percent Asian, and two percent as 
“another” race or ethnic identity. Additionally, 43 percent of respondents identified as 
Democrats, a quarter of the sample identified as Republicans and 32 percent as 
Independents. Upon examining the 657 Independents, 85 percent expressed a particular 
lean towards one of the two main parties – lean Republican (N=223) and lean Democrat 
(N=337). A balance check across the twelve treatment groups on the participants’ 
characteristics (e.g. age, race, gender, educational attainment, political preferences, etc.) 
was executed and confirmed that, despite the large number of treatment groups, 
participants are evenly distributed, indicating that no additional adjustments are necessary 




Participants were asked about their preferences regarding the current levels of 
immigration, measured by the variable LETIN, which uses a reverse coded Likert scale 
(1 = ‘Reduced a lot’ to 5 ‘Increased a lot’) to ensure that a positive response is captured 
as a higher value.  The government policies directed at immigrants include are also 
measured using a five point Likert scale ordered from negative to positive - prenatal care 
for unauthorized immigrant mothers PRENATAL (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree) and the reverse coded variable for denaturalization DENAT (1 = strongly agree to 
5 = strongly disagree).  
 
                                                




To test the difference in Americans’ reactions to harsh (welcoming) language 
regarding immigrants, I created four binary indicator variables: RESTNO (1 = 
restrictionist frame, no party leader attribution, 0 = all other respondents); 
RESTCLINTON (1= restrictionist frame with attribution to former President Bill 
Clinton, 0 = all other respondents); WELCOMENO (1 = welcoming frame, no party 
leader attribution, 0 = all other respondents); WELCOMEREAGAN (1 = welcoming 
frame with attribution to former President Ronald Reagan, 0 = all other respondents).  
 
The (bi)partisan cues on immigration policies are examined with six binary 
indicator variables. For vignette 2:  REPCUE (1 = Republican cue, 0 = all other 
treatments); DEMCUE (1= Democrat cue, 0 = all other treatments); BIPCUE (1 = 
Republican and Democrat cue, 0 = all other treatments). For vignette 3 OBAMACUE (1 
= President Obama cue, 0 = all other treatments); TRUMPCUE (1= President Trump 
cue, 0 = all other treatments); TWOPRESCUE (1 = Obama and Trump administration 
cue, 0 = all other treatments). 
 
PARTISANSHIP 
The survey asked participants which political party they identified. Dummy 
variables were created to isolate the differences in preferences between Republicans – 
REPID (N=514); Democrats – DEMID (N=882); and Independents – INDID 
(N=566).  A second question was put to respondents who identified themselves as 
political independents, which asked whether they more closely identified as a Republican 
or Democrat, which revealed that an overwhelming majority align themselves with one 
of the two major parties. A second set of partisan variables were created, collapsing these 
‘leaner’ respondents into the two main parties: BROADREP (N=737) and 




DOES HARSH LANGUAGE AFFECT PREFERENCE ON IMMIGRATION LEVELS?   
The effect of the restrictionist and welcoming frames was estimated by 
comparing the difference in mean response of Americans’ preferences for immigration 
levels within the U.S. to those who received President Ronald Reagan’s welcoming 
speech that was positively framed about immigrants, to those who received President Bill 
Clinton’s negatively framed speech calling for tougher immigration controls. The 
difference in means was also calculated for those who received information about the 
source of the speech. The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in Table 
4.6 demonstrate a significant difference (p<.01) in preferred immigration levels for those 
allocated to the welcoming versus the restrictive frame. Figure 4.1 depicts the results 
from the four treatment groups across the entire sample of 2,053 respondents. The top 
pair of plots represent the participants allocated to the restrictionist Clinton frame – ½ 
receive a cue attributing credit to the former president, while the other half did not. The 
bottom pair illustrate the results of the participants who received the welcoming Reagan 
frame – ½ identifying former President Reagan as the speaker and ½ omitting this 
information. This holistic view clearly shows that participants who received President 
Reagan’s welcoming speech were, on average, more favorable to increases in immigration 
levels, irrespective of whether or not they knew that the text came from a credible party 
leader, whereas the respondents who read President Clinton’s negative speech favored 
curbing immigration levels, even when they did not receive information on the origins of 







Figure 4.1 –Effects of Restrictionist & Welcoming Frames Total Sample 
 








 coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Restrictionist – Clinton -0.076 -0.074 -0.086 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.068) 
Welcoming – No Attribution 0.278*** 0.253*** 0.260*** 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.067) 
Welcoming – Reagan 0.326*** 0.313*** 0.326*** 
 (0.073) (0.068) (0.067) 
Republican ID  -0.415***  
  (0.064)  
Democrat ID  0.549***  
  (0.056)  
Broad Republican   -0.897*** 
   (0.050) 
    
     α 2.869 2.746 3.198 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.022 0.139 0.156 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 











PARTISANS’ REACTIONS TO CONTRASTING FRAMES FROM IN-PARTY ELITES 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide the four treatment groups with the effects broken 
down within each partisan group (Republican – level 2; Democrat – level 3; and in Figure 
4.3 Independents are listed in level 4) compared to the entire sample laid out in level 1. 
These forest plots show vast differences from the participants who were allocated to the 
welcoming and restrictionist frame, but no discernable differences among the 
respondents who received the cues of attribution to Presidents Reagan and Clinton. At 
first glance this outcome is surprising, as evidence from a large literature shows that 
individuals tend to follow the lead of trusted party leaders (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007) and that 
these voters are more likely to remain consistently on side with the leader (Levendusky, 
2010), but the fact that speeches from these former presidents directly contradict the 
messages disseminated from the current party leaders, and the large gap in immigration 
preferences between Republicans and Democrats suggest that partisans are relying the 
results fit the context.  
 
Figure 4.2: Effects of Welcoming & Restrictive Frames – Total Sample 














































































Figure 4.3: Effects of Welcoming & Restrictive Frames – Total Sample 
Compared to Republicans / Democrats Only 
 
DO PARTY SPONSOR CUES EXACERBATE POLARIZATION?  
The results from Table 4.7 show no effect on the partisan cues on the question 
of support for prenatal care for ‘illegal immigrant’ mothers. What becomes apparent 
from models two and three is that again, preferences on this issue are almost entirely 
driven by the individual’s partisan affiliation. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 break down the effects 
of the party cues by the respondent’s party identification. Figure 4.5 isolates the effects 
within for Republicans only, whereas Figure 4.6 only includes the results of each cue on 
the respondents who identify as Democrat. For each graph, level 1 represents the 
segment of Republicans/Democrats allocated to the Republican cue, level 2 shows the 
segment of Republicans/Democrats exposed to the Democrat cue, and level 3 depicts 
the results of the respondents allocated to the bipartisan cue. Each of the four lines 
within the levels breaks down the sample to factor in the spill-over impact of the 
welcoming and restrictive frame. These graphs illustrate that predictably, Republicans 
are, on average, more likely to strongly oppose providing prenatal care to unauthorized 
immigrants and Democrats are on average, more likely to support the initiative. 


























































 coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Republican Cue 0.022 0.042 0.037 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.069) 
Democrat Cue -0.097 -0.081 -0.104 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.069) 
Republican ID  -0.625***  
  (0.077)  
Democrat ID  0.701***  
  (0.067)  
Broad Republican   -1.222*** 
   (0.059) 
    
     α 3.449 3.292 3.885 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.001 0.146 0.174 




Figures 4.5 & 4.6 – Republican & Democratic Responses to  
Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette by Treatment 
  








































































On the issue of denaturalizing citizens who may have used an alternative name to 
apply for a visa, it is important to flag a routing error in the survey, which allocated the 
177 respondents from treatment group nine – who would have initially received the 
welcoming frame without attribution and subsequently a bi-partisan cue, were instead 
allocated to the Republican cue question for the Denaturalization vignette and do not 
show up in the results for this question. The results from Table 4.8 indicate a larger 
difference between the Trump and Obama cue. Interestingly, those who received the 
Obama cue were, on average, more likely to support the denaturalization policy, but the 
results are only marginally significant.  
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 also break down the effects of the party cues by the 
respondent’s party identification. Figure 4.8 isolates the effects within for Republicans 
only, whereas Figure 4.9 only includes the results of each cue on the respondents who 
identify as Democrat. Again, level 1 represents the segment of Republicans/Democrats 
allocated to the Republican cue, level 2 displays the segment of Republicans/Democrats 
exposed to the Democrat cue, and level 3 portrays the results of the respondents 
allocated to the bipartisan cue. As with the earlier graphs, each of the four lines within 
the levels breaks down the sample to factor in the spill-over impact of the welcoming 
and restrictive frame. Again, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 reveal the substantial gulf between 
parties, demonstrating that an individual’s partisan affiliation is best predictor of where 


















 coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Trump Cue 0.073 0.112 0.120* 
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.071) 
Obama Cue -0.123* -0.090 -0.099 
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.070) 
Republican ID  -0.457***  
  (0.076)  
Democrat ID  0.509***  
  (0.066)  
Broad Republican   -0.949*** 
   (0.058) 
    
     α 3.449 3.292 3.885 
Adjusted 𝑅! 0.001 0.146 0.174 







Figures 4.8 & 4.9 – Republican & Democratic Responses to  





















































































HOW DO PARTISANS RESPOND TO BIPARTISAN CUES  
 
Figures 4.5-4.9 reveal that the bipartisan cues make little difference in the policy preferences 
of Democrats or Republicans. Despite a glut of polling data suggesting many Americans prefer 
political compromise to move policy, the results indicate that bipartisan support fails to disrupt 
the deep rooted partisan pattern observed across items. These patterns persist for policies that 
could positive and negatively impact immigrant populations. This finding supports the research 
demonstrating that Americans’ pleas for bipartisan solutions are a better reflection of self-serving 
partisan desires, and this leaves policy makers with little incentive to work with their 
colleagues on the other side to craft substantive policy solutions on the issue of 
immigration (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014; Nicholson, 2012).  
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I bridge together two of the major theories believed to trigger hostile 
attitudes towards immigrants political frames and partisanship in order to test how public 
opinion is affected by the competing frames the in current immigration debate. Political 
parties work hard to define and craft a credible messaging strategy on the issue, and a 
large literature demonstrates that how an issue is framed can have a powerful impact on 
public opinion (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar 
and Kinder, 1987; Nelson and Oxley 1997). We also have a wealth of evidence showing 
that political parties are a major predictor in shaping public opinion (e.g. Bartels 2002; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). However, 
to date no study has provided evidence demonstrating how Americans’ opinions on 
immigration are influenced by issue frames that are explicitly sponsored by political 
parties, and also provides a contrasting frame /policy issues from the same party.  
I find that Americans of all political stripes are more supportive of immigrants when 
they receive a welcoming frame that emphasizes the positive contributions and seek to 
reduce immigration when they receive a restrictive immigration frame where the focus is 
on negative consequences. Still, there are vast differences in the attitudes across all policy 
initiatives depending on the respondents’ partisan identity. Republicans were consistently 
more likely to respond negatively (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) 
whereas Democrats took a softer approach in their responses on all items. This 
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consistency is not surprising, given the remarkable polarization experienced within the 
United States in recent years (Abramowitz, 2010; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; 
Jacobson, 2014; Mutz, 2018) and that the messaging strategies adopted by political actors 
are more extreme (Hopkin, 2013; McCaffrey, 2000).  
The cues that reveal attribution of the frames did not the sway preferences for the 
entire sample or within the partisan groups, countering the findings from a wide range of 
research demonstrating that important role played by party elites (e.g. Converse, 1964; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Goren, 2005; Peterson, et al, 2010). Similarly, the party 
sponsor and bipartisan cues embedded in the vignettes on prenatal care and 
denaturalization failed to influence respondent’s preferences, despite a large literature 
showing demonstrating the effectiveness of party sponsor cues (Brewer, 2001; Chong 
and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Zaller, 1992). It is possible that the observed 
differences between partisan groups make it difficult to widen the gulf between the 
groups, irrespective of the party signals received. The results potentially point at a much 
deeper problem that has important implications for those interested in both the study of, 
but also the practice of good governance (Guttman and Thompson, 2012) – that is if 
elected officials are taking their cues from public opinion, and the electorate is signaling 
they do not want politicians to reach across the aisle, then it becomes increasingly 
difficult to govern. Both parties can ‘own’ the issue of immigration, but under very 
different narratives. To simplify - Republicans own immigration control (e.g. Gadarian and 
Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011) and Democrats own immigrants’ rights 
(Jeong, et al, 2011; Mayada, et al 2016).  
The vignette survey experimental design yields a rich set of data, allowing us to test a 
much larger number of hypotheses simultaneously. However, there are some important 
limitations of the study design and sample that may also hamper the results. Namely, the 
sample drawn from a pool of workers on Mechanical Turk was on average younger, 
more educated and more likely to identify as Democrats. Additionally, the sample size of 
2,000 respondents across 12 treatment groups (and two parties) introduced some 
challenges in testing alternative hypotheses (e.g. low versus high knowledge citizens, 
voters versus non-voters).  
The results of this study serve as a pilot and inform the research design for a larger 
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study that will be put to a nationally representative sample in some important ways. First, 
although the power analysis (see Annex 4.C) indicates sufficient power to detect a 
difference on the partisan and bipartisan cues, should one exist in the general population, 
it is possible that the skew of the sample combined with the many treatment groups 
limited the ability to detect of any effects. The revised design will reduce the number of 
treatment groups from 12 to six – collapsing the four treatment groups for the 
welcoming and restrictive frame into two and omit the test of attribution. This means 
that all respondents will receive information revealing attribution to either Clinton or the 
Reagan and the null result from the MTurk sample will be incorporated into the findings 
of any final paper that is published. The sample will remain at 2,000 respondents, but 
with a more focused design and nationally representative sample, the effects may be 
stronger from the outset, and allow for an analysis of any spill-over effects from the 
welcoming and restrictive frames into the second and third vignettes.  
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Annex 4.A: Summary Statistics by Treatment (Groups 1-6) 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
 
Mean StdDev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Republican 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.46 
Democrat 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50 
Independent 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.45 
Broadly Rep 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.49 
Broadly Dem 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.58 0.50 
Male 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Female 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Age 18-24 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 
Age 25-34 0.42 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Age 35-44 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.45 
Age 45-54 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30 
Age 55-64 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.26 
Age 65+ 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20 
White 0.76 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.43 0.78 0.42 0.75 0.44 
Black 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 
Latino 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
Other Ethnicity 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
H/S Diploma 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 
Some College 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 
Bachelors 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.50 
Graduate Degree 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 
Under $40k 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.49 
$40k-$70k 0.38 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 
Over $70k 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 
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Annex 4.A: Summary Statistics by Treatment (Groups 7-12) 
 
Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 Group 10 Group 11 Group 12 
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Republican 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.39 
Democrat 0.42 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Independent 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.33 0.47 
Broadly Rep 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.45 
Broadly Dem 0.59 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.67 0.47 
Male 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Female 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Age 18-24 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27 
Age 25-34 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.34 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Age 35-44 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.41 
Age 45-54 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32 
Age 55-64 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.34 
Age 65+ 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24 
White 0.76 0.43 0.73 0.44 0.78 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.72 0.45 0.70 0.46 
Black 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 
Latino 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.30 
Other Ethnicity 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 
H/S Diploma 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.11 0.32 
Some College 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.48 
Bachelors 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49 
Graduate Degree 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.36 
Under $40k 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.50 
$40k-$70k 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 
Over $70k 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 
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Annex 4.B: Figures 
Figure 4.4 – Effects of Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette 




















Figure 4.7 – Effects of Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette 

























































































Annex 4.C: Power Analysis for Study Sample Size 
 
Conservative Estimate: Treating Partisan ID as Blocking Condition 
 
Input parameters:              
              Effect size f                      =   0.15 
                                err prob                        =   0.05 
                              Total sample size             =   2000 
                              Numerator df                   =   35 
                              Number of groups           =   36 
 
Output parameters:             
        Noncentrality parameter            =   45.00000 
                               Critical F                              =   1.4289903 
                               Denominator df                         =   1964 
                               Actual power                              =   0.9812613 
 
Moderate Estimate: Treating Partisan ID as a Covariate 
 
Input parameters:              
Effect size f                              =   0.15 
                                  err prob                        =   0.05 
                                Total sample size                 =   2000 
                                Numerator df                       =   18 
                                Number of groups                   =   12 
  Number of covariates  =   7 
 
Output parameters:             
     Noncentrality parameter            =   45.00000 
                            Critical F                                    =   1.6090431 
                            Denominator df                         =   1988 
                            Actual power                              =   0.9968603 
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Annex 4.D: Experimental Instrument 
Qualtrics Harsh TESS Pilot Study 2018 
 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 1 - CONSENT 
consent1 STUDY: What's your take on important social issues?   
   
    OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT     This survey is for a research 
study about important social issues in the United States. You will be asked to report your 
views about different issues discussed in government and on the news.     This survey 
requires you to pay careful attention. Please make sure that there are no 
distractions. Only participants who answer carefully will be credited.    
  
 PARTICIPATION & CONFIDENTIALITY    The survey will take 
approximately 5 minutes, and you will receive $.50 for your participation.   
  
 
 • All information from this project is confidential. Personal information such as your 
name will not be used in any work that results from this research, and will be treated as 
strictly confidential.   
    
• Results of this project will be written up as part of a PhD dissertation at the London 
School of Economics. Results may also be published in an academic journal and 
discussed at conferences.   
    
• You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time, and for any reason.  
  
 • If you have any questions about this research please contact the researcher Melissa 
Shannon (m.shannon@lse.ac.uk). 
  
 • It is important that you respond honestly to all questionnaire items.    
    
    
CONSENT   
 I understand the purpose of this research project and all my questions have been 
answered. I understand that my answers will be kept confidential and will be fully 
anonymized. I understand that I have the right to stop participating at any time. I 
have read and understand the information provided above. I give my consent to 
participate.   
o Yes, I AGREE to participate  (1)  
o No, I DO NOT give my consent and will EXIT the survey  (2)  
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End of Block: BLOCK 1 - CONSENT 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 2 - WEED-OUT QUESTION 
 
 
attention1   STUDY: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL ISSUES        
In this study you will be asked to think about different social issues and report your 
attitudes.    
   
  Before you start, we want to know whether you actually take the time to read the 
directions. We will screen out and refuse to pay people who do random clicking. In order 
to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please answer whether the following 
statement is true.        
   
  This survey contains questions about social issues 
o Definitely True  (1)  
o Probably True  (2)  
o Neither True nor False  (3)  
o Probably False  (4)  
o Definitely False  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 2 - WEED-OUT QUESTION 
 





 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.         
 
“All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
        
  “All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 
years, and we must do more to stop it.”    
     
  





   
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first 
stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to 
work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under 
different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for 
them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in 
history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, 
neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they 





   
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.        
 
 “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first stepped 
foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. 
They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, 
often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but 
what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They 
brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, 
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peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.         
 
“All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 





   
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 
years, and we must do more to stop it.”    
    






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.        
 
 “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first stepped 
foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. 
They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, 
often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but 
what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They 
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brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, 
peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first 
stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to 
work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under 
different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for 
them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in 
history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, 
neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they 
shared the same values, the same dream.”       
 





   
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 





 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.       
  
 “All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this 
country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. 
The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. 
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But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of 
immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent 
years, and we must do more to stop it.”    
  







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first 
stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to 
work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under 
different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for 
them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in 
history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, 
neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for 
your first question.   
 
      “Through this ‘Golden Door’ have come millions of men and women, who first 
stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to 
work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under 
different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for 
them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in 
history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, 
neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they 
shared the same values, the same dream.”       
 
President Ronald Reagan - Republican        
 
End of Block: BLOCK 3 -Presidential Frames 
 






 Do you think the number of immigrants to America should be....     
o Increased a lot  (1)  
o Increased a little  (2)  
o Remain the same as it is  (3)  
o Reduced a little  (4)  
o Reduced a lot  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 4 - Immigration level 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 5 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 1-3 
Display This Question: 
If  Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed 
 
 
Prenatal - Rep 1  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     
 
  “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have 
worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health 
insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-
income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  




Display This Question: 
If  Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed 
 
 
Prenatal - Dem 2  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     
 
  “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked 
to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance 
to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income 
unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  




Display This Question: 
If  Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed 
 
Prenatal - Bipart 3  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?      
 
 “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and 
Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants 
who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health 
screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal 
care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 5 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 1-3 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 6 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 4-6 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Rep 4  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     
 
  “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have 
worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health 
insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-
income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Dem 5  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?      
 
 “Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked 
to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance 
to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income 
unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Bipart 6  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and 
Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants 
who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health 
screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal 
care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 6 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 4-6 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 7 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 7-9 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Rep 7  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have 
worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health 
insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-
income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Dem 8  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked 
to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance 
to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income 
unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
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Display This Question: 
If  Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed 
 
Prenatal - Bipart 9  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and 
Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants 
who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health 
screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal 
care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 7 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 7-9 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 8 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 10-12 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Rep 10  
  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have 
worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health 
insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-
income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Dem 11  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked 
to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance 
to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income 
unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Prenatal - Bipart 12  
  
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.      How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?       
 
“Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to 
improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and 
Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants 
who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health 
screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal 
care.”     
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Somewhat disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (4)  
o Strongly agree  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 8 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 10-12 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 9 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 1-3 
Display This Question: 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     “Old 
fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government 
by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get 
citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
 
Display This Question: 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
 
Display This Question: 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old 
records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We 
should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to 
get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 9 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 1-3 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 10 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 4-6 
Display This Question: 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Trump administration began  checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke 
the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
 
Display This Question: 





   
 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
 
Display This Question: 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     “Old 
fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government 
by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get 
citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old records to 
identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke 
the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”    
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 10 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 4-6 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 11 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 7-9 
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Display This Question: 





 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?     
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
 
Display This Question: 







 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?      
 
“Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  




Display This Question: 





 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
  
“Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old 
records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We 
should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to 
get a visa”   
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 11 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 7-9 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 12 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 10-12 
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Display This Question: 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?   
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  




Display This Question: 





 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?      
 
“Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify 
immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the 
citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa”     
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  




Display This Question: 






 Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you 
think.     How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement   
 
 “Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the 
government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and 
then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old 
records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We 
should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to 
get a visa”    
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 12 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 10-12 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 13 - Voting Behavior 
 
 
votereg Are you currently registered to vote? 
  
  
o Yes  (1)  






vote2012 Did you vote in the 2016 presidential election?    
o Yes  (1)  





likvote There are many local, state, and national elections.  Furthermore, many 
people intend to vote in a given election, but sometimes personal and 
professional circumstances keep them from the polls.     Thinking back over the 
past two or three years, would you say that you voted in all elections, almost all, 
about half, one or two, or none at all? 
  
  
o All Elections  (1)  
o Almost All  (2)  
o About Half  (3)  
o One or Two  (4)  
o None At All  (5)  
o Don't Know  (6)  
 
 





partyid Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
o Republican  (1)  
o Democrat  (2)  
o Independent  (3)  
o Another Party, Please Specify:  (4) 
________________________________________________ 
o No Preference  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Republican 
 
repub Would you call yourself a... 
o Strong Republican  (1)  
o Not Very Strong Republican  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Democrat 
 
dem Would you call yourself a... 
o Strong Democrat  (1)  
o Not Very Strong Democrat  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Independent 
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indepaff Do you think of yourself as closer to the... 
o Republican Party  (1)  





polid In general, do you think of yourself as… 
o Extremely Liberal  (1)  
o Liberal  (2)  
o Slightly Liberal  (3)  
o Moderate, Middle of the Road  (4)  
o Slightly Conservative  (5)  
o Conservative  (6)  
o Extremely Conservative  (7)  
 
 





polknow Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives? 
  
   
o John Boehner  (1)  
o Harry Reid  (2)  
o Paul Ryan  (3)  
o Nancy Pelosi  (4)  
o Don't Know  (5)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 13 - Voting Behavior 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 14 - Respondent's Place of Residence 
 
state Please select the state and county in which you currently reside.  
State: (1)  
County: (2)  
  State (1) ... Wyoming ~ Weston County (3152) 
 
End of Block: BLOCK 14 - Respondent's Place of Residence 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 15 - Demographics 
  
 
gender What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  






born What year were you born? 





edu What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o Less than High School  (1)  
o High School / GED  (2)  
o Some College  (3)  
o 2-year College Degree  (4)  
o 4-year College Degree  (5)  
o Master’s Degree  (6)  
o Doctoral Degree  (7)  
o Professional Degree (JD, MD)  (8)  
o Prefer Not to Answer  (9)  
 
 
Page Break  
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income What is your annual income range? 
o Below $20,000  (1)  
o $20,000 - $29,999  (2)  
o $30,000 - $39,999  (3)  
o $40,000 - $49,999  (4)  
o $50,000 - $59,999  (5)  
o $60,000 - $69,999  (6)  
o $70,000 - $79,999  (9)  
o $80,000 - $89,999  (7)  
o $90,000 or more  (8)  
 
 




marstat Please indicate your marital status: 






race What is your race? 
   
o White/Caucasian  (1)  
o African American  (2)  
o Hispanic  (3)  
o Asian  (4)  
o Native American  (5)  
o Pacific Islander  (6)  
o Other  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
 




relig What is your religion? 
o Baptist—Any Denomination  (1)  
o Protestant (e.g., Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal)  (2)  
o Catholic  (3)  
o Mormon  (4)  
o Jewish  (5)  
o Muslim  (6)  
o Hindu  (7)  
o Buddhist  (8)  
o Pentecostal  (9)  
o Eastern Orthodox  (10)  
o Other Christian  (11) 
________________________________________________ 
o Other non-Christian  (12) 
________________________________________________ 





church How often do you attend religious services?   
  
   
o More than Once a Week  (1)  
o Once a Week  (2)  
o Once or Twice a Month  (3)  
o A Few Times a Year  (4)  
o Once a Year or Less  (5)  
o Never  (6)  
 
 
Page Break  
End of Block: BLOCK 15 - Demographics 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 16 - Citizenship 
 
bornUS Were you born in the United States, Puerto Rico or some other country? 
o The United States  (1)  
o Puerto Rico  (2)  
o Some other country  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Were you born in the United States, Puerto Rico or some other country? = Some other country 
 
citizen Are you a naturalized American citizen? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Page Break  
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intparent Where were your parents born?       
o One parent born in the U.S.  (1)  
o Both parents born in the U.S.  (2)  
o Neither parent born in the U.S.  (3)  
o Don't Know  (4)  
 
End of Block: BLOCK 16 - Citizenship 
 
Start of Block: BLOCK 17 - end page for testers 
 
end Thank you for taking part.  If you have any comments about the topics covered in 
the survey that you think might be useful for the study, please include them below. 
 
 
Be sure to click next so that you can receive your worker code and get paid for 


























This doctoral thesis builds upon prior research to examine whether and the 
extent to which attitudes towards immigrants induce support for punitive policies 
directed at immigrant populations. Hajinal and Rivera (2014) argue that the heavily 
rotated threat narrative on immigration has successfully fed fears about immigrants. They 
content that these messages also play an important role in shaping non-minority voters’ 
attitudes towards minority populations and but trigger party selection.  
Research on this topic that employs the lingua-franca of the current political 
discourse is critical to understanding how individuals engage with these messages, how 
successful these frames are at tapping into latent views about immigrant populations, and 
piecing together how these factors sway policy preferences in this realm. Recent 
examinations on the effects of Donald Trump’s immigration rhetoric within online 
discussion forums show that the volume and content of phrasing increases dramatically 
after his speeches, copycatting the phrasing laid-out in his speeches and giving full credit. 
By December 2015, Demata (2017) observed a sizable shift in the most prominent 
phrases linked to overall discussions of immigration from “reform,” “amnesty,” and 
“uslatino” to “illegal”, “alien”, “Muslim”, “terrorism”, “ban” tied to hashtags for 
“trump” and “realdonaldtrump”. Observational analysis of this kind is informative, but 
the viewpoint is restrained and potentially misleading. For example, partisan 
identification is assumed because of the post on the web forum and only includes 
messages from those who are active on these forums rather than from the wider 
electorate. Further, the scope of much of the literature on how individuals engage with 
the issue of immigration is centered on negative political communication (Brader et al, 
2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014), limiting our perspective to one 
aspect of this important issue. In short these types of analyses give us little insights into 
how people across the entire electorate respond to the same political message on 
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immigration, an important addition given the increasingly fragmented media and partisan 
environment. 
 I make several important contributions to public opinion research by 
investigating whether additional factors may neutralize (i.e. positive frames and concrete 
savings estimates in Chapters II and III, welcoming frames by trusted party elites in 
Chapter IV, and bi-partisan cues Chapters II and IV) these policy preferences. Further, 
by presenting respondents with vignettes that mimic or use the actual language from the 
debates on immigration, I am able to investigate how Americans respond to real-world 
political communication on this highly partisan and polarized issue. 
Careful attention has gone into drafting these political messages to ensure they 
come across as credible and research participants understand what is being asked in the 
same way. In Chapter II (Paper 1) I present the results of pre-testing phase of a vignette 
survey experiment. The tested instrument seeks to measure how individuals’ attitudes 
towards immigrants and party sponsor influences support for government funded health 
care initiatives, and whether providing respondents with a concrete economic benefit 
induces a more positive enrollment preference when immigrant groups benefit from a 
public entitlement program. This methodology has not been used in this area and 
presents a vital contribution to the research in this vein.  
To identify sources of response error and improve the validity of survey 
questions in surveys, I conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews with participants in 
Texas between August and September 2015. Through the cognitive interviews I hoped 
to (1) identify any complicated language in the survey that could affect comprehension, 
memory retrieval, and decision processes; (2) investigate the ways in which participants 
mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; (3) evaluate how online 
survey participants engage with the survey in its electronic form. The cognitive interviews 
provide vital feedback to improve the quality of the survey instrument, however, the 
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study also bears out some important qualitative insights into how individuals residing 
within the U.S. engage with and comprehend political issue frames on immigration.  
Across all interview participants, the consensus was largely positive to the 
positive frames employed. Regularly participants would make suggestions on how to 
improve the wording to increase agreement with the statements rather than to pull out an 
objective evaluation or policy preference. These discussions suggest that the positive 
frames do induce more positive preferences, findings that are also supported in the larger 
quantitative studies carried out in Chapters III and IV. 
Although participants were largely positive in their assessment of the vignettes 
put before them, once the immigrant primes were present, the participants consistently 
linked the issue of immigration to politics, referring to it as a ‘hot-button’ issue. This 
theme was especially common among individuals who strongly identified with a political 
party, many of which expressed anxiety that the vignettes mentioned an immigrant group 
in relation to the public entitlement programs. Their reactions were amplified when they 
received the party cue. They feared that members of the opposite party would respond 
more negatively when it was employed providing qualitative evidence that touches on 
Iyengar and Westwood’s (2015) main thesis that partisan hostility across the American 
electorate now exceeds racial disdain. But through the interviews the participants offered 
a more nuanced perspective of their concerns about what the immigrant cues meant, but 
always under the lens of how they believed these would influence the ‘other’ party’s 
preferences on the policy under consideration. The feedback received from this project 
was critical in informing the theoretical approach and hypotheses tested on partisan cues 
in Chapter IV. 
As participants of the cognitive interviews received the concrete savings 
estimates, some moderated their response from a negative position, commenting ‘it’s a 
no-brainer’, however, other subjects expressed skepticism about the figures embedded in 
the vignette. The feedback related to this concern centered on a mistrust of where the 
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numbers came from. The suspicion expressed was particularly prominent among those 
with stronger party affiliation, but expressed relatively evenly across committed 
Republican and Democratic participants.   This mistrust of apolitical information 
introduces some interesting questions worthy of further investigation. The ability for 
citizens absorb and objectively evaluate new information in the political world is a 
fundamental standard for democratic decision-making. For example, if the economy is 
performing poorly or the number of mass shooting increase, there is a traditional 
assumption that the entire electorate, regardless of party preference – would update their 
beliefs in light of the new information and reassess their political preferences. Yet, this 
assumption is challenged by research demonstrating that partisans interpret the same, 
seemingly neutral, information through a partisan lens and discount the information 
before them (e.g., Gaines et al., 2007). Experimental work has deepened the cracks in 
this assumption, showing that once partisans form an attitude about an issue or 
candidate, they fail to process new information about these objects impartially (e.g. 
Bartles, 2002; Druckman et al, 2013; Zaller, 1992). Rather, these individuals question and 
disregard information that contests their existing opinions. Despite the growth of 
research in this area, to date there has been scant evidence presented of how this mistrust 
of apolitical information transpires in real-world settings. Consequently, we know almost 
nothing about the depths or motivations behind these types of the bias. The persistent 
theme of mistrust of neutral information invites further investigation to this important 
topic. 
 In Chapter III, I employ an original survey experiment to directly tests three 
fundamental theories believed to be at the heart of exclusionary policies targeted at the 
foreign-born – anxiety about immigrant participation in government funded initiatives, 
hostility towards unauthorized immigrants, and the concerns about taxes. Social welfare 
programs were created to improve outcomes for disadvantaged populations, but they 
also provide a tangible economic benefit to society (Heckman, 2006). However, the 
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American electorate’s complex and somewhat contradictory vision of a social safety net, 
which calls for a system of minimal taxes while aiming to provide high quality public 
services, presents the opportunity for exclusionary attitudes to emerge.  
As policy makers debate how best to resolve record budget deficits and 
burgeoning demands on the social infrastructure, this research seeks to disentangle the 
political decisions made by Americans’ regarding who should get access to government-
funded assistance. Pioneering studies examining the links between attitudes towards 
immigrants and their exclusionary preferences relied on observational data, but the 
inferences made are restricted because they lack a counterfactual, that is no direct 
comparison that removes the explicit reminder of immigrant participation. This study 
broadens our understanding of these links by introducing immigrant primes to a large 
and nationally representative sample of Americans, and asks about their willingness to 
block access to these controversial populations.  
Scholars in a range of disciplines have all provided evidence indicating that 
individuals are less willing to fund government services when the costs are presented to 
them (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Finkelstein, 2007; Green et al, 1994; Meltsner 1974; 
Povich, 2014) and when an beneficiary is deemed to be undeserving (Gilens, 1999). A 
large literature has also shown that political frames centered on the immigrant tax burden 
would negatively influence Americans’ enrollment preferences for government funded 
programs (Clark et al, 1994; Hanson et al., 2007), but the original contribution examined 
in this study determines whether a similar pattern emerge if individuals were exposed to a 
positive frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies. 
To date few studies have explicitly examined Americans’ reactions to messages 
using the term illegal immigrant in a comparative context. Knoll et al (2011) get closer to 
the impact of the 'illegal immigrant' cue by testing whether Iowa voters change their 
preferences for federal immigration reform options when primed to think about 
'undocumented immigrants' versus 'illegal immigrants', and 'undocumented immigrants' 
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against 'Mexican immigrants' – but these frames related to citizenship not public benefits 
policies. Carried out between March 2007 and January 2008, their results provided 
limited evidence for decreased support for conditional citizenship under the 'Mexican 
immigrant frame', however, the effects were stronger for Republicans who believed 
immigration was an important policy problem. The experiment conducted in Chapter III 
expanded upon the findings of Knoll et al (2011) by testing changes in preferences on a 
much larger and nationally representative sample to examine differences by education 
and income level, in line with the prevailing theory.  Additionally, the experiment 
provides respondents with a greater range of social policy options that were recently 
floated in state legislatures and the U.S. Congress, and the data were collected at a point 
when citizens have experienced greater exposure to the immigration debate.  
The results clearly demonstrate that immigrant participation consistently 
triggered more exclusionary responses. The respondents who were exposed to the ‘illegal 
immigrant’ prime expressed more punitive preferences relative to those who received the 
‘immigrant’ prime. Similar to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) and Knoll (2013), these 
findings suggest that legal status is a significant driver of exclusionary preferences. Still 
across the sample, respondents expressed strong opposition for ‘immigrant’ and ‘illegal 
immigrant’, indicating that Americans would support greater restrictions on immigrant 
participation in public programs even when they have gone through the proper channels 
to obtain a visa.  
Across all three vignettes, respondents with lower levels of income and education 
provided statistically similar preferences to respondents with more education and higher 
incomes. This result stands in stark contrast to earlier observational work (e.g. Clark et al, 
1994; Fachini and Mayada, 2009; Hanson, 2005) that suggest that hostile preferences 
towards immigrants are linked to concerns about higher taxes. Instead, the findings from 
Chapter III advance several theories a growing body of work, which suggests that 
spending and policy preferences related immigration are motivated by group-level 
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concerns about how immigrants impact society (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; 
Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; McLaren, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Mutz, 2018).    
The test to examine whether a concrete savings estimates can neutralize the 
negative effects associated with negative immigrant attitudes also addressed a substantive 
gap in the literature that has become much more prominent in the age of questioning 
fact-based information. Across the three vignettes there was a steady lack of impact on 
the immigrant primes. This finding hints at the presence of some reasonably entrenched 
norms in which Americans feel that it is appropriate to block access to government-
funded services to the foreign-born, even when this decision equates to a group-level 
economic loss.  However, it is worth noting that similar to the qualitative feedback from 
Chapter II, the fiscal benefit also rarely resonated with those allocated to the control 
group. This would suggested that the numerical and fact-based argument is not 
compelling, at least not in the manner presented here.  
Similar to the qualitative feedback presented in Chapter II and the evidence 
presented by Gadarian and Albertson (2013) and Hopkins (2014), I find that vast and 
significant differences in the responses of Republicans and Democrats on policy 
preferences on immigration. These partisan differences suggest that reforms to the 
immigration system within the United States will remain just as contentious. However, 
for those interested in learning ways to dampen the effects of the negative political 
rhetoric, the pattern and consistency of the negative reactions to the immigrant primes 
suggests that all Americans’ irrespective of party affiliation are potentially tolerant to 
further restrictions on the types of government funded services that non-citizens may 
access. These finding held as firmly for the ‘immigrant’ as they did for the ‘illegal 
immigrant’ groups. As the Trump administration has put forward additional hurdles to 
block legal immigrants from obtaining permanent residency or citizenship if they or 
household members received in certain services (National Immigration Law Center, 
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2018) this result seems particularly pertinent in determining what kind of opposition can 
be mobilized to halt such actions.  
The results from Chapter III expose another important finding that warrants 
further investigation. Much of the previous literature in this realm has focused on 
Americans’ opposition to low-skilled migrants. Within this study, the initiative the 
generated the lowest support among respondents, even Democrats, was the offer of in-
state tuition to either immigrant prime group. Much of the research that has sought to 
unpack the attributes that make a more desirable immigrant point to skill level as the 
most important factor used to weigh up their decision (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014), but this outcome 
provides clear evidence that Americans, across all segments of the electorate, are 
prepared to limit access to a means of obtaining the credentials necessary to secure a 
high-skilled job. From a policy perspective, the pattern of results seems striking, as only 
group has generated sympathy - young people who were brought to the U.S. as children, 
who are commonly referred to as DREAMERS – to garner enough bi-partisan support 
to try for a policy solution.    
Chapter IV builds off the findings from Chapters II and III. For this paper I 
explicitly test whether the language referring to immigrants sways Americans’ preferences 
for immigration policies and whether a partisan cue triggers a more polarized response. 
The experimental design consists of a 4 by 3 block, drawing upon the large and timely 
literature investigating parties’ use frames (arguments) and cues (symbols) to establish 
policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007; 
Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; 
Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). The 
vignettes pull from the actual welcoming and restrictive frames implanted in speeches by 
former Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, extending the important research 
conducted by those attempting to mimic the real-world political debates on immigration 
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(e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). The careful 
selection of the immigrant frames allows for a unique analysis of respondents reactions 
to partisan frames that counter each parties’ current positioning on the issue. This is 
critical for a robust examination of the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects 
within the highly polarized context.  
Within this chapter two of the major theories believed to trigger hostile 
preferences towards immigrants are investigated: the tone of the political frames and the 
role partisanship. By taking this approach, I am able to test how public opinion is 
affected by the competing frames the in current immigration debate. There is a wealth of 
evidence showing that political parties are a major predictor in shaping public opinion 
(e.g. Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987). However, to date no study has provided evidence demonstrating how Americans’ 
opinions on immigration are influenced by issue frames that are explicitly sponsored by 
political parties, and also provides a contrasting frame /policy issues from the same 
party.  
 
Similar to Chapter III, I find that all Americans are more supportive of immigrants 
when they receive a welcoming frame that emphasizes the positive contributions made 
by immigrants and are more punitive of reducing immigration when they receive a 
restrictive immigration frame where the focus is on negative consequences to costs and 
competition for resources. Still as with the findings in Chapters II and III, there are vast 
differences in the preferences expressed across all policy initiatives depending on the 
respondents’ partisan identity. Republicans were steadily more negative (Gadarian and 
Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) and Democrats were more positive. The stability across 
items is not surprising, given the remarkable polarization experienced within the United 
States in recent years (Abramowitz, 2010; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Jacobson, 2014; 
Mutz, 2018) and that the messaging frames are more extreme (Hopkin, 2013; McCaffrey, 
2000). The very large differences between partisan groups make the null result of the 
partisan cue less surprising, as it might not be possible to intensify the polarization when 
the gulf is so wide.  
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The cues that give credit to the president and their respective party also did not 
influence preferences - across the entire sample or within the partisan groups. Similarly, 
the bipartisan cues within the vignettes on prenatal care and denaturalization did not 
sway respondent’s preferences. These results counter the findings from a wide range of 
research demonstrating that important role played by party elites that suggests when high 
level and trusted political elites agree on policy position, it signals that the issue is worthy 
of political support (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Druckman et al, 
2010 Goren, 2005; Goren et al, 2009 Peterson, et al, 2010; Zaller, 1992). Public opinion 
surveys suggest that most Americans want elected officials to cooperate and govern well. 
However, the findings from this direct test of bipartisan support failed to generate 
greater support for either the positive or punitive policy options laid out.  
Perhaps this points to the paradox that is beginning to be explored in this prolonged 
period of polarization - that even through Americans say they want Congress to be more 
bipartisan, partisans are actually more supportive of elected officials when they engage in 
partisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011; Nicholson, 2012). The results 
presented in Chapter IV hint at a much larger issue that has important implications on 
how to make government work (Guttman and Thompson, 2012). If politicians are 
crafting their policy positions in response to public opinion, and the electorate appears to 
reject bipartisan consensus, then how can any policy decisions of substance emerge? 
Both parties can ‘own’ the issue of immigration, but under very different narratives. 
More specifically, Republicans own immigration control (e.g. Gadarian and Albertson, 
2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011) and Democrats own immigrants’ rights (Jeong, et 
al, 2011; Mayada, et al 2016).  
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS BODY OF RESEARCH 
The findings from the first two studies, which draw from a rich source of 
qualitative insights and robust data from a population-based survey experiment that 
generally, that Americans respond more negatively to the mention of immigrants. Across 
the board, support to restrict access to public services is higher, and at least qualitatively 
there is evidence to suggest that support for health care initiatives is lower. 
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Across all three studies I find that partisan identification is the largest driver of 
individuals’ views on any topic put in front of them, mirroring the findings of a large 
body of research (Abromovich, 2010; Bartels 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes, 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lauderdale, 2012).  
For both quantitative studies, and across all items, Republicans respond more negatively 
and Democrats respond more positively. Research on partisanship suggest that persistent 
exposure to party frames increase the salience of an issue (Taylor, et al, 1979), it can also 
make that issue more polarizing as positions become entrenched. Others demonstrate 
that as this process hardens in the political discourse, that partisans then strongly 
associate the issue with the party (see Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Cohen 2003; Iyengar 
and Valentino 2000; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). Because the parties are viewed by 
partisans to match their ideological identity (Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010) and 
the parties’ frames are becoming more extreme (Hopkins, 2013; McCaffey, 2000) it 
ultimately makes shifting views very difficult (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). This raises 
some troubling questions for individuals interested in governance (on all issues), 
immigration policy, and the safety and welfare of immigrant, or indeed minority 
populations more generally. If a large portion of the population is taking cues from a 
party that advocates sending military troops to secure the border (Stengling and Hudak, 
2018) or detaining children indefinitely (Hampton and Venters, 2018) – while a similarly 
sized contingent call for shutting down Immigration and Customs enforcement – it 
leaves little room for making good public policy, and poses serious threats to a 
population that lacks full political, social, and civil rights.  
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Notwithstanding this thesis’ contributions to the field of public opinion research, 
there are several limitations that should be addressed by future research and data 
collection. The vignette survey experimental design allows for direct tests of theoretical 
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concerns on a sufficiently large sample, permitting simultaneous hypotheses 
simultaneously. However, there are some important limitations of the study design and 
sample that should be addressed when discussing the results. In Chapter IV, the sample 
was drawn from a pool of workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. These respondents 
were on average, younger, more educated and more likely to identify as Democrats. 
Additionally, within the same study the sample size of 2,000 respondents was distributed 
across 12 treatment groups. The analysis was broken down further to examine the effects 
of partisanship across two parties. Effectively this introduced some challenges in testing 
alternative hypotheses (e.g. low versus high knowledge citizens, voters versus non-voters) 
because the sample sizes within each groups was too small. A future project will reduce 
the number of treatments from 12 groups to six. This will be achieved by collapsing the 
four treatment groups for the welcoming and restrictive frame into two and removing 
the test of attribution. Instead, all respondents will receive information revealing the 
party elite who delivered the message - Clinton or Reagan. With a reduced study design 
the effects on a sample size of 2,000 respondents may be more detectible, allowing for an 
analysis of any potential spill-over effects of the welcoming and restrictive frames into 
the second and third vignettes.  
For instance, we know from prior research that unengaged citizens typically have 
lower levels of political and policy knowledge; they also make fundamentally different 
and less stable political decisions than well-informed voters (Bartles, 1996; Delli et al, 
1996; Lauderdale, 2013; Zaller, 2004). A growing body of empirical evidence 
demonstrates that these unengaged citizens are not political centrists, but rather it is 
believed that they receive more new information from political frames on which they rely 
on more heavily than their partisan counterparts (Bechtel, 2015; Cam, 2005; Drukman et 
al, 2010; Zaller, 1992). When the ethnic minority cues are embedded into issue specific 
policy frames they have the potential to influence a large share of voters because these 
messages induce a ‘gut-level’ reaction that triggers anxiety and sense of urgency to 
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motivate low knowledge voters (Carmines and Stimpson, 1980; 1989). However, the 
findings from Hopkins (2013) and Gadarian and Albertson’s (2013) respective studies 
revealed that frames and cues related to immigrant populations failed to influence low 
knowledge voters. These findings raise important questions about the limits of anti-
immigrant messaging strategies, which remain untested in this work. 
Popkin (1994) offers a perspective that may aid in unpacking the nuances of this 
complex puzzle. While he also suggests that disengaged citizens use ‘gut-level reasoning’ 
relying on information acquired from a variety of sources in their daily lives (e.g. media, 
personal interactions), he notes that these irregular voters seek out mental shortcuts such 
as a party identifier to aid in their political decision making. Lupia (1994) demonstrates 
this empirically in his comparison of high and low knowledge Californian voters’ 
decisions regarding a complex insurance reform initiative. In the study, subjects were 
asked how they voted on the initiative, their knowledge on the issue, and whether they 
could identify the positions of interest groups involved in the debate. The political 
decisions of voters who only knew of interests groups positions (‘shortcut voters’) were 
indistinguishable from those made by voters with high policy knowledge (‘encyclopedic 
voters’). Although the less politically aware may spontaneously process political 
information along party lines, many scholars have shown these voters rely on signals that 
underscore the partisan terms of the debate rather than the substance of the issues 
(Zaller, 1992; Kam 2005). Lauderdale (2013) demonstrates this phenomenon using the 
nationally representative GfK sample of U.S. voters, showing that citizens with low-
knowledge make more consistent and partisan decisions across a range of six policies if 
they received a party cue to help them connect the issue to their ideological leanings. In 
future work, I would like to test whether citizens with lower levels of political knowledge 
and engagement would be less changeable in their immigration preferences and examine 
how they respond to the partisan cues.  
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Another major concern with the research presented is one of potential reverse 
causation – that is does partisanship drive views about immigration or do views about 
immigrants influence party support? Although a vast body of evidence suggests that 
party attachment is a major driver of where an individual may align themselves on a 
whole host of issues (e.g. Bartels 2002; Green and Palmquist 1990; Zaller, 2004) the party 
sponsor and elite cues that countered the current position that were presented in Chapter 
IV failed to shift views across the entire sample and within partisan groups. Although the 
population based survey experiment offers a robust set of data fit for examining this 
issue in the current context of this highly polarized debate, this question of reverse 
causality can only be resolved with an ongoing with data that repeats the measures over 
time. Such an approach could not be carried out on the same respondents because it 
would introduce bias with priming, but there may be alternative approaches that should 
be considered. In the future, I will seek out data from similarly framed population based 
survey experiments, carried out in the past, when immigration was not such a polarizing 
issue. The TESS archive offers some hope in pursuing this, as the data from prior studies 
(including two data sets from this research) provide access to these data at no charge. 
Also, although the studies present respondents with rigorously tested vignettes or 
political speeches provided by party elites, the mode in which these frames were 
presented – via text on a computer screen - do not reflect the way most individuals take 
in political information - via video or audio clips (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). We know 
from research on communication studies that political information, particularly those 
containing factual content is more compelling when packaged in a way that is more 
familiar, appealing and engaging (Buckingham and Scanlon, 2005). Future work in this 
area will draw upon primary sources of media content to determine if there is a stronger 
impact.   
Finally, one novel feature of this research is that Americans of all political stripes 
are exposed to an identical message, and careful work went into balancing the exposure 
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of each of the experiments’ manipulations. This allows for an even comparison of how 
Americans respond to these highly political messages, and is vital to understanding the 
policy debates of the day. However, the technological revolution that has taken place 
over the past two decades has completely transformed the transmission of information 
with remarkable consequences for the news media in general. Today’s more diversified 
and fragmented media landscape looks vastly different to the national network 
marketplace of twenty years ago and local media outlets are closing or merging across the 
country (Iyengar and Kinder, 2016). In the year 2000, most Americans got their political 
information via one of the three major television networks – ABC, CBS, or NBC. They 
received roughly the same news stories, in a similar format, and the presenters of the 
programming adhered to the same journalistic norms – fact-based and balanced 
reporting. As digital converter boxes replaced the traditional analog set-up, an 
exceptional leap in the number of channels an American household could access. By the 
end of 2010 the average American gained access to 130 channels versus 19 just twenty-
five years before. Fox News signed on in 1996 and quickly gained a healthy share of the 
market by emphasizing a conservative perspective in their coverage. Other networks like 
CNN and MSNBC followed the traditional journalistic norms, but altered their formats 
in the hopes of picking up a similar share of liberal viewers Iyengar and Kinder, 2016). 
Although political elites had already adopted a more polarized tone, some scholars argue 
that these shifts in markets accelerated this pattern across the electorate. The growth of 
cable news outlets like CNBC, Fox News the proliferation of formal online sources like 
Huffington Post, Politico, and Buzzfeed; and the dominance of social media sources like 
Facebook and Twitter have all made it very difficult and very unlikely for Americans to 
receive the same information (Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga, 2017). This 
research does not address the extent to which Americans are exposing themselves to 
partisan news media. Measures to separate mainstream and partisan news were not 
included. If we believe that the source of the news is a major contributor to political 
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preferences, and there is a large body of research to support this (e.g. Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998), then it is 
necessary to include stimuli that enables a disentangling of the effects of partisan and 
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methodologically controversial approaches. N.B. not all of these questions will be 
relevant to every study. These questions provide pointers to direct researchers’ thinking 
about the ethical dimensions of their research. It is expected that researchers will already 
have addressed the academic justification for the project in their proposal; the guidance 
questions set out below aim to help researchers address specific ethical issues in so far as 
they relate to participants or data.  
 
In particular, consideration of risks to the research participants versus benefits need to 
be weighed up by researchers. It is important to think through carefully the likely impact 
on participants or vulnerable groups of any data collection methods. Certain groups are 
particularly vulnerable, or will be placed in a vulnerable position in relation to research, 
and may succumb to pressure; for example children or people with learning disability, or 
students when they are participating in research as students. Some participants will have 
diminished capacity to give consent and are therefore less able to protect themselves and 
require specific consideration (see further guidance given on the RPDD web pages 
regarding informed consent). The Research Ethics Committee (REC) recognizes that it is 
not only research with human participants that raises relevant ethical concerns. 
Researchers may be assessing sensitive information, the publication or analysis of which 
may have direct impact on agencies, communities or individuals. For example, collection 
and use of archive, historical, legal, online or visual materials may raise ethical issues (e.g 
for families and friends of people deceased), and research on provision of social or 
human services may impact user provision. Similarly, use of other people’s primary data 
may need clearance or raise concerns about its interpretation. The Research Ethics 
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when it scrutinises proposals. Please ensure that each answer provides the Committee 
with enough information to make an informed decision on the ethical dimensions of the 
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The LSE Research Ethics Policy and guidance will be reviewed annually and may be 
subject to further development.  
 
The completed questionnaire should only be returned to Michael Nelson in the 
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III. Research Aims 
 
Please provide brief details of the research aims and the scientific background of the 
research. A full copy of the proposal should be attached to this document. 
 
The aim of this research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public 
opinion about the foreign-born shapes public spending preferences and support for 
policies directed at immigrant populations. To disentangle these preferences I will collect 
an original dataset, which asks participants questions about recent state policy initiatives. 
I will also employ survey experiments, often regarded as one of the most credible 
research designs because of the use of random assignment and a treatment and control, 
to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant groups influence spending 
preferences for programmes that reduce poverty and inequality. Additionally, I will 
include a direct test to determine the extent to which individuals are willing to exclude 
particular immigrants from specific services, and whether or not they will reject public 
savings to prohibit access. State level indicators will also be applied to assess whether 
certain demographic (e.g. the level and change of foreign born or ethnic minorities), 
economic (e.g. unemployment, benefit take-up, and tax rates), and political (e.g. the 
ideological composition of legislative bodies) characteristics are fuelling anti-immigrant 
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RESEARCH ETHICS CHECKLIST. 
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4.1 Are there any real or perceived conflicts of interest which could compromise the 









4.3 Are there any restrictions on the freedom of the investigator(s) to publish the results 




4.4 Are any incentives being offered to participants?  
 
I plan to collect data from two web-based samples, the crowdsourcing platform 
Mechanical Turk and the market research firm GfK.  For Mechanical Turk 
sample, participants will receive a small payment for the completion of each 
survey (e.g. $3.00 for the initial 20 minute survey and $2.00 for the second, which 
could be completed in less than 10 minutes). Participants who complete the 
survey will be recompensed at just over the minimum wage ($9.19 per hour) for 
the state of Washington, which has the highest hourly rate in the country.  The 
rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about exploitation, but the incentive is 
not greater than the payment offered through the LSE Behavioural Research Lab 
(£10 for studies that last up to an hour). 
 
Participants from the GfK sample, even those without computers, are provided 
with free internet access and hardware (through the service WebTV) for as long 
as they remain in the panel. The participants also receive some small 
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participants, personal, medical or otherwise sensitive data or methodologically 
controversial approaches. It is used to identify whether a full application for ethics 
approval needs to be submitted. The research ethics review process is not designed to 
assess the merits of the research in question, but is merely a device to ensure that 
external risks have been fully considered and that an acceptable research methodology 
has been applied. This checklist applies to research undertaken by both staff and students, 
but it should be noted that the way the checklist is processed differs between these two 
groups. 
 
For staff: if a full application is required please ensure that you complete the Ethics 
Review Questionnaire for Researchers and send the completed form to Michael Nelson 
in the Research Division (RD).  
 
Please accompany the questionnaire with a copy of this checklist and a copy of the 
research proposal. 
 
For MSc/PhD students: if a full application is required please ensure that you complete 
the Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers and discuss the issues raised with your 
student supervisor in the first instance. You should ensure that the completed forms are 
accompanied with a copy of the research proposal to ensure that your supervisor can 
make a fully informed decision on the ethical implications of the research. Where the 
supervisor is satisfied that all ethical concerns have been addressed s/he must sign the 
checklist and ensure that a copy is retained within the department as a record of the 
decision reached. It is appreciated that in certain cases the student supervisor may not be 
able to reach a decision on the ethical concerns raised. In such instances the matter 
should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee (please send all relevant forms and 
a copy of the proposal to Michael Nelson in RD). Only where an informed decision cannot be 
reached by the supervisor should paperwork be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee. 
 
For undergraduate students: After completing the checklist, undergraduate students 
should discuss any issues raised with their supervisor in the first instance. If fully satisfied 
with the research proposal, the supervisor can sign the checklist on behalf of the 
department. A copy of the signed form should be retained by the department as a record 
of the decision reached. It is appreciated that in certain instances the student supervisor 
may not be able to reach a decision on the ethical concerns raised. In such instances the 
application for ethics approval should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee 
(please send all relevant forms and a copy of the proposal to Michael Nelson in RD). 
Only where an informed decision cannot be reached by the supervisor should paperwork be submitted to 
the Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Before completing this form, please refer to the LSE Research Ethics Policy. The 
principal investigator or, where the principal investigator is a student, the supervisor, is 
responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review. For 
students, your supervisor should be able to provide you with guidance on the ethical 
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implications of the research project. If members of staff have any queries regarding the 
completion of the checklist they should address these to Michael Nelson (RD) in the first 
instance.  
 
This checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take 
part in any research. 
 
Section I: Applicant Details 
 












50 Crispin St – Lilian Knowles House 
Flat D6B1 






Section II: Project Details 
 
Title of the proposal and brief abstract:  
The Politics of Population Change: How Do Attitudes towards Immigrants 
Influence Public Spending Preferences & Support for Restrictionist Policies? 
 
The aim of this research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public 
opinion about the foreign-born shapes public spending preferences and support for 
policies directed at immigrant populations. To disentangle these preferences I will 
collect an original dataset, which asks participants questions about recent state policy 
initiatives. I will also employ survey experiments, often regarded as one of the most 
credible research designs because of the use of random assignment and a treatment and 
control, to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant groups influence 
spending preferences for programmes that reduce poverty and inequality. Additionally, 
I will include a direct test to determine the extent to which individuals are willing to 
exclude particular immigrants from specific services, and whether or not they will reject 
public savings to prohibit access. State level indicators will also be applied to assess 
whether certain demographic (e.g. the level and change of foreign born or ethnic 
minorities), economic (e.g. unemployment, benefit take-up, and tax rates), and political 
(e.g. the ideological composition of legislative bodies) characteristics are fuelling anti-
immigrant proposals at the state level and affect public spending preferences. 
 
 
Section III:  Student Details: 
 
Details of study: Three papers examining how attitudes towards immigrants 
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 shape policy preferences directed at immigrant population. 
Involves primary data collection using online surveys. 
Supervisors’ names: 
 













 Yes No Not 
certain 
Does the study involve participants who are in any way vulnerable 
or may have any difficulty giving consent? If you have answered yes or 
are not certain about this please complete Section 1 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
 
As general guidance, the Research Ethics Committee feels that research 
participants under the age of 18 may be vulnerable. 
 
 X  
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study 
without their knowledge and consent at the time? (e.g. covert 
observation of people in public places) If you have answered yes or are 
not certain about this please complete Section 1 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 




   
Does the research methodology use deception? If you have answered 
yes or are not certain about this please complete Section 2 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
 
 X  
Are there any significant concerns regarding the design of the 
research project?  
 
a) If the proposed research relates to the provision of social or 
human services is it feasible and/or appropriate that service users 
or service user representatives should be in some way involved in 
or consulted upon the development of the project? 
 
b) Does the project involve the handling of any sensitive 
information? 
 
 X  
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If you have answered yes or not certain to these questions please complete Section 





   
 
Will the independence of the research be affected by the source of 
the funding? If you have answered yes or not certain about this please 
complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
  X 
 
Are there payments to researchers/participants that may have an 
impact on the objectivity of the research? If you have answered yes or 
not certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
  X 
Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to participants? If you have 
answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
 




   
Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the 
study? If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete 




 X  
Could the study induce unacceptable psychological stress or anxiety 
or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks 
encountered in normal life? Will the study involve prolonged or 
repetitive testing? If you have answered yes or not certain about this please 
complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
 X  
Are drugs, placebos or other substances to be administered to the 
study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or 
potentially harmful procedures of any kind? If you have answered yes or 
not certain about this please complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
 X  
 
Risk to Researchers 
 
   
Do you have any doubts or concerns regarding your (or your 
colleagues) physical or psychological wellbeing during the research 
period? If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete 
 X  
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Do you or your supervisor have any concerns regarding 
confidentiality, privacy or data protection? If you have answered yes or 
not certain about this please complete Section 7 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 




   
 
Are there any particular groups who are likely to be harmed by 
dissemination of the results of this project? If you have answered yes or 
not certain about this please complete Section 8 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
 X  
 
If you have answered no to all the questions, staff members should file the completed 
form for their records. Students should retain a copy of the form and submit it with their 
research report or dissertation. 
 
If you have answered yes or not certain to any of the questions you will need to 
describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your research. 
You will need to answer the relevant questions in the Ethics Review Questionnaire for 
Researchers form addressing the ethical issues raised by your proposal. Staff should 
ensure that the completed questionnaire is sent to Michael Nelson in RD. Students 
should submit their completed questionnaire to their supervisor in the first instance. It 
will be at the discretion of the supervisor whether they feel that the research should be 
considered by the Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the School’s Research Ethics Policy 
and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This 
includes providing details of your proposal and completed questionnaire, and ensuring 
confidentiality in the storage and use of data. 
 
Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the research 
should be notified to Michael Nelson in RD. 
 
I have read and understood the LSE Research Ethics Policy and the questions contained 
in the Research Checklist above. 
 
Academic Research Staff 
 







Student Name (Please print): Melissa Shannon 
Department: Social Policy 
Date: 30/6/13 
Date of Research Ethics Seminar attended:29/11/12 
 











* By signing this document the student supervisor attests to the fact that any ethical 
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